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Abstract 
 
This thesis defends the ‘true-futurist’ view, according to which statements about 
the future are either true or false, even if the future is open and unsettled in some 
robust, objective and mind-independent sense. 
A general argument for the validity of the principle of bivalence in the open 
future is advanced. The key feature of such argument is the ‘principle of 
retrospective determinacy’, stating that, for any proposition p, if it is now the 
case that p, then it was true that p would be the case. Different possible 
objections are discussed and dismissed. Second, two true-futurist theories are 
presented and shown to meet all the relevant desiderata of a true-futurist theory. 
In particular, much attention is devoted to the ‘problem of counterfactual 
evaluation’, concerning the truth-value of future-contingent statements in merely 
counterfactual scenarios. In addition, it is argued that that the choice between the 
two true-futurist theories depends upon which metaphysical picture of time is 
assumed as true.  
Some notable theoretical commitments of True-Futurism are examined. In 
particular, it is argued  that True-Futurism is incompatible with two different 
ideas. The first one being that future-contingent statements (although bivalent) 
have an indefinite truth-value. The second one being that there are true 
‘counterfactuals of openness’,  stating that a certain future-contingent statement 
would have had a specific truth-value, had different circumstances obtained. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1 Open Future and Bivalence 
I. Suppose that the future is objectively ‘open’, and imagine that today, while it 
is unsettled whether it will be sunny tomorrow, I say 
(1) It will be sunny tomorrow 
How is my statement to be evaluated? Along the history of philosophy (from 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione to the contemporary debate on truth-relativism 
in; from medieval and modern philosophy to the birth of three-valued and 
supervaluationist logics) two main answers have been proposed to this 
question: 
True-Futurism: future-contingent statements are truth-valued (either true 
or false 
Gappism: future-contingent statements are gappy (neither true nor false) 
In this essay, I aim to defend the true-futurist thesis and argue that future-
directed statements are either true or false, even if the future is open. 
 
II. My inquiry about the truth-status of future-contingent statements (that is, 
their being either truth-valued or gappy) will, however, depart from the pattern 
that traditionally has animated the discussion on the open future and the 
principle of bivalence. As a matter of fact, one of the main questions featuring 
in  the debate on future-contingents both in recent and ancient times has 
concerned the compatibility of bivalence and openness. How can, in fact, a 
statement p be now unsettled, even if it has—now!—a definite t
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is already true today that a sea-battle will occur tomorrow, then it seems that 
tomorrow’s occurrence of a sea-battle is something that inevitably will occur. 
In this essay, I will not address the question about the compatibility between 
open future and bivalence and simply assume that the future is open in the 
relevant sense. I shall, therefore, consider the results of my investigations as a 
reason to claim that if the principle of bivalence should turn out to be 
incompatible with the openness of the future, then we should conclude that the 
future is not open, but settled. 
 
III. Although my defence of true-futurism will touch upon many different 
issues, its main core will consists in two steps: 
 
I. First, I shall advance a general argument for the validity of the principle 
of bivalence in the open future; 
 
II. second, I shall present two logico-semantic frameworks capable of 
accommodating what I will argue to be the main set of desiderata  of 
any true-futurist theory. 
 
The first step will have has its pivotal point what I shall call ‘the principle of 
retrospective determinacy’, according to which, if today it is the case that p, 
then it was true yesterday that p would be the case today. The second step will 
be mainly concerned with what I shall dub the ‘problem of counterfactual 
evaluation’ that is the problem of evaluating future-contingent statements in 
merely counterfactual situations. 
 
IV. My inquiry will be as metaphysically neutral as possible.1 I will not, in 
other words, assume any specific metaphysics of time to be the correct one. As 
I will show, however, the choice between the two true-futurist theories I will 
put forward depends on which metaphysical picture of time is assumed as true. 
 
                                                 
1
 See, however, section 2.6.2 below. 
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V. In this introductory chapter, I will expose the framework within which I 
shall conduct my discussion. In particular, I will explain what I shall take to be 
the correct conception of open future, and what claims I shall assume, for the 
sake of the argument, to be either true, or at least plausible. In the last section, I 
will provide a brief chapter-by-chapter overview of the essay. 
2. Stage-setting 
2.1 Mind-Independence 
 
By saying that the future is open I mean that it is open in an objective, non-
epistemic and mind-independent sense. One might in fact say that, even if the 
future were—in a sense to be specified—objectively settled, we could not, at 
least to a certain extent, know it. In this case, it seems that it would be correct 
to say that the future is—at least in some sense—‘open’.  
This idea relies on the thesis that  the future is intrinsically unknowable by 
us now and so—to borrow an expression coined by Roy Sorensen in his 
investigations over vagueness and pathological statements—it is an ‘epistemic 
island’ with respect to the present. However, in this essay I am concerned only 
with the stronger idea that the openness of the future does not  depend on our 
ability of foreknowing it, but on some feature of reality itself. The question of 
what this feature exactly is, is for me irrelevant in this context: perhaps the 
future is objectively open because it does not  exist; or because there exist 
many possible futures all ontologically on a par; or, again, only because the 
conjunction of the laws of nature and the present state of the world is 
insufficient to necessitate a unique future. What is important for my inquiry 
about the truth-status of future-contingent statements is only that the way in 
which the future is open does not depend in any way whatsoever on the 
existence of individuals having cognitive abilities. In other words, by assuming 
that the future is open, I am assuming that the future would have been as 
unsettled as it actually is, even if no individual capable of knowing had ever 
existed. 
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2.2 Asymmetry 
 
We seem to intuitively feel that the future is open in a way in which the past is 
not. The past is ‘over and done with’ and so ‘there is no use crying over spilled 
milk’, or so they say. This feeling seems to be rooted in the belief that while 
present and future actions can have causal effect on the future, they cannot 
stand in the same kind of relation with the past. While, in other words,  we 
seem to be free to decide what to do next, and so to deliberate whether to try 
and cause the future to be in a certain way, we strongly feel to lack the same 
kind of ability with respect to the past, so that the past appears to be ‘close’ and 
isolated from the present in a way the future is not.  
Whether or not this family of intuitions is on the right track is an 
interesting and philosophically important question. However, what I am 
interested in is a mind-and-agent-independent notion of openness that does not 
depend on our having free will or on our being able to cause the past to be in a 
certain way.  
Once the kind of relevant unsettledness of the future is intended in an 
objective and mind-independent way, the intuitions about an alleged 
asymmetry between the past and the future become less and less strong and the 
question about whether such an asymmetry really obtains appears to crucially 
depend on what is the mind-independent feature of reality that makes the future 
objectively unsettled. If, for instance, the openness of the future is thought of as 
depending on the fact that the future does not  exist, then the question about 
whether the past is as open as the future boils down to the question about 
whether the past exists or not. If, instead, the future is thought to be open 
because it is not necessitated by the conjunction of the present state of the 
world and the laws of nature, then the past is open if it is also not so 
necessitated, etc. In this essay, however, I will leave this question on the side 
and assume—for simplicity’s sake—that the future is objectively  open in a 
way that the past is not. 
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2.3 Unsettledness  
 
The open future thesis—that is, the thesis that the future is open in some 
robust, objective way—is true if, and only if, for some future-directed 
proposition p, the following is true  
(2) It is now-unsettled that p and it is now-unsettled that ~p 
What is it for a proposition p to be now-unsettled? In this essay I will define 
settledness by means of metaphysical necessity. Take ‘Fut’ to be a variable 
ranging over proposition completely representing a possible way the future 
might turn out to be and ‘the-Present’ to be a proposition completely 
representing the present state of the world. I will assume in this essay that to 
say that the future is open is to say that  
(3) ~∃Fut □ (the-Present → Fut) 
that is, that there is no complete description of the future such that it is 
metaphysically necessitated by the present state of the world. In turn, by ‘the 
present state of the world’ I mean the pattern of instantiation of fundamental n-
ary relations that obtains among fundamental entities. Therefore, using ‘Act’ 
for the operator ‘it is actually the case that’, ‘Now’ for the operator ‘it is now 
the case that’ and ‘<x1,x2,...,xn>’ and ‘Rn’  as variables ranging, respectively, 
over n-tuples of fundamental entities and n-ary fundamental relations, the open 
future thesis boils down do 
(4) ~∃Fut□(∀<x1,x2,...,xn>∀Rn(ActNowRn(x1,x2,...,xn) 
↔Rn(x1,x2,...,xn)]→ Fut] 
Letting then ‘N’ to stand for the operator ‘it is now settled that’, we can define 
the relevant notion of settledness in play in this essay as follows: 
(5) Np =df □(the-Present → p) 
from which follows immediately the thesis of the necessity of the present: 
(6) Nthe-Present 
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which, in light of the notion of ‘state of the present’ can be unpacked as 
follows: 
(7) ∀<x1,x2,...,xn>∀Rn (ActNowRn(x1,x2,...,xn) → NRn(x1,x2,...,xn)] 
that is: for any n-tuple of fundamental entities <x1,x2,...,xn> and n-ary 
fundamental relation Rn, if it is now-actually the case that Rn(x1,x2,...,xn), then it 
is now settled that Rn(x1,x2,...,xn). 
The definition given in (2) entails that there are at least two different (and, 
hence, incompatible) ways the future might turn out to be that are compossible 
with the present 
(8) ∃Fut1∃Fut2[◊(the-Present & Fut1) & ◊(the-Present & Fut2) & 
□(Fut1 ↔~Fut2)] 
(7) reflects the intuitive thought that the future’s being open consists in there 
being many possible futures ‘ahead of us’, that is many possible ways things 
might unfold in the future, once the present moment will have elapsed. 
Calling—as it is customary—the kind of modality associated with the N-
operator ‘historical necessity’, (7) appears thus to legitimate the idea that to say 
that the future is open is thus to say that the modal space of historical 
possibility has a ‘tree-like’ shape and consists in a set of possible histories 
branching towards the future, as represented in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
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The nodes in the tree of branching historical possibilities are called ‘moments’ 
and intuitively represents possible (present) states of the world. They are 
ordered by a quasi-earlier/later relation that is irreflexive, asymmetric, 
transitive and left-linear. ‘Histories’, on the other hand, are linear chains of 
moments, intuitively representing possible ways things might unfold as time 
passes. 
In this essay, the branching-tree picture will have a role of central 
importance. I will, in fact, assume—as it appears consistent with, and indeed 
entailed, by my other assumptions—that the future is open if, and only if, the 
modal space of historical possibility is a branching-tree of possible histories. 
However, until chapter 8 (in which I shall have something to say about the 
relation between different metaphysical models of time and the theories I will 
present in this essay), I shall not make any specific assumption about the nature 
of histories, leaving thus open the question about whether histories have to be 
thought of as ersatz abstract constructions (perhaps out of propositions) or à là 
Lewis as concrete worlds. 
 
2.4  Open future and determinism 
 
The determinist thesis is the thesis that the state of the world at any time t is 
necessitated by the conjunction of the laws of nature ‘L’ and the state of the 
world at any other time tʹ: 
(9) □[(L & S(tʹ))→S(t)] 
It might be natural to think that, to say that the future is objectively open, 
entails that the determinist thesis is false. However, there appears to be at least 
a certain interpretation of the determinist thesis which seems to be actually 
compatible with the future’s being open. In this section I am to argue that, 
although potentially attractive, this thesis is false. 
In order to explain how determinism and (historical) unsettledness can be 
compatible, I will focus—for simplicity’s sake—on the thesis, which is 
entailed by the determinist thesis, according to which the laws (L) and the 
present state of the world (P) necessitate the future (F) 
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(10) □[(L & P)→F] 
Suppose thus that F is the actual future and that F is not settled, being the 
future open 
(11) F & ~NF 
From the definition of settledness it follows that necessity entails settledness, 
so that from (9) it follows that 
(12) N[(L & P)→F] 
From (11), (12) and the principle stating that settledness is closed under 
entailment 
(13) From N(p→q) and Np, infer Nq 
it follows that also the conjunction between the present state of the world and 
the laws of nature is unsettled 
(14) ~N(L & P) 
Given, however that the present is settled 
(15) NP 
it follows that, if the future is open and determinism is true, then the laws of 
nature must be unsettled  
(16) ~NL 
But how can laws of nature be unsettled? As Barnes and Cameron (2009) point 
out, laws can be unsettled for those who uphold what John Perry (ms.) calls a 
‘weak’ conception of laws, according to which laws are basically true 
generalizations. If that is the case, then the laws of nature L that obtain with 
respect to the actual history can differ from the laws of nature obtaining with 
respect to all other (merely) possible histories. Therefore, given that different 
futures are presently possible, and that the laws of nature depend on the way 
things will actually unfold, it follows that there are presently possible histories 
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having different laws of nature and, hence, that the laws of nature are presently 
unsettled. 
However, it is easy to show that, if the future is open, than for the very 
definition of determinism and the fact that the laws of nature are contingent, it 
follows that no pair of histories whatsoever can share the same laws of nature. 
Suppose in fact that there are two possible histories h1 and h2 sharing the same 
laws of nature L1. In a branching model every pair of histories shares at least 
one moment. Therefore, there is a moment m1 such that m1 belongs both to h1 
and to h2. Call S(t1) the state of the world at m1. S(t1) obtains (at m) with 
respect to both h1 and h2. Given the truth of determinism, however, it follows 
that any other state of the world S(t*) obtaining along either h1 or h2 is 
necessitated by the conjunction of L1 and S(t1) 
(17) □[(L1 & S(t1)→S(t*)] 
Hence, at every time, the very same state of the world must obtain both at h1 
and h2, and, therefore, h1 and h2 are not different histories, contrary to what 
we have assumed. 
The fact that, in a branching framework, if the determinist thesis is true, 
then each history has its own laws of nature entails that in a scenario in which 
the future is open and determinism is true, super-determinism is also true, that 
is the  thesis that the actual laws of nature L alone necessitate the actual state of 
the world at (any) time t: 
(SD) □[L→S(t)] 
Suppose in fact that L are the actual laws of nature and S(t) is the state of the 
world that actually obtains at a certain time t. Since, as we have just seen, in 
the framework we are actually considering, each history h as its own laws Lh, 
which are different from the laws Lhʹ obtaining at any other history hʹ, it 
follows that for any possible history it is true that if the laws L obtain, then S(t) 
is true. 
However, the very idea that specifying the laws of nature is sufficient in 
order to determine—down to the least remarkable sub-atomic fact—the whole 
course of history appears to be an highly-implausible thesis that, at least to my 
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knowledge, no determinist has ever upheld. I think, therefore, that the moral 
that we should draw from the fact that, within a branching setting, weak 
determinism (the form of determinism embracing a weak conception of the 
laws of nature) entails super-determinism is that—at least in an open future 
setting—a stronger version of determinism is needed to really capture what we 
ordinarily mean by ‘determinism’. Such stronger conception—strong 
determinism—should add to the weak determinist thesis the requirement that 
the laws of nature be settled.  
To say that the laws of nature must be settled, appears to entail the 
correctness of the following definition: 
(18) The laws of nature L, the present state of the world P  and the 
future F are such that: NL & □[(L & P)→F] 
or more in general: 
(19) The laws of nature L and the true description S(t) of the state of the 
world at t are such that: (i) NL and (ii) for every time tʹ, the true 
description S(tʹ)  of the state of the world at t is such that □[(L & 
S(t))→S(tʹ)] 
Strong determinism is clearly incompatible with the open future, as one 
would have expected determinism to be. According to such a conception of 
determinism, at any moment the laws of nature plus the present state of the 
world suffice to determine any state of the world at any other moment along 
the actual history, making thus impossible for there to be multiple possible 
futures. For this reason, although I will not discuss determinism in this essay, 
in the following chapters I will implicitly consider it as incompatible with the 
idea that the future is open and, hence, assume strong determinism as the 
correct definition of determinism. 
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2.5 Ungroundedness 
 
According to the grounding principle  
(G) Truth must be grounded in reality 
If, in other words, a certain proposition p is true, then reality must, somehow, 
witness—as it were—the fact that p is true: truth cannot simply float on the 
void. There are two main ways to understand the notion of grounding. 
According to the truthmaker principle 
(TM) If p is true, then there is some entity x such than x makes p true 
according to the supervenience principle 
(SUP)  If p is true, then if p were false, there would a difference with either 
the actual population of entities or the actual pattern of instantiation 
of properties and relations 
Therefore, we could say that 
(Gdf) A true proposition p is grounded if, and only if, p is either truth-
made or supervenient (on the actual population of entities and the 
actual pattern of instantiation of properties and relations) 
The grounding principle itself can be understood in different ways. If, for 
instance, we remain neutral on the kind of metaphysical framework underlying 
our theory, (G) seems to express a notion of absolute grounding, since no 
restriction whatsoever is explicitly put on the way in which p has to be 
grounded. Among the ways in which the grounding principle can be explicitly 
qualified, the following—which we might call the principle of present 
grounding—has specific relevance in this context: 
(PG) Truth must be presently grounded 
where for a true proposition p to be presently grounded, it must be either true 
that there is an entity x such that x presently exists and presently makes p true, 
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or that if p were false, then there would a difference with respect to either the 
present population of entities or the present pattern of instantiation of 
properties and relations. 
As we have seen above, I am here assuming the principle of the necessity 
of the present (henceforth, ‘NP’). However, NP appears to entail that the 
principle of present grounding is false for true future-contingent statement. As 
a matter of fact, NP entails that the present population of entities and the 
present instantiation of fundamental properties and relations (that is: the 
present state of the world) is now settled. This, in turn, entails that according to 
every possible future the same present state of the world obtains. Suppose, 
then, that the future-contingent statement ‘Fp’ (standing for ‘it will be the case 
that p’) is now true, and call ‘s’ the present state of the world. Since Fp is now-
unsettled, there is some now-possible history h with respect to which Fp is 
false. However, since the present state of the world is settled, s obtains also 
with respect to h. On the other hand, it seems hardly questionable that the 
counterfactual histories passing through the present moment are among the 
closest histories to the actual one. Therefore, assuming the standard lewisian 
semantics for counterfactual, which in our framework should, at a first 
approximation, go along the lines of 
(20) ‘If it was the case that p, then it would be the case that q’ if, and 
only if, in all the closest p-history, q is the case 
it follows that the principle of present supervenience, according to which, for 
every proposition p, if p is now true, then  
(21) If p were now false, then the present state of the world would be 
different 
is false. 
Furthermore, consider the principle of present truthmaking 
(22) If p is true, then there presently exists an entity x such that it is now 
the case that x makes p true 
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To precisely cash out what the notion of truthmaking amounts to, is notoriously 
a difficult task. However, the following principle, linking the notion of 
truthmaking to the notion of settledness, appears to be intuitively valid: 
(LP)  If it is now the case that [x makes p true], then it is now settled that 
[if x exists, then x makes p true] 
However, it is easy to observe that if (LP) is indeed valid, then the necessity of 
the present entails that if there are true future-contingent statements, then the 
principle of present truthmaking is false. As a matter of fact, if it is true that x 
now exists and makes p true, then it follows from the principle of the necessity 
of the present that it is now settled that x exists. However, from LP it follows 
that it is now settled that if x exists, then x makes p true. Therefore, it is now 
settled that x exists and makes p true and, hence, that p is true, so that p cannot 
be a future-contingent statement. 
Notice that, in order to deny LP in order to maintain that present 
truthmaking and true future-contingent statement are compatible is tantamount 
to claiming that, given a certain true future-contingent statement Fp, there is 
some x such that:  
 
• x presently exists;  
 
• x makes p true;  
 
• in the now-possible histories in which Fp is false, x exists but does 
not  make p true.  
 
I found this position implausible for at least three reasons. First, I find it hard to 
imagine what kind of entity could possess this kind of historically-contingent 
truthmaking power. Second, to say that x makes p true but it is now possible 
that x exists, and x does not  make p true (and p is false) seems to run against 
the principle of the necessity of the present, since the obtaining of the (present) 
truthmaking relation between x and p appears in fact to be part and parcel of 
the present state of the world. Finally, and most importantly, the very notion of 
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an historically contingent truthmaking power appears dubious: intuitively, if a 
fact or a proposition is historically contingent, it is something that it is not 
settled by the present state of the world, but that will somehow be settled by the 
way things will unfold. However, what only could settle whether x makes Fp 
true is, I submit, the fact that p will indeed be the case. But, if that were the 
case, we would have a case of vicious circularity, since although Fp would be 
indeed made true by x, the fact that x makes Fp true would ultimately depend 
on the fact that p will be the case. In other words, we would have a situation in 
which the truth of Fp depends on x, and the fact that it so depends, depends in 
turn on the fact that p will obtain, that is on the fact...that Fp! However, the 
truthmaking relation should have at least some explanatory power, that is it 
should—somehow—explain why the proposition in question is true in non-
vacuous terms. Rendering the truthmaking power of a proposition p’s 
truthmaker dependant on the fact that p is the case, would then make x play no 
role in explaining why p is true.  
The principle of the necessity of the present appears, thus, to entail the 
falsity of the principle of present grounding. This result, however, shouldn’t 
come as a surprise. As I said above, in fact, to say that the future is objectively 
open appears to be tantamount to saying that the way the future will be is not 
pre-determined by the present state of the world. However, to say that truth of 
a certain future-contingent proposition p is presently grounded is just to say 
that the present state of the world somehow determines the truth of p and, 
hence, the way things will go in the future. Hence, since the way in which the 
truth of a future-contingent proposition Fp would be determined by the  present 
state of the world (were the principle of present grounding be valid) appears to 
be in tension with the lack of pre-determination that future-contingent 
statements should, as such, enjoy, it should be apparent that the presence of 
future-contingent statement actually commits open-futurists to the rejection of 
the principle of present grounding. In this essay, I will therefore assume the 
following principle:  
(NPG) If future-contingent statements are truth-valued, their being truth-
valued is not grounded on the present state of the world and, 
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therefore, if they are grounded at all, their ground must lie in some 
other region of reality (if any).  
 
 
2.6 Present ungroundedness 
 
2.6.1 No-futurism, presentism and the lack of present grounds 
 
This essay is not concerned with a specific metaphysics of time, but aims 
instead to provide a general discussion and defence of the principle of 
bivalence in the open future, prior to any specific commitment to any 
particular metaphysical stance on temporality. However, the principle of the 
necessity of the present and the invalidity of the principle of present grounding 
might be seen as problematic with respect to some metaphysical positions. In 
this section I will discuss these alleged problems and argue that, among the 
main metaphysical models of time, only one proves to be immediately in 
contradiction with those assumptions. 
Let us begin by considering the failure of the principle of present 
grounding. It must be stressed, for a start, that such a failure does not  entail 
that open-futurists are committed to the thesis that future-contingent 
proposition are absolutely  ungrounded. What the invalidity of the principle of 
present grounding entails is that, if future-contingent statements are grounded, 
they are not grounded in the present state of the world. Consider, then, an 
eternalist setting according to which past, present and future all atemporally 
exist, there is no objective form of ‘temporal becoming’ and the openness of 
the future just boils down to the fact that, for any time t, there is a set of ersatz 
possible-worlds overlapping with the actual world up to time t and branching 
onwards. Suppose that a certain statement S is a true future-contingent 
statement with respect to a certain time T1, concerning what will be the case at 
T2 (a time later than T1). The eternalist can consistently maintain that S is 
locally ungrounded with respect to time T1, but grounded simpliciter, since 
(taking, for simplicity’s sake, facts to be the grounds for truth) there is indeed a 
fact f, temporally located at T2, that grounds the truth of S. Eternalists can, 
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thus, avoid commitment to the principle of present grounding without 
offending the grounding intuition, that is the intuition that truth cannot simply 
float on the void and must be, somehow, tethered to reality. 
A first tension arises with the so-called growing-block theory, that is the 
theory according to which past and present exist, the future does not  and the 
objective passage of time consists in the successive increment of reality given 
by the coming into existence of later and later  world time-slices. The growing-
block theory is a no-futurist theory, that is a theory according to which the 
future does not  exist and so, as such, cannot claim that the grounds of future-
contingent statements is temporally dislocated in the future. Given their 
present-ungroundedness, they cannot be grounded in the present either. It 
would also seem implausible to suppose that their grounds are to be found in 
the past. It seems thus that growing-blockers have some trouble in respecting 
the grounding intuition. 
However, growing-block theory is not immediately in contradiction with 
the grounding principle. As a matter of fact, growing-blockers takes tenseless 
discourse to be meaningful and, hence, they seem to acknowledge the existence 
of atemporal facts: An event e, for instance, occurs tenselessly at a time t, and 
so the occurrence of e at t can be seen, in itself, as an atemporal fact. Therefore, 
it seems that—assuming again, for simplicity’s sake, facts to play the role of 
grounds for truths—the growing-blocker has at least the possibility to try and 
salvage the validity of the grounding principle by invoking atemporal facts as 
grounds for future-contingent statements. If, in fact, the ground for a future-
contingent statement is not  something that obtains now but is instead an 
atemporal fact, one cannot derive from the principle of the necessity of the 
present that the future is settled. Of course, explaining what these alleged 
atemporal facts are and how they manage to provide an adequate grounding for 
future-contingent truths might prove to be too difficult a task for growing block 
theorists. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility that shows how the growing-
block theory alone is not per se incompatible with the grounding intuition. 
There is a dynamic theory of time that appears to be immediately in 
contradiction with the grounding principle, at least if its characterizing slogan 
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is taken at face value. Such a theory is presentism. According to presentists,  
every entity is a present entity, that is:  
(Pr) For all x, (if x exists, then) x is present 
For the presentist, the boundaries of the present are the very boundaries of 
reality. Hence, since future contingent-statements are not grounded in the 
present state of the world, it follows not only that future-contingent statements 
are presently ungrounded, but also that they are ungrounded simpliciter, thus 
contradicting the grounding principle. 
The argument just exposed depends on the validity, within a presentist 
setting, of the principle of present grounding: 
(PG) Truth must be presently grounded 
Hence, whether or not presentism is incompatible with what True-Futurism 
depends on whether (PG) is indeed a valid and unquestionable principle. 
However, in the recent literature on grounding principles, more and more 
authors are putting forward different lines of criticism to the idea that every 
truth must be grounded in reality: 
 
I. One of the most intriguing reasons that have been recently offered to doubt 
the universal validity of the grounding principle comes from the recent 
literature on semantic paradoxes. Consider in fact the following sentences (the 
truth-teller and the no-no sentences): 
 
 This sentence is true 
 
 The neighbouring sentence is not true 
 The neighbouring sentence is not true 
 
These sentences appear  to  be affected by  the  same  pathological feature: the  
truth-teller  can  consistently possess either truth-value; the no-no sentences 
can tolerate divergent assignments (T-F, F-T); however, in both cases, not only 
it appears impossible to come to know their truth-value (either via proof or 
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empirical investigation), but there also seems to be nothing that  could 
determine which is the correct assignment. While the liar  
This sentence is false  
and (what we might call) the yes-no sentences  
  
The neighbouring sentence is true  
The neighbouring sentence is not true  
  
suffer from inconsistency (not tolerating any truth-value assignment), the truth-
teller and the  no-no  pair  display  a  kind  of  pathological  indeterminacy  
(tolerating  too  many  truth-value assignments, while there being seemingly 
nothing to determine which is the correct one). Roy Sorensen (2001) has 
offered an interesting solution to this puzzle, which—briefly stated—consists 
in (i) rejecting the universal validity of the grounding principle, (ii) take the 
truth-teller and the no-no sentences to have ungrounded truth-values and (iii) to 
be, for this very reason. metaphysically unknowable 
 
If 'This is true' is true, then it is an epistemic island. There is no access to its 
truthmaker to the truth of the truth-teller. 
 
The [no-no sentences] constitute a more complex epistemic island. [...] both 
members are absolutely unknowable, because there is no way to learn the truth-
value of any particular member. (Sorensen, 2001, p. 175) 
 
Sorensen’s solution to the puzzle posed by the truth-teller and the no-no 
sentences is not only independently interesting—as a way of dealing with a 
specific class of pathological sentences—but calls for attention also for a 
further reason. According to Sorensen, his ‘truthmaker gap’ treatment of the 
truth-teller and the no-no sentences constitutes in fact ‘a precedent for an 
epistemic solution to the sorites paradox’ (2001, p.176) according to which 
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(i) vague predicates admit sharp cut-offs (there is  a number n such that it 
is both true that n seconds after noon is noonish and that n+1 seconds 
after noon is not noonish) 
 
(ii) it is metaphysically impossible to know the truth-value of cut-off 
sentences (vagueness gives rise to absolute ignorance) 
 
(iii) cut-off sentences are metaphysically unknowable because they possess 
a groundless truth-value: they are true/false without having a 
truth/false-maker. 
 
As he himself puts it, 
 
[since] the believer in the truthmaker gap solution to the no-no paradox  has 
already accepted a T-F assignment for a perfectly symmetrical pair of sentences[, 
…] he will not oppose the possibility that a particular threshold for ‘noonish’ 
groundlessly exists. Just as there is absolutely no way to know which no-no 
sentence is true, the threshold for ‘noonish’ is absolutely unknowable (Sorensen, 
2001, p. 176). 
  
 
II. Beyond semantic paradoxes, in recent years the universal validity of 
grounding principles has been questioned for a broad range of cases: Modality, 
negative existentials, and dispositional counterfactuals, among others. Authors 
like Jonathan Tallant and Trenton Merricks, for instance, have advocated either 
the rejection or a significant reformulation of grounding principles.  
Tallant defends the view that the rejection of classical grounding principles 
(in favour of a view he dubs ‘No-Ground Cheating’ (NGC)) is motivated by 
ontological parsimony: 
 
The most obvious point in favour of NGC is ontological parsimony. Because we  
‘cheat’  by  not  providing  ontological  ground  for  talk  about  absences, 
negative existentials, times other than the present, and possibilities, we can 
dispense with a multitude of ontological commitments. Since we regard our best 
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theories as those that are most ontologically parsimonious, we ought to prefer 
NGC to ontologies that provide grounds. (Tallant, 2009: 425) 
 
[...]  what the proponent of NGC must argue is that it is better to have complexity 
in our conceptual framework than it is to have complexity in the world. Thus, the 
no-ground cheat thinks it is better to say that: 
 
NGC-ST: a proposition is true if and only if, either: (a) there exists an entity that 
makes that proposition true; or, (b) there does not exist an entity and that makes 
the proposition true; or, (c) there could have existed an entity that would make 
the proposition true; or, (d) there has existed an entity that makes the proposition 
true . . . 
 
rather than endorse a theory that commits to ontological grounds in each of the 
relevant domains of discourse. (Tallant, 2009: 426) 
 
Merricks, instead, has mounted against the principle of grounding what we 
might call an ‘argument from aboutness’, which is well summarised by the 
following passage of Jonathan Schaffer: 
 
First,  Merricks argues  that  the  best  account  of   truthmaking involves  both  
necessitation  and aboutness, as per: 
 
TNec: (∀p)( ∀w) (if  p is true at w then (∃x) (x exists at w & x is not suspicious 
& (∀w′) (if  x exists at w′  then p is true at w′) & p is about x))  
 
Necessitation is imposed in the third conjunct under the existential quantifier, 
where  x  is  required  to  be  such  that  at  all  worlds  where  x  exists  p  is  true. 
Aboutness is imposed in the fourth conjunct under the existential quantifier, 
where x is required to be what p is about. Thus: “every truth is necessitated by, 
and is about, the positive existence of  this or that . . .”  
 
Merricks  then  argues  that  TNec  fails,  primarily  because  negative  
existentials, modals, and claims about the past and future are not about what is, 
but rather about what is not, what might be, and what was and will be. Merricks 
thus concludes that truth does not depend on what there is, and also sees in this 
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refutation of  the correspondence theory of  truth [...], and ultimately a rationale 
for truth primitivism. (Schaffer, 2008: 302-3). 
 
 
II. Furthermore, regardless the question of the open future, presentism has 
already troubles with the grounding principles for what concerns true 
statements about the past. To this effect, many authors have tried and defend 
presentism from the ‘grounding objection’ by advancing different proposals 
about what could ground the truth of past-directed statements.2 Recently, 
however, many authors have argued that the real solution to the grounding 
problem lies in the very restriction or significant reformulation of the 
grounding principle. Beyond Tallant and Merricks (see above), the most recent 
and interesting attack to the grounding principle has come from Caplan and 
Sanson (2010) and Kierland and Morton (2007): 
 
Consider  the  proposition—call it ‘A’—that Arnold was pale. A, it seems, is a true 
proposition.[...W]e have two candidate explanations of the truth of A: 
 
(PRESENT)  The  proposition  that  Arnold  was  pale  is  true because Arnold 
now has the property having been pale. 
 
(PAST) The proposition that Arnold was pale is true because Arnold once had the 
property being pale. 
 
It seems to us that (PAST) is a proper explanation of the truth of A; and it seems 
to us that, once this is recognized, it becomes clear that (PRESENT) is not. [...] It  
is  because  Arnold  once  had  the  property being  pale  that  he  now  has  the  
property  having  being  pale.  But  the reverse is not the case: it is not because 
Arnold now has the property having being pale that he once had the property 
being pale. To put the point metaphorically, that he now has the property having 
been pale is at best a symptom of the (unsightly) property he once had: being 
pale. (Caplan and Sanson, 2010: 2—5) 
 
                                                 
2
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(BSP) [‘Truth supervenes on things and how things are.’] is not intuitively 
plausible, although it can seem otherwise.[...] (BSP) is formulated by ignoring 
issues of time, and then when it is applied to issues of time, we find that—lo and 
behold!—one of our intuitive views must be rejected. [... ] Of course, this will not 
move anyone who does not agree that (III), i.e., presentism, captures our intuitive 
view of time. But those who offer the objection  from  being-supervenience  
against  presentism  need  to  make  a positive case for (BSP). 
So,  as  we  see  it,  there  is  no  independent  objection  here  given  the 
possibility of some sort of thing/property/time metaphysics. According to such 
metaphysics, the past is an aspect of reality, but it cannot be reduced to things or 
the properties they possess (i.e., how these things are). Call this brute past 
presentism; [...] On this view, then, what is the past? It is what has happened: 
what things existed and how they were. But what is that? To ask that question is 
to presuppose that the past must be explainable in other terms. And this 
presupposition may simply be false. 
The brute past has an intrinsic nature [...] a certain ‘shape’. This shape does 
not consist in a structure of things having properties and standing in relations to 
one another. The past is an aspect of reality, even though  no  past  things  are.  
How  can  this  be?  There  is  no  reductive explanatory  answer  to  this  
question.  The  crucial  feature  of  brute  past presentism  is  that  is postulates  a  
sui  generis  metaphysical  category,  one independent of things and how they are. 
(Kierland and Morton 2007: 490—491) 
 
 
IV. Finally, a rejection or significant reformulation the grounding principles 
has been proposed with respect to the open future itself. On the one hand, for 
instance, Ross Cameron (2010) has advanced a truthmaking theory for 
presentist which solves the problem just sketched by appealing to the idea of 
ontic indeterminacy. According to Cameron’s proposal, future-contingent 
statement do have a truthmaker, but it is ontically indeterminate and so 
insufficient to settle the future. While it is in other words true that 
(23) It is (now)determinately the case that, there is an x, such that x 
makes Fp true 
(where Fp is a future-contingent statement) it is false that 
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(24) There is an x such that it is (now) determinately the case that x 
makes Fp true 
Therefore, since plausibly settledness entails definiteness 
(25) If it is settled that p, the it is (now) determinately the case that Fp3 
it follows that 
(26) There is no x such that it is now settled that x makes Fp true 
and, hence, that Fp is now unsettled. 
On the other hand, Patrick Greenough (ms) has recently proposed a theory 
for the open future according to which: 
(27) Future-contingent statement are indeterminately true(/false),  
where, roughly,  
(28) A statement p is indeterminately true(/false) if, and only if, p is 
true(/false) but there is nothing to ground the truth(/falsity) of p.4 
 
 
Of course, the presence in the recent literature of a growing scepticism for what 
concerns the grounding principle both in general and especially with 
connection to presentism does not  alone suffice to give us grounds to reject it. 
I think it is, however, sufficient to prove that the grounding principle is in itself 
disputable, and that it is not implausible that in the seemingly inconsistent triad 
 
• Future-directed statements are bivalent 
 
• The future is objectively open 
                                                 
3
 Cameron does not  seem to explicitly state this principle. I think, however this is a charitable 
reconstruction of the lines of reasoning underlying his main argument for the compatibility between 
presentism, the grounding principle and the open future. 
4
 See chapter 4. 
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• Truth must be presently grounded 
 
the principle of present grounding is the element that has to be rejected. For 
this reason, I will consider as an option for presentists (and for all other 
theorists of time which might appear to be committed to the principle of 
present grounding, once the principle of grounding is accepted) the idea that 
future-contingent statements have an ungrounded truth-value and, hence, I will 
not consider presentism as immediately at odds with True-Futurism. 
 
 
2.6.2 Moving spotlight and the necessity of the (hyper-)present 
 
Let us take stock. So far, I have characterized the framework within which I 
will conduct my investigation by means of two main thesis: 
 
(i) future-contingent statements, if true, are presently ungrounded; 
 
(ii) the present state of the world is now-settled. 
 
Furthermore, I have announced that the discussion I will put forward in this 
essay will not be concerned with a specific metaphysics of time and that, in 
general, most of the claims I shall be arguing for are thought of as neutral with 
respect to the question as to which is the correct metaphysical stance on time. 
To this effect, in the last section I have argued that there are at least plausible 
reasons to suppose that eternalism, the growing-block theory and presentism 
are not immediately threatened by the thesis that future-contingent proposition 
are presently ungrounded.  
In this section, I am going to argue that—under quite modest 
assumptions—the principle of the necessity of the present is incompatible with 
the metaphysical view on time commonly known as the moving spotlight 
theory, to the effect that such a theory will be assumed in this essay to be the 
only metaphysical theory of time (among the most prominent ones) which 
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appears to be incompatible with the idea that the future is open and that the 
principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid. 
According to the moving spotlight theory5, past, present and future times 
all equally exist, as the eternalist claims. However, in addition to the eternalist 
ontology, the moving spotlight theorists posits the existence of a fundamental 
property of ‘presentness’ which both ‘illuminates’ a unique time on the 
eternalist block and together ‘moves on’ to later and later time as ‘time passes’. 
In other words, the movement of the ‘moving spotlight’ of the present 
represents the A-theoretic, objective temporal passage in which times 
themselves undergo a change from being non-present to being present and 
from being present to being non-present.  
The moving spotlight theory—appealing as it might be to those who are 
both attracted by the advantages of eternalism over presentism and the 
growing-block theory, but still believe in the objective reality of temporal 
passage—presents an immediate difficulty which their upholders are called to 
address. According to MST, in fact, each existing time acquires and loses the 
property of being present. Hence, it appears that, for all times t, it is both true 
to say that 
(29) t is present 
and 
(30) t is not present 
whence a contradiction.  
The only way for the MST-theorist to solve this contradiction (which is 
clearly at least close to the contradiction featuring in the famous McTaggart’s 
argument for the unreality of time)6, appears that of distinguishing the temporal 
respects according to which t is, and is not present, respectively. As a matter of 
fact, the MST-theorist can reply, it is not true that t is both present and non-
present simpliciter. What is true, instead, is that, for instance,  first t is non-
present and then it becomes present, or that t is now present and was non-
                                                 
5
 For a classical presentation of the moving spotlight theory, see Schlesinger (1991). 
6
 See McTaggart (1908). 
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present. After all, the process in which times acquire and lose the property of 
presentness is thought of by the MST-theorist as the A-theoretically, temporal 
and dynamic aspect of reality. 
Since the respects with respect to which t is and is not present respectively 
have a temporal nature I see only two main kind of options for the MST-
theorist to overcome the contradiction displayed above: 
(I) The truth of ‘t is present’ and ‘t is not present’ is relative to the 
times that compose the eternalist world-block featuring in her 
theory. What is correct to say is not, therefore, that t is(/not) present 
simpliciter but rather that t is present with respect to t and t is not-
present with respect to any time tʹ different from t 
(II)  the change in presentness undergone by each time t occurs in 
hyper-time, that is the higher-order temporal dimension in which 
(hypo-)times undergo change 
In turn, the second option comes in two flavours, depending on whether hyper-
time is conceived A- or B-theoretically: 
(IIA) If hyper-time is conceived A-theoretically, then MST-theorists can 
use hyper-temporal operators and claim that, for instance: it is 
hyper-now the case that t is present, but it hyper-was the case  that t 
is not-present. 
(IIB) If hyper-time is conceived B-theoretically, then the truth of ‘t is 
present’ and ‘t is not present’ can be relativized to hyper-times. In 
this case, the MST-theorist can claim that t is present with respect 
to hyper-time T1 and t is not present with respect to hyper-time T2 
In order to show how the moving-spotlight theory is incompatible with the 
open future, I will consider option IIB, that is the case the contradiction is 
solved by appealing to an eternalist hyper-time. It will then easy to see how my 
argument applies also to the other cases. 
My argument rests on four main assumptions about hyper-time and its 
connection with hypo-time: 
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(H1) For all hyper-times T, the state of the world at T is hyper-settled at 
T (we can call this the principle of the necessity of the hyper-
present) 
(H2) Necessarily, hypo-times and their earlier-later ordering are hyper-
eternal: In other words, hypo-times cannot begin and cease to exist 
in hyper-time nor can they change their earlier-later ordering 
(H3) If t is present at T and it is hyper-settled at T that, at Tʹ, tʹ will be 
present, then it is also hypo-settled at t that tʹ will obtain (if the 
hyper-future is settled, then the hypo-future is also settled) 
(H4) (Assuming for simplicity’ sake that both hypo-time and hyper-time 
are discrete) for every hypo-time t1 and t2 and hyper-time T1 and 
T2, such that (i) t1 is hypo-earlier than t2, (ii) T1 is hyper-earlier 
than T2, (iii) no hypo-time is both hypo-earlier than t2 and hypo-
later than t1 and (iv) no hyper-time is both hyper-time is both 
hyper-earlier than T2 and hyper-later than T1, necessarily, if t1 is 
present at T1, then t2 is present at T2 
Furthermore, my argument will rely also on the following intuitively valid rule 
of inference 
(Z1) From □(p→q) and NT/tp, infer NT/tq 
The argument goes as follows:  
 
ARGUMENT A 
 
• T and Tʹ are variables for hyper-times; 
• t and tʹ are variables for hypo-times;  
• T1, T2, t1 and t2 are hyper- and hypo-temporal parameters 
respectively; 
• x<y stands for ‘y is the hyper/hypo-time that immediately follows 
x’; 
• x and P are usual variables for entities and properties;  
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• Present(x) and Obtains(x) stand for ‘x is present’ and ‘x obtains’ 
respectively;  
• at-T: is the operator ‘it is the case at the hyper-time T that’; 
• Nt is the  (hypo-)historical necessity operator ‘it is (hypo-)settled at 
t that’;  
• NT is the hyper-historical necessity operator ‘it is hyper-settled at T 
that’. 
 
(A1) ∀x∀P∀T (at-T:Px→NTPx) [premiss] 
(A2) ∀t∀tʹ∀T∀Tʹ(T<nTʹ & t<tʹ)→  
→□ (( at-T:(t<tʹ & Present(t))→at-Tʹ:Present(tʹ)) 
[premiss] 
(A3) T1<T2  
(A4) at-T1:(t1<
 
t2 & Present(t1)) [premiss] 
(A5) □((at-T1:(t1<t2 & Present(t1))→                                  
at-T2:Present(t2)) 
[from A2] 
(A6) NT1 ((t1<t2 & Present(t2)) [from 
A1,A4] 
(A7) NT1 (at-T2:Present(t2)) [from A5,A6 
by Z1] 
(A8) ∀t∀tʹ∀T∀Tʹ(T<nTʹ & t<tʹ)→□((at-T: Present(t) & 
NT at-Tʹ:Present(tʹ))→NtObtains(tʹ)) 
[premiss] 
(A9) NtObtains(t2) [from A4, 
A7, A8] 
 
In other words: Suppose that (i) T2 is the hyper-time that immediately follows 
T1, (ii) t2 is the hypo-time that immediately follows t1 and (iii) at T1 t1 is 
present. On the one hand we have that, necessarily, if T2 is the hyper-time that 
immediately follows T1, t2 is the hypo-time that immediately follows t1 and at 
T1 t1 is present, then at T2 t2 is present. On the other, we have that, since the 
state of the world at T1 is hyper-settled (the hyper-present is necessary), it is 
hyper-settled at T1 that t1 is present and t2 is the hypo-time that immediately 
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follows t1. Therefore, by (beta), we have that it is hyper-settled at T1 that t2 is 
present at T2 or, in other words, that the hyper-future of T1 is hyper-settled as 
to what hypo-time will be present at T2. However, if the hyper-future of the 
hyper-time at which t1 is present is hyper-settled, it follows that also the hypo-
future of t1 is settled and, therefore, that is settled at t1 that t2 will obtain. 
Since the argument clearly generalises we cannot but conclude that, within 
what we might call the ‘hyper-temporal moving spotlight theory’ both the 
hyper-future and the hypo-future are settled. QED 
The point made by means of the argument I have just exposed might be 
made more vivid as follows.  
In the argument above I spoke, for simplicity’s sake, only of ‘(hypo-) 
times’ and ‘hyper-times’. However, within a branching framework we also 
have to distinguish between times and moments, where the latter are the nodes 
in the branching tree of possibilities and the former represent the ‘horizontal’ 
division of the branching tree as in the following figure (see chapter x on the 
times/moments distinction): 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
In light of the times/moments distinction the hyper-temporal moving spotlight 
framework we are considering must be reformulated as follows: there is one 
concrete history of concrete moments (the eternalist world block) and a 
concrete hyper-history of hyper-moments; moments and hyper-moments occur 
at times and hyper-times, respectively. Suppose that at a certain hyper-moment 
M1 the hypo-moment m1 is present and the hypo-moment m2 is the moment 
that immediately follows m1. Since (i) the hyper-present is hyper-settled, (ii) 
t3 
t2 
t1 
time
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5   m6 m7 
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necessarily, moments cannot cease to exist or come into existence nor they can 
change their order and (iii) necessarily, if at a hyper-moment M a moment m is 
present, then at the next hyper-moment Mʹ the hypo-moment mʹ that 
immediately follows m will be present, it follows that—supposing that the 
hyper-moment M1 occurs at the hyper-time T1—it is hyper-settled at T1 that 
the hyper-moment M2 will obtain and hence that m2 hyper-will be present. 
What this means is that there is no hyper-possible history passing through M1 
such that M2 is not the hyper-moment that immediately follows M1. Since the 
result clearly generalises, we cannot but conclude that 
(31) Within a hyper-temporal moving spotlight framework, there can be 
only one hyper-history 
which is tantamount to saying that, within a hyper-temporal moving spotlight 
framework, the hyper-future is hyper-settled.  
On the other hand, we are also assuming that a necessary condition for the 
hypo-future to be hypo-unsettled is that the hyper-future be hyper-unsettled 
(thesis H3 above). Therefore, we cannot but conclude that 
(32) Within a hyper-temporal moving spotlight framework, there can be 
only one hypo-history 
and, hence, that, within a hyper-temporal moving spotlight framework, the 
hypo-future is also settled. 
For what concerns the principles used in my argument consider what 
follows: 
 
• H1 is the principle stating the necessity of the hyper-present. We 
have seen above that the necessity of the present is one of the main 
assumptions in this essay. I provided above some considerations to 
bolster the plausibility of such claim. However, once the principle 
of the necessity of the present is accepted for the ordinary, first-
order, temporal dimension, no principled reason appears 
forthcoming to reject it in the case of hyper-time. As a matter of 
fact, even when it comes to hyper-time what we should be 
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interested in is a robust, serious and objective form of hyper-
openness of the hyper-future and as I have tried to argue—or at 
least to prove plausible—a serious notion of openness of the future 
requires the present to be necessary. 
 
 
• H2 prohibits any kind of change in either the past, the present or 
the future within the process of temporal becoming. In other words, 
the only change we have in this MST-model is the movement of 
the moving spotlight. While the moving spotlight moves, in other 
words, everything else (moments and their ordering) cannot 
change.  
 
• H4 is a crucial principle, which strikes nevertheless as highly-
intuitive within a moving spotlight framework. If a certain set of 
events exists at a later moment, then those events will become 
present. Denying this point would just mean to threaten the 
intuitive meaning of the very idea of a moving spotlight of the 
present. 
 
• H3 is, perhaps, the most controversial principle. I believe, however, 
that it has at least the ring of plausibility to it. As a matter of fact, 
one might deny H3 and say that what only is important in order for 
the hypo-future to be settled is that the hypo-future not be 
necessitated by the hypo-present state of the world and, hence, the 
fact that the hyper-future is settled should have no bearing at all on 
the openness of its hypo-temporal counterpart. This is an 
interesting objection that might be developed in an independently 
engaging theory for the open (hypo-)future within a moving 
spotlight theory. That said, I still think  that the idea that the 
settledness of the hyper-future entails the settledness of the hypo-
future is not one that can be easily rejected by moving-spotlight 
theorists either on pain of contradicting the very reasons that lead 
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them to embrace the moving spotlight theory, or on pain of being 
committed to a far too weak notion of the open future. As a matter 
of fact, MST-theorists posit the existence of the moving spotlight 
of the present to account for the objectively dynamic character of 
time. For MST-theorists, time literally passes, and in their theory 
the movement of the moving spotlight is what the objective 
passage of time consists in. On the other hand, the possible hypo-
histories are intuitively thought of as representing the possible 
ways things might turn out to be...in the future. But such histories 
are like roads that the moving spotlight of the present might or 
might not take. Hence, to say that, although the present (hyper-) 
will move to moment m2 by means of (hyper-)historical necessity, 
the (hypo-)future is nevertheless open would be like saying at a 
junction that there are many roads we can take, even if the car we 
are driving has no steering wheel and there is in fact no way for us 
to avoid taking the road ahead of us. It appears, in other words, that 
a necessary condition for an hypo-possible history to adequately 
represent a possible way the future might turn out to be is that it be 
possible for the moving spotlight to move from the moment which 
is now present down that history. However, since there is only one 
possible hypo-future capable of being illuminated by the moving 
spotlight, we cannot but conclude that there are no others hypo-
possible futures.7  
 
I conclude, therefore, that the argument for the settledness of the future in a 
hyper-temporal moving spotlight framework is sound. 
So far, I have argued for the incompatibility between the moving spotlight 
theory and the open future by focussing on an eternalist hyper-time. However, 
as I have suggested above, there are at least other two options for the moving 
spotlight theorist to avoid the contradiction that seems to ensue by the position 
of a moving spotlight of the present, that is an A-theoretical hyper-time and the 
                                                 
7
 This point will be made more vivid once the distinction between a ‘deep’ and ‘superficial’ past and 
future is introduced in chapter 3. 
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relativization of the movement of the moving spotlight to standard times. It is, 
however, easy to see that two similar kind of arguments can be advanced in 
both cases and, hence, that regardless of how the moving spotlight theorist 
decides to avoid the contradiction presented above, in a moving spotlight 
theory the future is necessarily settled. 
The two arguments are the following:8 
 
ARGUMENT B 
 
The argument relies on the following transfer principle for hyper-
settledness 
(Z2) From NNOWp and □(p→q), infer NNOWq 
From ‘It is hyper-now settled that p’ and ‘Necessarily, if p, then q’, 
infer ‘It is hyper-now settled that q’ 
 
If it is hyper-now the case that moment m2 is later than moment m1 and 
that moment m1 is present, then (by the principle of the necessity of the 
hyper-present) it is hyper-now settled that m2 is later than m1, and that m2 
is present. It is, however, metaphysically necessary that if it is hyper-now 
the case that a moment mʹ is later than m and m is present, then  it hyper-
will be the case that mʹ is present. Hence—by the validity of the transfer 
principle Z2—it is hyper-now settled that it hyper-will be the case that m2 
is present. Since, however, hyper-settledness entails hypo-settledness 
and—as we are assuming—the time of m1 is t1, it follows that it is settled 
at t1 that m2 will obtain. 
 
ARGUMENT C 
 
The argument relies on the following transfer principle for perspective 
settledness: 
                                                 
8
 I will expose arguments B and C only informally. The overall structure of their formal counterparts 
should, however, be easily gathered from argument A.  
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(Z3) From Nat-tp and □(p→q), infer Nat-tq 
From ‘From the perspective of t, it is settled that p’ and 
‘Necessarily, if p, then q’, infer ‘From the perspective of t, it is 
settled that q’ 
 
If from the perspective of t1, m1 is present, m1 is earlier than m2 and t1 is 
earlier than t2, then from the perspective of t1 it is settled that m1 is 
present and t1 is earlier than t2. It is, however, metaphysically necessary 
that if from the perspective of t it is settled that, if m2 is later than m1, m1 
is present and t2 is later than t1, then  from the perspective of t2 it is the 
case that m2 is present. Hence—by the validity of the transfer principle 
Z3—it is settled, from the perspective of t, that from the perspective of t2 
it is the case that m2 is present. Since, however, perspective-settledness 
entails simple settledness9 and—as we are assuming—the time of m1 is t1, 
it follows that it is (simply) settled at t1 that m2 will obtains. 
 
I conclude, therefore, that no matter how the moving spotlight theorist decides 
to avoid the alleged contradiction that temporal passage seems to involve in her 
theory, the moving spotlight theory is incompatible with the open future. QED 
 
2.6.3 Too many grounds for Branching Worlds? 
 
In the previous sections I discussed the validity of the grounding principle with 
respect to three main metaphysical theories of time: eternalism, the growing-
block theory and presentism. There are still two views on time I haven’t 
touched upon that deserve a brief comment as to their relationship to the 
grounding principle. Such theories are both modal realist, that is they both take 
possible histories to be concrete and equally existing lewisian worlds. 
                                                 
9
 This point will be more clear once the distinction between deep and superficial future will have been 
exposed (see chapter 2). 
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The first one is both modal realist and dynamic and is usually called the 
shrinking-tree theory.10 According to the shrinking-tree theory, the concrete 
branching tree of Lewisian worlds composing the multiverse in an open future 
setting has a fundamental dynamic character that consists in the progressive 
‘falling off’ of later and later branches. This process is what the objective and 
mind-independent temporal becoming consists in. The present, for shrinking-
tree theorists, is the moment m on the branching tree such that there are no 
possible worlds to which m does not  belong. In other words, the present is the 
moment m such that every possible worlds w includes a world-segment s 
representing one of its possible future.  
The second theory is the one we might call Lewisian branching-time 
theory, which is a static theory of time: the branching-tree of historical 
possibility consists in a plurality of Lewisian worlds branching towards the 
future and overlapping towards the past, but no process of objective temporal 
becoming takes place. In a static Lewisian framework all the worlds exist 
simpliciter and no moment is marked as the present. 
Unlike the no-futurist case, the problem with modal-realist theories of the 
open future is that there are too many  grounds for future-directed propositions. 
As a matter of fact, assuming again for simplicity’s sake events to be what 
grounds the truth of propositions, if the following principle is taken as valid 
(BG) A future-directed proposition Fp saying that event e will obtain in 
the future is groundedly true(false), if, and only if there  is a 
moment mʹ later then the present moment such that e obtain(does 
not  obtain) at mʹ 
it follows that for any moment m and future-contingent proposition Fp  with 
respect to m, Fp is both groundedly true and groundedly false at m. 
There appears to be to possible solutions to the modal realist impasse. The 
first consists in modifying (BG) as follows 
(BG1) A future-directed proposition Fp saying that event e will obtain in 
the future is groundedly true(false), if, and only if there  is a unique 
                                                 
10
 See McCall (1984, 1994). 
36 
 
moment mʹ later then the present moment such that e obtains(does 
not  obtain) at mʹ 
BG1 plus the principle that every true(false) proposition is groundedly 
true(false) entails that future-contingent statements are neither true nor false. 
However, we are here interested in the idea that future-contingent statement do 
possess a definite truth-value. As we will see, this idea entails that one of the 
possible futures of any moment m is such that it is marked as the  way things 
will, in fact, turn out in the future of m. This idea appears to call for a 
reformulation of BG which might be reformulated as follows: 
(BG2) A future-directed proposition Fp saying that event e will obtain in 
the future is groundedly true(false), if, and only if there  is a 
moment mʹ later then the present moment and lying on the ‘true 
future’ of the present moment such that e obtain(does not  obtain) at 
mʹ 
However, also BG2 harbours a problem. As a matter of fact, given that all the 
possible futures of a certain moment are thought of as equally real, one might 
wonder why a certain future is the actual future. On the one hand, one might 
argue that the actual future is the future f along which all the true(false) future-
directed statements are true(false) with respect to f. This, however, would 
engender a vicious circle to the effect that future-contingent statements are in 
fact ungrounded, at least given the validity of the following intuitively valid 
principle 
(33) A true(false)proposition p cannot be grounded in a fact f, such that 
the fact that f obtains depends on p’s being true (false) 
On the other hand, one might take there to be a sui generis objective property 
of ‘being actual’ which is possessed by a certain possible world w on the 
branching tree making rendering it the actual world in the branching 
multiverse. However, in this case it seems that an objection similar to the one 
posed to the moving spotlight theory could be mounted to the shrinking-tree 
theory of time. As a matter of fact, also shrinking-tree theorists admit that a 
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certain moment m is, in some sense, both present and non-present and, hence, 
are called to distinguish the temporal respects in which m is and is not present. 
But, under the plausible assumption that the property of ‘being actual’ cannot 
be lost or acquired in the process of objective temporal becoming, it appears 
that from the fact that (i) either with respect to this hyper-moment (ii) or from 
the perspective of this moment, (iii) or it is hyper-now the case that the moment 
m is present and the possible world w is actual we cannot but conclude—as we 
have done in the case of the moving spotlight theory—that the future is settled.  
Things, however, do not look better for the static modal-realist: What in 
fact can the property of being actual amount to, once we have admitted that all 
worlds are ontologically on a par? 
It seems, thus, that also in the case of modal realist theories we have a 
certain tension between with the principle of grounding and the principle of 
bivalence. For this reason—although I will sketch in chapter 8 a possible way 
for the static modal realist to respect the principle of grounding without 
jeopardizing neither the openness of the future nor the principle of bivalence—
I will assume that also modal realist theorist of time have to option to reject the 
universal validity of the grounding principle and claim that future-contingent 
statement are ungrounded, even if truth-valued. 
3  Conclusion 
3.1 Summing-up 
 
In this introductory part I have presented the framework within which I will be 
conducting my discussion about the principle of bivalence in the open future. 
Its most salient features can be summoned up in the following list: 
 
(i) the future is open in an objective, non-epistemic mind-
independent way 
 
(ii) the future is open in a way the past is not 
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(iii) the openness of the future is to be understood by means of a 
branching tree of (historically-)possible histories 
 
(iv) the present is historically necessary 
 
(v) determinism (properly understood) is incompatible with the idea 
that the future is open 
 
(vi) If future-contingent statements are truth-valued, their being 
truth-valued is not grounded on the present state of the world 
and, therefore, if they are grounded at all, their ground must lie 
in some other region of reality (if any). 
 
(vii) there are reasons to doubt the universal validity of the grounding 
principle and, hence, those theories of time which might be in 
tension with the idea that future-contingent statements are 
bivalent and presently ungrounded are to be considered a live 
option for the true-futurist 
 
(viii) the moving-spotlight theory is incompatible with the open future 
 
 
3.2 Overview 
 
In the next chapters, I will both defend the true-futurist idea that the principle 
of bivalence is unrestricted valid even if the future is open and present two 
logico-semantic theories within which True-Futurism can be accommodated. 
My discussion will proceed as follows: 
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PART ONE:  
Open Future, Bivalence and Retrospective Determinacy 
 
 
Chapter  2: Open future and relative truth 
 
I will begin my discussion about the principle of bivalence in the open future 
by considering the idea, recently advanced by John MacFarlane, that a gappist 
approach to future-contingent statements requires a ‘truth-relativist’ 
framework, mainly for reason that have to do with our alleged intuitions about 
the behaviour of statements featuring ‘actually’.  
 MacFarlane’s rationale for a truth-relativist manoeuvre in the open 
future lies in the tension between what he calls the ‘indeterminacy’ and the 
‘determinacy intuition’, namely the intuitions that (i) if the future is open an 
utterance of a future-contingent statement like ‘it will be sunny tomorrow’ is 
neither true nor false today but (ii) if yesterday I uttered ‘ it will be sunny 
tomorrow’ and today is indeed a sunny day it is correct to say that my utterance 
was true. 
The limited aim of this chapter is that of arguing that, even accepted the 
correctness of a gappist approach to the open future, truth-relativism proves to 
be unnecessary to accommodate our alleged intuitions. The main point against 
the relativist will concern the semantic behaviour of ‘actually’. 
 
 
Chapter  3: Open Future and Bivalence 
 
In chapter 3 I will propose a general positive argument for the validity of the 
principle of bivalence in the open future and defend it from possible objections. 
I will show that the main problem for Gappism is not much the tension 
between the determinacy and the indeterminacy intuition—as MacFarlane 
claims—but the tension between the determinacy intuition (or ‘the principle of 
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Retrospective Determinacy’ as I shall  call it) and the necessitation of the main 
thesis of Gappism (that is, that future contingent statement are neither true nor 
false) 
 
 
Chapter  4: Indeterminate truth and bivalence 
 
I will discuss the idea, recently advanced by some authors, that future-
contingent statements, although either true or false, are neither determinately 
true nor determinately false (‘Determinacy Gappism’). To this effect, I shall 
firstly argue that true-futurists are committed to what I shall call ‘Definite 
True-Futurism’, that is the view according to which future-contingent 
statements are either definitely true or definitely false. I will, therefore, 
conclude that the only option for determinacy gappists is that of taking their 
notion of indeterminate truth as referring to the grounding status of future-
contingent statements by claiming either that future-contingent statements are 
ungrounded or indeterminately grounded. 
 
 
 
PART TWO:  
The True-Future of True-Futurism 
 
 
Chapter  5: The logic of true futurism I—The problem of counterfactual 
evaluation 
 
In chapter 5 I will begin the discussion of what is the true logico-semantic 
theory for True-Futurism. I will (i) adress the ‘problem of counterfactual 
evaluation’ (as I shall call it), first presented by Nuel Belnap et al., (ii) present 
the distinction between relative and absolute ‘thin red line theories’ (where the 
‘thin red line’ is the history marked as the way things will turn out to be), (iii) 
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advance two prima facie possible solutions to the problem of counterfactual 
evaluation and then (iv) dismiss them as wanting.  
Furthermore, I will argue that the rather technical problem of 
counterfactual evaluation—concerning the truth-conditions of future-
contingent statements with respect to moments that, in the branching tree of 
possibilities, lie off the thin red line—points in fact to a significant 
philosophical question, that is whether there are, in a bivalent open future 
setting, true counterfactuals of openness (COPs), that is counterfactuals like ‘if 
the merely counterfactual moment m had obtained, then the future-contingent 
statement S would have been true(/false)’. 
 
 
Chapter  6: Against Counterfactual True-Futurism 
 
This chapter will be devoted to arguing that the thesis that there are true 
counterfactuals of openness (‘Counterfactual True-Futurism’) contradicts the 
idea that the future is open and that, hence, true-futurists are committed to the 
view that, although, for every merely counterfactual moment m and future-
contingent statement S, it is correct to say that if m had obtained, then the S 
would have been either true or false, it is both false to say that if m had 
obtained, then S would have been true and that if m had obtained, then the S 
would have been false (‘Factual True-Futurism’). 
 
 
Chapter 7:The logic of true futurism II—The True Logic of True-Futurism
  
Drawing on the results obtained in the two previous chapters I will present two 
(factual) true-futurist theories meeting all the desiderata for an adequate true-
futurist theory. 
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PART THREE:  
True-Futurism and Metaphysics 
 
Chapter  8: The metaphysics of the Thin Red Line 
 
In this chapter I will show which metaphysical theories of time fit better with 
which true-futurist theories, briefly return to the problem of grounding for 
future-contingent statements and, finally, stress what is the main lesson to be 
drawn from my discussion for what concerns the topology of time and 
historical possibility.  
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Chapter 2 
Open future and relative truth 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss John MacFarlane’s recent claim that a gappist 
treatment of future-contingent statements requires a peculiar departure from the 
received Kaplanian semantics, consisting in the double relativization of the 
notion of sentence-truth to both a context of use (as Kaplan taught us) and a 
‘context of assessment’. What requires the gappist to choose a ‘truth-relativist’ 
framework, argues MacFarlane, is a tension between two equally strong 
intuitions about our assertions in the open future: the ‘indeterminacy intuition’ 
(according to which if the future is objectively unsettled and I utter ‘it will be 
sunny tomorrow’, then what I said is neither true nor false) and the 
‘determinacy intuition’ (according to which if one day later it is indeed a sunny 
day, it is correct to claim that what I said yesterday was true). 
In this chapter I shall be considering only whether MacFarlane’s truth-
relativism is indeed necessary in the open future, once Gappism  is assumed 
and leave the question about whether Gappism is a viable option for open-
futurists in the following chapter. 
1  Open future, gappism and truth-relativism 
1.1 Truth-relativism 
 
According to a familiar picture, sentence-truth depends on two main factors: 
the proposition expressed by the sentence in question and the circumstances 
against which such proposition is evaluated. What proposition a certain 
sentence expresses might depend, for languages containing indexical 
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expressions, on the context in which that sentence is uttered or used. If, for 
instance, Barack Obama utters 
(1) I am here now 
in Washington on the 26th of May 2009, he will thereby express the 
proposition that Barack Obama is in Washington on the 26th of May 2009. But 
if Gordon Brown utters the same sentence in London on the13th of December 
2008, he will thereby express the proposition that Gordon Brown is in London 
on the 13th of December 2008. The context of use has thus in many cases a 
content-determinative role, as it helps determine which proposition is 
expressed by a certain sentence (as uttered in that context). According to the 
received view about sentence-truth, the context of use has also a 
circumstances-determinative role. Suppose that Obama has in fact uttered (1) 
in Washington on the 26th of May 2009. Knowing the context in which that 
sentence was uttered seem to suffice to determine whether his utterance is true: 
as a matter of fact, if Obama was actually in Washington on the 26th of May 
2009, then since he uttered (1) in the actual world, his utterance was true. It 
seems thus that the relevant circumstances against which the proposition p 
expressed by a certain sentence S in a certain context c is to be evaluated are 
the very circumstances determined by c, so that the doubly relativized notion of 
sentence-truth at a context of use and circumstances of evaluation can be 
connected to the simpler notion of sentence-truth at a context of use as follows: 
(2) A  sentence  S  is  true  in  the  context  c  if,  and  only  if,  the 
proposition p expressed by S in c is true with respect to the 
circumstances determined by c  
Since every utterance determines a unique sentence (the sentence uttered) and a 
unique context (the context in which the sentence was uttered)1 the  received  
view  is  that  utterance-truth is absolute: 
(3)  An utterance u is true (simpliciter) if, and only if, Su (the sentence 
uttered) is true in cu  (the context of utterance) 
                                                     
1
 See, however, Lopez De Sa (2008) for an interesting criticism to this point and to the idea that truth-
relativism is best characterized by the claim that utterance-truth is relative. 
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Recently, the thesis that utterance-truth is absolute has been vigorously 
contrasted by many authors who, for many areas of discourse, have advocated 
the truth-relativist thesis that utterance-truth must be relativized to a context of 
assessment. The doubly relativized notion of utterance-truth is generally 
understood by relativists as defined by means of a doubly relativized notion of 
sentence-truth, as follows: 
(4) An utterance u is true with respect to the context of assessment ca  
if, and only if, Su  (the sentence uttered) is true as uttered in cu  and 
assessed from ca  
Two main reasons might render sentence-truth relative also to a context of 
assessment:  
(a)   the context of use does not exhaust the content-determinative role: 
which proposition a sentence expresses is determined (also) by the 
context from which the sentence is assessed 
(b)   the context of use does not exhaust the circumstances-determinative 
role:  the  relevant  circumstances  (against  which  the  proposition 
expressed by the sentence in question has to be evaluated) are 
determined  (also)  by  the  context  from  which  the  sentence  is 
assessed.  
In this paper, I will call the two different forms of truth-relativism 
corresponding to (a) and (b) indexical- and nonindexical-relativism, 
respectively (see §2.3 below). 
 
 
1.2 Relative truth and the open future 
 
Among other areas of discourse, the open future has been argued by John 
MacFarlane (2003, 2008) to require a truth-relativist framework. According to 
MacFarlane, there are two main intuitions elicited by an open future setting, 
which any theory of the open future should accommodate:   
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Suppose that the world is objectively indeterministic. In some possible futures, there is a 
sea battle tomorrow. In others, there is not. How should we evaluate an assertion (made 
now) of the sentence ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’? The question is difficult to 
answer because we are torn between two intuitions. On the one hand, there is a strong 
temptation to say that the assertion is neither true nor false. After all, there are possible 
future histories witnessing its truth and others witnessing its falsity, with nothing to 
break the symmetry. I shall call this ‘the indeterminacy intuition’. On the other hand, 
there is a strong temptation to say that the assertion does have a definite truth-value, 
albeit one that must remain unknown until the future ‘unfolds’. After all, once the sea 
battle has happened (or not), it seems quite strange to deny that the assertion was true 
(or false). I shall call the thought that the assertion does have a definite truth-value ‘the 
determinacy intuition’ (MacFarlane, 2003) 
The supervaluationist theory of the open future2,3  appears to be one of the most 
promising theory within which the indeterminacy intuition can be properly 
articulated and accommodated. According to it, time is to be thought of as a 
tree of possible worlds overlapping towards the past and branching towards the 
future. Truth at a context must be consequently understood in terms of truth at 
every world overlapping at the context of utterance: 
(5) S is true in the context c if, and only if, S is true at every point of 
evaluation4 <c,w>, such that w is a world overlapping at c;  
S is false in the context c if, and only if, S is false at every point of 
evaluation <c,w>, such that w is a world overlapping at c;  
                                                     
2
 See Thomason (1970), Belnap et al. (2001), MacFarlane, MacFarlane (2003,2008). 
3
 ‘This  is  precisely  the  supervaluational  idea:  First  you  ascribe  truth  values dependent on an 
auxiliary parameter, and then you ascribe plain truth by using a  universal  quantifier  to  cancel  the  
auxiliary  parameter’ (Belnap,  2009).  In  our case the auxiliary parameter which gets ‘cancelled’ by a 
universal quantification is the possible-world parameter. Notice that, strictly speaking, the theories that I 
am calling in this paper ‘supervaluationism’ and ‘relativism’ are both supervaluationist theories. For 
simplicity’s sake, however, I use here ‘supervaluationism’ to refer to the supervaluationist theory which 
relativize truth only to a context of use. 
4
 A point of evaluation is a <context,index> pair, where a context is a possible occasion in which a 
sentence might be uttered or used (or a representation thereof), and an index is a n-tuple of parameters 
representing the circumstances against which the proposition expressed by the sentence in context has to 
be evaluated; see Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1996) and MacFarlane (2008). Here and throughout the paper I 
will be following MacFarlane (2008) in treating temporal modifiers as referring terms and quantifiers 
rather than operators, thus not taking an index to include also a time-parameter. 
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otherwise, S is neither true nor false in c. 
Since only in some possible futures a sea battle is taking place tomorrow, the 
supervaluationist will predict my utterance of  
(6) There will be a sea battle tomorrow 
to be neither true nor false, thereby vindicating the indeterminacy intuition.  
Supervaluationism appears, however, to fall short of the determinacy intuition. 
According to (5), utterance-truth is in fact absolute: from any point of view, an 
utterance has a certain truth-value depending only on the worlds overlapping at 
the context of utterance. Therefore, for the supervaluationist my utterance of 
(6) is to be assessed as neither true nor false even from the advantaged point of 
view of today.  
MacFarlane’s (2003) solution to the supervaluationist impasse is 
surprisingly simple. Sentence-truth must be relativized both to a context of use 
and to a context of assessment, along the following lines: 
(7) S is true in the context of use cu and context of assessment ca if, and 
only if, S is true at every point of evaluation <cu,w>, such that w is 
a world overlapping both at c and cu; 
S is false in the context of use cu and context of assessment ca if, 
and only if, S is false at every point of evaluation <cu,w>, such that 
w is a world overlapping both at cu and ca; 
otherwise, S is neither true nor false in cu/ca. 
The relativist’s definition of utterance-truth given in (7) allows thus for a 
simple and elegant account of both the indeterminacy and the determinacy 
intuition (for simplicity’s sake, the expression ‘point of view’ has to be 
understood—here and throughout the paper—as interchangeable with ‘context 
of assessment’): 
 
(i) From  the  point  of  view  of  yesterday,  my  utterance  of  (6)  was 
neither true nor false, since only in some world overlapping both at the 
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context of utterance and of assessment (which in this case coincide) a 
sea battle is taking place today. 
(ii) From the point of view of today, my utterance of (6) was true, since in 
every world overlapping both at the context of utterance and of 
assessment a sea battle is taking place today. 
 
1.3 Retrospective determinacy and propositions 
 
More recently,  however,  MacFarlane  (2008)  has  restricted  his  argument in  
favour  of  a  relativist  treatment  of  the  open  future,  acknowledging that our 
intuitions about retrospective assessments are not based upon considerations 
about the technical notion of ‘utterance-truth’, but  rather  upon  reflections  
about  what  has  been  said by our assertions—a proposition. Therefore, he 
now argues, the real question is whether supervaluationism can vindicate our 
retrospective assessments of the truth of propositions. The answer he gives is 
that, in most cases, the supervaluationist appears to be able to accommodate 
our intuitions.  
According to MacFarlane (2008), in our ordinary retrospective 
assessments like ‘What I said yesterday was true’, ‘True’ occurs as a monadic 
predicate of propositions, whose semantics appears to be as simple and 
straightforward as  
(8) ‘True’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <c,w>  if, and only if, x 
is a proposition and x is true at w. 
Notice that (8) has two immediate consequences: (i) the absence of an 
argument place for a time in ‘true’ deprives its tensed uses of any semantic 
significance (the use of ‘was true’ instead of ‘is true’, for instance, is 
determined by grammatical reasons only); (ii) the following disquotational 
schema is true at every point of evaluation: 
(9) ∀x((x =the proposition that S) ⊃ (true(x)≡S)) 
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It is easy to prove that in the case of (6) the supervaluationist can accommodate 
the determinacy intuition by saying that, if yesterday I uttered (6) and today a 
sea battle is indeed taking place, then what I said yesterday was true: 
ARGUMENT A 
(A1) Yesterday  I  uttered  the  sentence  ‘There will be a sea battle 
tomorrow’ [premiss] 
(A2) Yesterday I said that a sea battle would take place today [from (A1)] 
(A3) A sea battle is taking place today [premiss] 
(A4) What I said yesterday was true [from (A2),(A3),(9)] 
Nevertheless, claims MacFarlane, this result still does not render the 
relativization to a context of assessment redundant, since the supervaluationist 
appears unable to deliver an adequate account of our retrospective assessments 
of claims made by means of sentences containing ‘actually’. 
 
1.4 Truth and determinate truth 
 
Before proceeding further, it might be interesting to appreciate the peculiar 
nature of the supervaluationist framework MacFarlane proposes in Truth in the 
Garden of Forking Paths for what concerns the Gappism/True-futurism debate. 
The introduction of the truth-predicate defined in (8)  in the object-
language has the striking consequence of making True-Futurism true within it. 
As a matter of fact, it is an immediate consequence of (11) that, for every 
proposition p, it is true in every possible context of use c that 
(10) True(p) or False(p) 
Even if it is unsettled that p in c, it is thus incorrect to assert in c that p is 
neither true nor false. As MacFarlane himself says: 
 
For those who do not think that a proof of unsettledness should compel withdrawal  of  
an  assertion  about  the  future,  this  result  might  actually  be welcome. From their 
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‘internal’ points of view on the branching tree of histories, speakers will not be able to 
acknowledge proofs of unsettledness as grounds for asserting that what they said was 
not true—since these proofs would then also be grounds for asserting the negations of 
what they said. (MacFarlane, 2008: 97) 
 
However, he continues,  
 
But for those supervaluationists who do think that a proof of unsettledness should 
compel withdrawal of an assertion about the future, there is an easy solution. We can 
introduce a ‘determinate truth’ predicate: 
 
(47)  ‘DetTrue’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <c,w>  if, and only if, x is a 
proposition and x is true at every world wʹ ∈ W(c). 
 
Using this predicate, our speakers can correctly characterize propositions whose truth is 
still unsettled as ‘not Determinately True’. Whether they take a proof of unsettledness to 
compel withdrawal of an assertion about the future will then depend on whether they 
think retraction is required by a proof that the assertion is not Determinately True. 
(MacFarlane, 2008: 97) 
 
Notice that since—as the truth-predicate ‘True’—also ‘Determinately True’ is 
not time-indexed, it follows (by an argument parallel to argument A) that if 
yesterday I uttered ‘it will be sunny tomorrow’ and today is indeed a sunny 
day, then it is even correct to say today  
(11) What I said yesterday was determinately true 
Notwithstanding the validity of the principle of bivalence in the object-
language ,and the correctness of retrospective assessments like (11), what we 
might call the principle of determinate bivalence is not valid within the object 
language. In other words, it is not the case that, for every proposition p and 
context c, it is true that 
(12) It is either determinately true that p or it is determinately false that 
p 
This allows us to distinguish between two possible kinds of true-futurist 
theories, that is those that uphold the validity of (12) and those that reject it. 
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We might call the first Determinacy True-Futurism and the second 
Indeterminacy True-Futurism. It follows that MacFarlane’s supervaluationist 
proposal is a gappist theory at the level of the meta-language, but an 
indeterminacy true-futurist theory at the level of the object-language. 
The question whether Indeterminacy True-Futurism might be a viable 
option for true-futurists will be discussed in chapter 4. In the remainder part of 
this chapter I will be only concerned with the question whether, even accepted 
MacFarlane’s rather unorthodox framework, truth-relativism is indeed required 
to accommodate our intuitions about actuality in the open future. 
 
1.5 Relative truth and actuality 
 
A plausible constraint on ‘actually’ is given by what MacFarlane dubs ‘Initial 
Redundancy’ 
(13) An operator ● is initial-redundant just in case for all sentences S , 
‘●S’ is true at exactly the same contexts of use (and assessment) as 
S (equivalently: each is a logical consequence of the other). 
In standard (non-branching) frameworks, Initial Redundancy is granted by the 
fact that the actuality operator shifts the world of evaluation to the world of the 
context of utterance. The effect is that the proposition expressed by the 
sentence embedded by ‘actually’ is always evaluated with respect to the world 
of utterance: 
(14) ‘Actually:S’ is true at the point of evaluation <c,w>, if, and only if, 
S is true at <c,wc>, where wc  is the world of the context c. 
In a branching framework, however, this definition will not do, since the 
openness of the future entails that there is no such thing as the world of the 
context of utterance. MacFarlane proposes thus the following definition for the 
actuality operator in a supervaluationist setting: 
(15) ‘Actually:S’ is true at <c,w> if, and only if, S is true at every point 
of evaluation <c,wʹ>, where wʹ is a world overlapping at c. 
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Here the actuality-operator behaves as a universal quantifier over the set of 
worlds overlapping at the context of use, thus respecting Initial Redundancy. 
To achieve  the  same  result for  the relativist,  MacFarlane  enriches  the  
relativist’s  points  of  evaluation  with  a  context-of-assessment parameter, 
thus defining the actuality operator as a universal quantifier over the set of 
worlds overlapping both at the context of use and at the context of assessment: 
(16) ‘Actually:S’ is true at <cu,ca,w> (where cu is the context of use and 
ca the context of assessment) if, and only if, S is true at every point 
of evaluation <cu,ca,w′>, where w′ is a world overlapping both at cu  
and ca. 
Suppose then that yesterday, in the context c1, I uttered both 
(17) It will be sunny tomorrow 
and 
(18) It will actually be sunny tomorrow 
Suppose furthermore that today, in the context c2, it is in fact a sunny day. It is 
easy to see that the relativist will predict that, from the point of view of today’s 
context of assessment, both (17) and (18) are true (as uttered in c1). What 
about the supervaluationist? MacFarlane claims that 
 
According to the supervaluationist, it should be correct for me to say [today] that my 
first claim was true and my second claim false (MacFarlane, 2008, p. 100). 
 
Why? The only point which appears to bolster this statement is the following 
comment on the behaviour of the actuality operator in a non-branching 
framework: 
 
No matter how deeply embedded we are, no matter how far the world of evaluation has 
been shifted, the actuality operator returns it to the world of the context of use 
(MacFarlane, 2008, p. 98). 
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Adapting this comment to our branching framework, what MacFarlane appears 
to claim is that when the supervaluationist evaluates today the proposition I 
expressed yesterday by my second claim, the very nature of the actuality 
operator makes it so that the relevant worlds for the truth of this proposition 
(today) are those overlapping at yesterday’s context. For this reason, argues 
MacFarlane, the supervaluationist cannot but give the wrong predictions—
today—about the truth of my second claim. 
2. ‘actually’ as indexical  
Assume the standard Kaplanian semantics for the supervaluationist and 
consider the following argument:5  
ARGUMENT B 
(B1)  Yesterday  I  uttered  the  sentence  ‘It will actually be sunny at t2’ 
[premiss] 
(B2)  Yesterday I said that it would be actually sunny at t2 [from (B1)] 
(B3)  It is actually sunny at t2  [premiss] 
(B4)  What I said yesterday was true [from (B2),(B3) by (9)] 
Suppose that (B1) and (B3) are true. If the argument were valid within the 
supervaluationist theory, it would follow that (B4) is true and, therefore, that 
the supervaluationist could—contrary to what MacFarlane claims—account for 
the determinacy intuition also when ‘actually’ is concerned. Therefore, if 
MacFarlane is right, B must be invalid for the supervaluationist. However, 
since MacFarlane is in fact assuming the validity of (9), the only passage he 
can blame for the alleged invalidity of B is the transition from (B1) to (B2).  
This, in turn, appears to entail that, according to MacFarlane, if (15) is the 
correct semantics for ‘actually’, the proposition expressed by ‘It will actually 
                                                     
5
 In the remainder of the paper, unless otherwise stated, I will use ‘supervaluationist’ to refer to the 
kaplanian (i.e. non truth-relativist) supervaluationist.  
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be sunny at t2’ at c1 is different from the one expressed by ‘It is actually sunny 
at t2’ at c2. Consider, in fact, the following argument: 
ARGUMENT C 
(C1)  By uttering ‘It will actually be sunny at t2’, yesterday I expressed 
the proposition P1 [premiss] 
(C2)  By uttering ‘It is actually sunny at t2’ today, I am expressing the 
proposition P2 [premiss] 
(C3) It is actually sunny at t2 [premiss] 
(C4)  P2 is true  [from (C2), (C3) by (9)] 
(C5)  P1=P2 [premiss] 
(C5) What I said yesterday was true [from (C1),(C4),(C5) by (10)] 
Argument C strikes as valid. But the only premiss MacFarlane could reject as 
false appears to be (C5), that is the premiss according which  ‘It will actually 
be sunny at t2’ at c1 and ‘It is actually sunny at t2’ at c2 express the very same 
proposition. For MacFarlane, it must, therefore, be for this very reason that the 
transition from (B1) to (B2) is invalid: since yesterday (by uttering ‘It will 
actually be sunny at t2’) I expressed P1 and P1 is different from P2 (the 
proposition that ‘It is actually sunny at t2’ expresses today), I cannot report 
today what I said yesterday by saying that yesterday I said that it would 
actually be sunny at t2, because this would be tantamount to saying that 
yesterday I expressed P2, contrary to what we are assuming. 
On the other hand, what only could be blamed for the difference in the 
proposition expressed by the two sentences in c1 and c2, respectively, appears 
to be ‘actually’. In other words: in the framework we are considering, only if 
the semantic value of ‘actually’ can vary from context to context, the sentences 
‘It will actually be sunny at t2’ and ‘It is actually sunny at t2’ can express two 
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different propositions in c1 and c2, respectively.6  It seems, therefore, that C and 
B are unsound only if ‘actually’ is an indexical expression, that is an 
expression whose semantic value is a function of the context in which it is 
uttered (such as, for instance, ‘I’ and ‘here’).  
It is, therefore, possible to reconstruct MacFarlane’s implicit argument 
against the supervaluationist as follows: 
 
ARGUMENT D 
(D1)  ‘actually’ is initial-redundant [premiss]  
(D2) The initial redundancy of ‘actually’ is respected only if ‘actually’ is 
defined as returning—somehow—the world of evaluation to the 
worlds overlapping at the context of utterance [premiss] 
(D3)  ‘actually’ is an operator behaving always as an universal quantifier 
over the worlds overlapping at the context of utterance [from (D2)] 
(D4) (15) is the correct semantics for ‘actually’  [from (D3)] 
(D5) ‘actually’ is indexical [from (D4)]  
(D6) If ‘actually’ is indexical, then argument B is invalid and, hence, the 
supervaluationist cannot vindicate the determinacy intuition when 
actuality-sentences are concerned [premiss] 
(D7) The supervaluationist cannot vindicate the determinacy intuition 
when actuality-sentences are concerned [from D5,D6] 
I will not dispute here neither that (D5) follows from (D4) nor the truth of 
(D1), (D2) and (D6).7 Furthermore, for the time being, I will also assume the 
truth of (D3). The crucial point is, therefore, whether (D4) follows from (D3), 
                                                     
6
 In fact, within the framework under discussion, ‘It will be sunny at t2’ in c1 is thought of as expressing 
the same proposition as ‘It is sunny at t2’ in c2. In other words, the supervaluationist endorses an 
eternalist position on propositional truth (see section 3). On this point, see also MacFarlane (2008). 
7
 See, however, Heck (2006) and Brogaard (2008) on some criticism to (D6). 
56 
 
that is whether (15) is the only possible semantics for ‘actually’, if we define 
‘actually’ as an operator behaving always as an universal quantifier over the 
worlds overlapping at the context of utterance.  
The answer, as I shall argue, must be negative. 
3. Context-sensitivity: indexical/nonindexical 
Interestingly enough, it is MacFarlane himself that provides us with the proper 
theoretical tools to contrast his claims about the puzzle of retrospective 
determinacy. As a matter of fact, in his ‘Nonindexical Contextualism’ (2009) 
he disentangles two notions that appear to have always been conflated in the 
literature on contextualism: indexicality and context-sensitivity. This leads him 
to acknowledge two different kinds of context-sensitivity: indexical and 
nonindexical. To understand MacFarlane’s point, consider the following 
argument (for an arbitrary sentence S, contexts Cx and Cy and feature g of the 
context): 
ARGUMENT E 
(E1)  The truth value of S as uttered in an arbitrary context c depends on 
the feature g of  c 
(E2)  contexts Cx and Cy differ relevantly with respect to the feature g 
(E3)  S is true in Cx and false in Cy 
(E4)  Therefore, S expresses different propositions in Cx and Cy 
(E5)  (and hence) the g-difference between Cx and Cy is—somehow—
reflected in the difference between the propositions Px and Py 
(which are the propositions expressed by S in, respectively, Cx and 
Cy) 
Argument E has some initial plausibility. Take for instance the sentence: 
(19)   I am British 
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The truth value of (19) depends clearly on the speaker of the context. Consider 
in fact two contexts in which the speaker is relevantly different, such as the 
contexts in which (19) is uttered by Gordon Brown and Barack Obama, 
respectively. (19) is true as uttered by Brown and false as uttered by Obama. 
This  appears to depend on the fact that Brown and Obama have expressed two 
different propositions, that is the propositions that Gordon Brown is British and 
that Barack Obama is British. 
However, as MacFarlane efficaciously argues, argument E harbours a 
fallacy. Consider, for example, the following instance of E: 
 
ARGUMENT F 
(F1)  The truth value of ‘Socrates is sitting’ as uttered in an arbitrary 
context c depends on the time of  c 
(F2)  the time of context c1 is different from the time of context c2 
(F3)  S is true in c1 and false in c2 
(F4)  Therefore, S expresses different propositions in c1 and c2 
To understand what is wrong with argument F, MacFarlane8 asks us to 
consider the contemporary debate on the semantics of tense. The main point 
under dispute is whether or not propositions can change their truth value over 
time. Eternalists (as our supervaluationists) deny this: they claim that a tensed 
sentence like ‘Socrates is sitting’ uttered in a context c expresses the 
proposition that Socrates is sitting at tc (where tc is the time of c), whose truth 
value is not time-dependent, but depends only on the world against which it is 
evaluated; temporalists, instead, claim that  ‘Socrates is sitting’ expresses 
always the proposition that Socrates is sitting, whose truth value depends (also) 
on the time against which it is evaluated. Therefore, although temporalists 
accept that tense is context-sensitive, they deny its being indexical, thus 
rejecting argument F. 
                                                     
8
 See MacFarlane (2009:  233-234). 
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Whereas eternalists think propositional truth to be relative only to possible 
worlds, for temporalists it is relative to both a possible world and a time. In 
other words: whereas eternalists think that the circumstances of evaluation 
against which propositions are evaluated are simply possible worlds, 
temporalists claim instead that they have to be represented by <world,time> 
pairs.9 Therefore, what makes tense context-sensitive is for temporalists both 
the fact that (i) the truth of tensed sentences like ‘Socrates is sitting’ depends 
(also) on a time-parameter t and the fact that (ii) t (along with the world-
parameter) is ‘initialized’ by the context of utterance, so that the truth value of 
a tensed sentence like ‘Socrates is sitting’ with respect to any context c, 
depends in fact (also) on the time of the context c. 
According to MacFarlane’s lesson, there are thus in general two ways in 
which a certain expression e might be sensitive to a certain feature g of the 
context of utterance: 
(i) The proposition expressed by a sentence S containing e depends on 
the feature g of the context 
(ii)  Although the proposition expressed by a sentence S containing e 
does not depend on the feature g of the context, (i) g is part of the 
circumstances of evaluation (that is: the n-tuple of parameters 
representing the circumstances of evaluation comprises a g-
parameter) and (ii) the relevant g is the g of the context (the g-
parameter is ‘initialized’ by the context of utterance). 
Although in both cases e is context-sensitive, in the first case, e is an indexical 
expression; in the second case, e is a nonindexical expression. 
4. ‘actually’ as nonindexical 
With the indexical/nonindexical distinction in play, it is easy to show that  
argument D is not valid. The fact that ‘actually’ is an operator behaving as an 
universal quantifier over the worlds overlapping at the context of utterance 
                                                     
9
 See, for instance, Kaplan (1989). 
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means that ‘actually’ is a context-sensitive operator. However, as we have just 
seen, the fact that ‘actually’ is context-sensitive does not entail that it is an 
indexical expression, since the feature g of the context ‘actually’ is sensitive to 
might in fact only be part of the circumstances of evaluation, without affecting 
the proposition expressed by actuality-sentences.  
It is relatively easy to give a nonindexical semantics for ‘actually’ which 
meets our desiderata: 
I. First, we enrich our indices (that is the n-tuples <x,y,z,....> representing  the 
circumstances of evaluation) with a set-of-worlds parameter s, (henceforth: the 
‘actuality parameter’) and take, consequently, a point of evaluation to be a 
<context, world, set of worlds> triple.10 
II. Second, we define the actuality operator as follows: 
(20) ‘actually:S’ is true at a point of evaluation <c,w,s> (where c is a 
context, w is a world and s is a set of worlds) if, and only if, S is 
true at every point of evaluation <c,w′,s>, where w′ is a world 
belonging to s. 
III. Finally, we substitute the definition of sentence-truth at a context given in 
(5) with 
(21) S is  true  at a  context c if, and  only if,  S is true  at every point of 
evaluation <c,w,sc>, such that w is a world overlapping at c and sc 
is the set of worlds overlapping at c; 
S is false at the context c if, and only if, S is false at every point of 
evaluation <c,w,sc>, such that w is a world overlapping at c and sc 
is the set of worlds overlapping at c;  
otherwise, S is neither true nor false at c. 
 
                                                     
10
 Notice that taking points of evaluation to be  <context, world, set of worlds> triples is tantamount to 
taking circumstances of evaluation not to be simply possible worlds—as previously done—but <world, 
set of worlds> pairs, instead. 
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Within this theory, three facts assure that ‘actually’ behaves always as a 
universal quantifier over the set of worlds overlapping at the context of 
utterance, thus respecting (D3) and Initial Redundancy: 
 
(a) by (20), the truth-conditions for ‘actually’ involve a universal 
quantification over the set of worlds represented by the actuality 
parameter; 
 
(b) by (21), the actuality parameter is initialized by the context of utterance 
as the set of worlds overlapping at the context of utterance; 
 
(c) in the absence of an operator capable of shifting the actuality-
parameter,11 once initialized by the context of utterance, it retains the 
same value (that is, the set of worlds overlapping at the context of 
utterance) ‘no matter how far the world of evaluation has been shifted’.  
 
The actuality operator so defined is clearly nonindexical. As a matter of 
fact, although in this case ‘actually’ is indeed sensitive to the set of worlds 
overlapping at the context of utterance, such a feature of the context is simply 
part of the circumstances of evaluation and, thus, does not affect the 
proposition expressed by an actuality-sentence. However, if ‘actually’ is 
nonindexical, then arguments B and C are sound. The nonindexicality of 
‘actually’ entails, in fact, that ‘It will be actually be sunny at t2’ at c1 and ‘It is 
actually sunny at t2’ at c2 express the very same proposition, to the effect that 
both the transition from (B2) and (B3) to (B4) is valid and that premiss (C5) is 
true.12 But if B and C are sound, then the supervaluationist has no trouble at all 
with the determinacy intuition, contrary to what MacFarlane claims. 
                                                     
11
 Stanley (2005) has recently attacked—drawing on Lewis (1980)—the position according to which 
some elements of the circumstances cannot be shifted by any sentence operator. For a plausible defence 
from this objection see MacFarlane (2009: 245). 
12
 Notice that ‘true’ has, in this case, to be redefined as follows:  
(8ʹ)  ‘True’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <c,w,s> if, and only if, x is a proposition and x 
is true with respect to the circumstances of evaluation <w,s> 
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5.  Is ‘actually’ nonindexical? 
So far I have (i) argued that MacFarlane’s argument E is invalid, (ii) proposed 
a nonindexical semantics for ‘actually’ and (iii) shown that if ‘actually’ is 
nonindexical, then the puzzle of retrospective determinacy poses no threat to 
the supervaluationist theory. The real question is, therefore, whether there are 
good reasons to think that (at least in a branching setting) ‘actually’ is indeed a 
nonindexical expression. In this section I will present a simple consideration 
that—at least prima facie—appears to bolster this idea. 
Within a branching framework, if I utter today 
(22)  There will be a sea battle tomorrow 
my utterance is neither true nor false because there is no possible future 
marked as ‘special’, among all the futures branching from the present context. 
The supervaluationist  theory rightly predicts so. Suppose, however, that I utter 
today 
(23) There will actually be a sea battle tomorrow 
According to the definitions given by MacFarlane both for the Kaplanian and 
the relativist supervaluationist ((15) and (16) above), my utterance is false 
(from the context of assessment of today), since it is false that in every possible 
future there is a sea battle tomorrow. Moreover, given (5), all the sentences of 
the form ‘actually:S’ are bivalent (with respect to any context c). However, the 
reason why (22) is deemed to be gappy in a branching setting is that no 
possible future is marked as the way things will turned out to be. But this 
seems to be just tantamount to saying that no future is marked as the actual 
one, since every possible future is a good candidate for the way things will 
                                                                                                                                            
Hence, if I say today (in the sunny context c2) ‘What you have said yesterday was true’ referring to the 
proposition P1 I expressed yesterday by uttering ‘It will actually be sunny at t2’ my utterance is true, 
since for every pair <w,s2>, such that w belongs to s2 and s2 is the set of worlds overlapping at c2, the 
proposition P1 that it is actually sunny at t2 is true. [Notice that both (8) and (8ʹ) are instances of  
(8ʹʹ) ‘True’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <c,e> if, and only if, x is a proposition and x is 
true with respect to the circumstances of evaluation e] 
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actually turn out to be. It seems thus that, in a branching setting, not only (23) 
should get the same truth value as (22), but also that, in general, actuality-
sentences of the form ‘actually:S’ should be neither true nor false at all (and 
only) the contexts in which S is neither true nor false. In other words, it appears 
that ‘actually’ should be constrained not only by the principle of Initial 
Redundancy, but also by the principle—that we might dub Initial 
Equivalence—according to which: 
(24) An operator ● is initial-equivalent just in case for all sentences S 
and contexts c, S is true/false/neither at a context c if, and only if, 
‘●S’ is true/false/neither at c. 
There is a simple nonindexical definition of ‘actually’ that can be added to 
the supervaluationist theory to meet Initial Equivalence and make (23) neither 
true nor false. It is sufficient to reformulate (20) and (21) above taking the 
actuality-parameter to be simply a possible world (instead of a set of worlds), 
as follows: 
(25) ‘actually:S’ is true at <c,w,wʹ> (where c is a context and w [the 
world of evaluation] and wʹ [the actuality-parameter] are possible 
worlds) if, and  only if,  S is true at the point of evaluation 
<c,w′,wʹ> 
(26) S is  true  at a  context c if, and  only if,  S is true  at every point of 
evaluation <c,w,w>, such that w is a world overlapping at c;  
S is false at a context c if, and only if, S is false at every point of 
evaluation <c,w,w>, such that w is a world overlapping at c;  
otherwise, S is neither true nor false at c. 
According to (25), ‘actually’ shifts the world of evaluation back to the ‘actual 
world’ represented by the actuality-parameter; according to (26), the ‘actual 
world’ and the world of evaluation are initialized by the context of utterance as 
one of the worlds overlapping at the context. It is straightforward to see that it 
is a consequence of (25) and (26) that: 
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(27) S is true/false/neither at a context c if, and only if, ‘actually:S’ is 
true/false/neither at c. 
and that, therefore, ‘actually’ is not only initial-redundant but also initial-
equivalent.  
As the actuality operator defined in (20), also the operator defined in (25) 
is clearly nonindexical. It seems, on the other hand, that no indexical account 
of ‘actually’ can be added to the supervaluationist theory to meet Initial 
Equivalence. The argument goes as follows: 
 
ARGUMENT G 
(G1)  ‘actually’ is (somehow) sensitive to the world(s) overlapping at the 
context of utterance [premiss] 
(G2)  Within the supervaluationist theory, ‘actually’ is to be defined by 
means of the notion of truth-at-a-point-of-evaluation [from the 
definition of supervaluationism] 
(G3) The notion of truth-at-a-point-of-evaluation is bivalent [from the 
definition of supervaluationism] 
(G4) What only a context can provide for the semantics of ‘actually’ in 
terms of possible worlds within a supervaluationist setting is a set 
of worlds (that is, the set of worlds overlapping at the context) 
[from the definition of branching time] 
(G5)    If ‘actually’ is indexical, the truth value of ‘actually:S’ at a certain 
point of evaluation <c,w> depends on the context parameter c 
[from the definition of indexicality] 
(G6) If ‘actually’ is indexical, the truth value of ‘actually:S’ at a certain 
point of evaluation <c,w>  depends on the set of worlds 
overlapping at c [from G4, G5] 
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(G7)   If ‘actually’ is indexical, then ‘actually:S’ is true at a point of 
evaluation <c,w> if the set of worlds overlapping at c is such-and-
such; otherwise ‘actually:S’ is false at <c,w> [from G1,G2,G3,G6] 
(G8)  If ‘actually’ is indexical, then ‘actually:S’ is true at a context c if 
the set of worlds overlapping at c is such-and-such; otherwise 
‘actually:S’ is false at c [from G7,(2)] 
(G9)     If ‘actually’ is indexical, then for every sentence S and context c, 
‘actually:S’ is either true or false at c [from G8]  
(G10)    For some sentence S and context c, S is neither true nor false at c 
[premiss] 
(G11) ‘actually’ is initial-equivalent only if, for some sentence S and 
context c, ‘actually:S’ is neither true nor false at c [from the 
definition of Initial Equivalence, G10] 
(G11) If ‘actually’ is indexical, it is not initial-equivalent [from G11] 
G is valid; (G1) is intuitively true; (G2)-(G4) cannot be denied without giving 
up either branching time or supervaluationism; (G5) appears to encapsulate the 
very gist of the notion of indexicality; denying (G10) would be for the 
supervaluationist tantamount to rejecting the very idea that the future is open. 
Therefore, we have to conclude that, if the supervaluationist accepts the 
correctness of Initial Equivalence as a constraint on ‘actually’, she is 
committed to a nonindexical account of ‘actually’ as, for instance, the one 
given in (25). 
6.  Conclusion 
The puzzle of retrospective determinacy might appear to require the 
supervaluationist to embrace truth-relativism and consequently depart from the 
standard Kaplanian semantics. To the contrary, I have argued in this paper both 
that (i) if ‘actually’ is nonindexical, then the supervaluationist can easily 
accommodate our intuitions about retrospective assessments without going 
65 
 
relativistic and that (ii) the supervaluationist appears to have good reasons to 
endorse a nonindexical treatment of the actuality operator.13 I conclude, 
therefore, that even accepting MacFarlane claims about the indeterminacy 
intuition and his rather unorthodox supervaluationist framework, truth-
relativism is not necessary in the open future. 
                                                     
13
 An interesting question arising from my discussion is whether, contrary to the received view on the 
matter, ‘actually’ is a nonindexical operator even in standard, non-branching, settings and, consequently, 
whether (25) might be seen as the correct universal definition of the actuality operator. Given the limited 
purpose of this chapter, I must leave this issue for another occasion. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Open Future and Bivalence. 
1.  Introduction 
Suppose that the future is open in some objective and metaphysically robust 
sense and, hence, that for some future-directed proposition ‘Fp’ (where ‘F’ is 
the future-tense operator ‘it will be the case that’ and p is a present-tense 
proposition like ‘It is raining in London’) it is presently unsettled whether it is 
the case that Fp (in what follows ‘N’ stands for ‘it is now settled that’): 
(1) ~NFp & ~N~Fp 
Let us call the truth-status of a certain proposition p its being either truth-
valued (i.e. either true or false) or gappy (i.e. neither true nor false). The 
question I aim to discuss in this chapter is the following:  
What is the truth-status of future-contingent propositions?  
This question gives rise to two distinct philosophical positions, which I shall 
call ‘Gappism’ and ‘True-Futurism’, respectively: 
Gappism: Future-contingent statements are neither true nor false 
True-Futurism: Future-contingent statements are either true or false 
The aim of this chapter is to put forward a positive argument for True-
Futurism. Its core features a general principle, that I shall call the principle of 
‘retrospective determinacy’: 
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Retrospective Determinacy: if it is the case that p, then it was true that p 
would be the case   
As seen in chapter 2, John MacFarlane (2003, 2008) has recently argued that 
the ‘intuition’ behind the principle of retrospective determinacy (the 
‘determinacy intuition’) is in tension with another intuition central to gappism, 
according to which if it is now unsettled today whether it will be raining in 
London tomorrow then it is neither true nor false that it will be raining in 
London tomorrow (the  ‘indeterminacy intuition’). How can it be, in fact, that 
today it is neither true nor false that p and, once a day has elapsed, it is true to 
say that p was true? To solve this puzzle MacFarlane has claimed that gappists 
should employ a truth-relativist framework according to which sentence-truth 
is not only relative to a context of utterance (as in the standard Kaplanian 
framework) but also to a ‘context of assessment’, that is the context from 
which the truth-value of a certain statement or utterance is assessed. 
I agree with MacFarlane that the principle of retrospective determinacy is 
problematic for gappists. However, in what follows, I will argue that the real 
tension is not between Retrospective Determinacy and the Indeterminacy 
Intuition, but between Retrospective Determinacy and the necessitation of the 
main gappist claim about the truth-status of future-contingents. The gist of my 
argument is the following: gappists claim that future-contingent statements are 
as such gappy. This appears to be tantamount to claiming that, necessarily, if 
Fp (‘It will be the case that p’) is unsettled then it is neither true nor false. 
However, if the principle of retrospective determinacy is valid, there are future-
directed statements Fp for which it is both true to say that Fp was true and that 
it was unsettled. But if Fp was both true and unsettled then it is false that 
necessarily if a statement Fp is unsettled then it is gappy. However, if future-
contingent statements have a certain truth-status S (truth-valued/gappy), then 
they must have such a truth-status by necessity, that is: either they are 
necessarily truth-valued or necessarily gappy. Therefore, since they are not 
necessarily gappy they are necessarily truth-valued and, hence, True-Futurism 
is true. 
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In the following, I will expose in detail the argument for the principle of 
bivalence in the open future and review some possible objections to it. I will 
show how the two main possible strategies available to gappists are both 
untenable and conclude that, therefore, True-Futurism is the correct answer to 
the question about the truth-status of future-contingent statements. 
2.  An argument for bivalence in the open future 
Consider the following two principles: 
(P1) Either it is necessary that future-contingent statements are either 
true or false or it is necessary that future-contingent statements are 
neither true nor false 
□[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(TFp v FFp)] v □[(~NFp & ~N~Fp) → 
(~TFp v ~FFp)] 
 
(P2)   If it is the case that p, then it was true that it would be the case that p  
p → PTFp 
(P1) states that future-contingent statements have a certain truth-status S by 
necessity. Within the Gappism/True-Futurism controversy, such a principle is 
surely valid. Both contenders claim, in fact, something about future-contingent 
statements as such. Therefore, they must perforce claim that their thesis has at 
least a certain form of necessity. How could it be, in fact, that future-contingent 
statements have a certain truth-status S only contingently? How could it be 
that, say, future-contingent statements are actually gappy but, had things gone 
otherwise, they would have been truth-valued? What would settle their truth-
status in this case? It appears, thus, that any philosophically stable and credible 
position about the truth-status of future-contingent statements has to be put in 
the form of a necessity-claim.  
On the other hand, (P2) strikes as a highly-intuitively valid principle 
governing the way we talk about past assertions about the future. Often, in fact, 
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we find ourselves saying things like ‘You were right’ or ‘What she said was 
true’ referring to things people have said in the past about the future. The very 
practice of betting appears to be based on the principle of retrospective 
determinacy: ‘I’ll pay you 100$, if it turns out that what you are now saying is 
true’; ‘Yesterday you bet on Crazy Horse, saying that it would win the race. 
You guessed right. Here is your money!’.   
However, P1 and P2 can be used to argue that, necessarily, future-
contingent statements are either true or false and, therefore, (at least as far 
future-contingent statements are concerned) the principle of bivalence is valid 
even if the future is open. The argument is the following: 
 
ARGUMENT A 
(A1) p [premiss] 
(A2) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp) [premiss] 
(A3) PTFp [from A1 by P2] 
(A4) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp & TFp) [from A2, A3] 
(A5) ~□[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(~TFp v ~FFp)] [from A4] 
(A6) □[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(TFp v FFp)] [from A5 by P1] 
 
 
If today it is the case that p, then it was true yesterday that p would be the case 
today. But it was unsettled yesterday whether it would have been the case that 
p today. Therefore, yesterday the proposition that today it would have been the 
case that p was both unsettled and true. It is thus false that, necessarily, future-
contingent statements are neither true nor false. Therefore, since future-
contingent statements have a certain truth-status necessarily, it follows that, 
necessarily, future-contingent statements are either true or false. 
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3.  Rejecting P1: deep and superficial past 
The first way to resist A’s conclusion is to deny P1. The simple denial of P1, 
however, appears insufficient to achieve a plausible philosophical position 
about the truth-status of future-contingent statements: what can it mean, in fact,  
that future-contingent statements are sometimes truth-valued and sometimes 
gappy? What could determine, on each occasion, their truth-status? Gappists, 
however, appear to have a prima facie plausible story to tell about P1 instead of 
simply rejecting it. It is true, they can say, that yesterday Fp was true. But this 
is only how things are from the perspective of the present moment (or, 
alternatively, considering yesterday simply as a moment that is now past, 
keeping fixed the way things have turned out to be today). Instead, from the 
perspective of yesterday (alternatively: considering yesterday as it was when it 
was present) Fp was indeed neither true nor false. Gappists can in other words 
distinguish between two ways to look at a (either merely possible or actual) 
moment m in time: from the perspective of an arbitrary moment mʹ or from the 
perspective of m itself. This distinction, in turn, gives rise to two kinds of 
necessity, that we might call ‘absolute’ and ‘diagonal’, respectively: 
(N1) p is  absolutely necessary if and only if, for every possible moment 
m, p is true at m from the perspective of every time mʹ 
(N2) p is diagonally necessary if, and only if, for every possible moment 
m, p is true at m from the perspective of m itself 
For (what we can call) the refined gappist, N2 is the sense in which it is true 
that, necessarily, future-contingent statements are neither true nor false, that is: 
future-contingent statements can be retrospectively truth-valued, but present 
future-contingent statement are always (and by d-necessity) gappy. 
In light of the distinction between N1 and N2, P2 becomes ambiguous, 
since the necessity operator ‘□’ featuring in it can be interpreted as referring to 
either a-necessity or d-necessity. If we interpret P1 as a-necessity, it is false. If 
we interpret P1 as d-necessity, it is true, but the resulting argument—which we 
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might call ‘argument Aʹ’ (where ‘■’ stands for ‘it is d-necessary that’) —
becomes invalid: 
 
ARGUMENT Aʹ 
(Aʹ1) p [premiss] 
(Aʹ2) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp) [premiss] 
(Aʹ3) PTFp [from Aʹ1 by P2] 
(Aʹ4) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp & TFp) [from Aʹ2, Aʹ3] 
(Aʹ5) ~■[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(~TFp v ~FFp)] [from Aʹ4] 
(A6) ■[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(TFp v FFp)] [from Aʹ5 by P1] 
 
 
In this case, the invalidity of Aʹ can depend on two factors, depending on how 
we interpret the past-tense operator ‘P’ in (Aʹ4). As a matter of fact, the 
distinction between a- and d-necessity goes along with the distinction between 
what we may call a ‘superficial’ and ‘deep’ past, that is the past as it is now 
and the past as it was when it was present. If ‘P’ in (Aʹ4) is intended in the 
superficial sense, then  (Aʹ4) is true but then the passage from (Aʹ4) to (Aʹ5) is 
invalid, since, from the point of view of today, it was true yesterday that Fp 
was true, does not entail that when yesterday was present Fp was true and 
therefore, that it is not d-necessary, that if Fp is unsettled it is gappy. If (Aʹ4) is 
intended in the deep sense, then it is false, since from the point of view of 
yesterday, Fp  was neither true nor false. 
4. Retrospective determinacy: deep and superficial future 
It seems thus that gappists can resist argument A’s conclusion by rejecting P1.  
To reject P1 (and to preserve a certain modal strength for their main claim) 
they have to  distinguish between two kinds of necessity. This distinction goes 
 72 
 
along with the distinction between two ways to consider the past: the past as it 
is (superficial past) and the past as it was (deep past). Let us introduce the two 
past-tense operators ‘was:’ and ‘WAS:’ to refer to the superficial and the deep 
past, respectively. According to the refined gappist, although it is true that in 
the superficial past Fp was true 
(2) was:TFp 
in the deep past Fp was neither true nor false 
(3) WAS:(~TFp & ~FFp) 
However, a problem appears to lurk. As a matter of fact, the a-/d-necessity 
distinction does not  go along only with the superficial/deep past distinction but 
also with the distinction of  a superficial and deep future, that is: the future as it 
is and the future as it will be. It appears, in other words, that if we can talk 
about the past as it is and the past as it was, we can also distinguish between 
the future as it is now and the future as it will be, when the relevant amount of 
time will have elapsed. Let us, then, also introduce the two future-tense 
operators ‘will:’ and ‘WILL:’ to refer to the superficial and the deep future, 
respectively. The distinction between deep and superficial past and future 
allows thus for the following disambiguations of P2: 
(P2a)  p → was:Twill:p 
(P2b)  p → was:TWILL:p 
(P2c)  p → WAS:Twill:p 
(P2d)  p → WAS:TWILL:p 
Within the refined gappist theory under consideration (2) is valid. Intuitively, 
the reason appears to be the following: from the point of view of the present it 
was true that it would be the case that p. That is: if you move one day in the 
past keeping fixed the way things actually turned out to be today, you cannot 
but conclude that yesterday, in the superficial past, it was true that it would be 
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the case that p. If (2) is valid, then P2a and P2b are also valid: in the superficial 
past it was surely true that both in its deep and superficial future it will be the 
case that p. If we keep the way things turned out to be today fixed and we 
consider the past from the point of view of today, it is surely true that in the 
future of the (superficial) past p is the case and, therefore, that it was true that it 
would be the case that p. 
The invalid interpretation of P2 is, for the refined gappist, P2c: if it is now 
the case that p, this does not  entail that in the deep past it was true that it 
would be the case that p. Once we move on considering the deep past, we are  
no longer keeping an eye, as it were, on what is currently the case today: we 
are looking at what was the case yesterday from the point of view of yesterday, 
when the future still had to unfold. However, the gappist continues, before the 
future unfolded it was neither true nor false that it would be the case that p 
today. The refined gappist can thus at least claim the following: 
(4) By d-necessity, superficial future-contingent statements are neither 
true nor false 
and, somehow, vindicate her philosophical intuitions. 
It seems, however, that if we thoroughly follow this train of thought we 
cannot but conclude that also P2d must be valid for the gappist. ‘WILL:p’ 
refers yesterday to the way things would turn out today not from the point of 
view of yesterday, but from the point of view of today. ‘WILL:p’ is in fact 
short of: ‘when tomorrow will be present (from the point of view of tomorrow) 
p will be the case’. If gappists can, in other words, consistently claim that 
(5) WAS:Twill:p 
is not true (since when yesterday was present, its superficial future was neither 
a p-future or a ~p-future) and, hence, that P2c is invalid,  they do not  appear to 
be in position to reject 
(6)  WAS:TWILL:p  
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and, hence, the validity of P2d: if from the point of view of the present it is the 
case that p, how could it have been false, even in the deep past, that from the 
point of view of its future (that is, today) p would be the case? 
If these lines of reasoning are correct, it follows that, although the 
difference between deep and superficial past and future allows the gappist to 
maintain that it is d-necessary that superficial future-contingent statements are 
neither true nor false,  
(7) ■[(~Nwill:p & ~N~will:p)→(~Twill:p v ~Fwill:p)] 
(where ‘■’  stands for d-necessity) she is committed to the thesis that deep 
future contingent statements are a-necessarily either true or false (in what 
follows ‘□’ stands for a-necessity): 
(8) □[(~NWILL:p & ~N~WILL:p)→(TWILL:p v FWILL:p)] 
Although (7) expresses in some way that the thesis the gappist was trying to 
defend, the fact that (8) is true in her theory shows that (7) is nothing but a 
pyrrhic victory for her.  
The gappist’s main statement is that future-contingent statements are 
neither true nor false. But within the refined gappist theory we are discussing, 
there is indeed a class of future-contingent statements (that is: deep future-
contingent statements) such that they are truth-valued even if unsettled. 
Therefore, the kind of gappism under consideration is only a weak form of 
denial of the principle of bivalence in the open future. Not only. Such form of 
gappism appears at a closer scrutiny to be so weak, to be actually compatible 
with the very spirit, if not the letter, of True-Futurism. As we have seen, the 
notion of a superficial future intends to capture the way the future is and to 
distinguish it from the way the future will be. However, what exactly could it 
mean, ‘the way the future is’? The only plausible way to make sense of this 
expression seems to be that of interpreting it as referring to the way in which 
the present (the entities that now existing plus the specific pattern of 
fundamental properties and relations obtaining among them and, perhaps, the 
laws of nature) determines the future. But to say that the future is unsettled 
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appears to be tantamount to saying that the present fails to fully determine how 
the future will be. Once the distinction between deep and superficial future is 
accepted it seems thus to become simply analytic that—in this specific sense of 
‘being true’—superficial future-contingent statements are neither true nor 
false. If a superficial future-contingent statement represents the way in which 
the present settles the future and the future is unsettled, then, for instance, it 
will be neither true that the way in which the future is settled by the present is 
such that it will be the case that p, nor false that the way in which the future is 
settled by the present is such that it will be the case that p (and, hence, true that 
the way in which the future is settled by the present is such that it will be the 
case that ~p). This is something that true futurists should be perfectly happy to 
accept. Their point is, in fact, that, beyond the way in which the present 
determines and settles the future, there is a determinate way the future will 
be...in the future! True futurists can thus reply to the refined gappists: “The 
superficial future  is but a faux future: it is not the real future—what will 
happen tomorrow, when tomorrow will be present, but only the present—
incomplete—projection of what the future will be. Therefore, when you say 
that superficial future-contingent statements are neither true nor false you are 
in fact just saying that the future is unsettled: something which we have agreed 
on from the very beginning of our discussion”. 
These lines of reasoning appear to be plausible enough. However, things 
actually get worse for the refined gappist, since regardless of the validity of 
P2d, a simple argument shows that what we might call the ‘weak’ rejection of 
P2 (that is, the rejection of P2 only limited to P2c) is simply untenable. We can 
recall that the kind of gappist under consideration upholds both that d-
necessarily, superficial future-contingent statements are neither true nor false 
(9) ■[(~Nwill:p & ~N~will:p)→(~Twill:p v ~Fwill:p)] 
and that at least P2a  
(P2a)  p → was:Twill:p 
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is valid. The validity of (9) entails the validity of the principle according to  
whether it is now the case that it is neither settled that p nor ~p then p is neither 
true nor false 
(10) NOW(~Nwill:p & ~N~will:p) → NOW(~Twill:p & ~Fwill:p) 
However, (P2a) and (10)—plus some intuitively valid principles governing the 
behaviour of tense-operators—suffice to conclude the falsity of (9). 
 
ARGUMENT B 
(B1) NOW(~Nwill:p & ~N~will:p) [premiss] 
(B2) will:(p v ~p) [premiss] 
(B3) will:(was:Twill:p v was:Fwill:p) [from B1, by 
P2a] 
(B4) will:was:(Twill:p v Fwill:p) [from B3] 
(B5) Twill:p v Fwill:p [from B4] 
(B6) NOW(Twill:p v Fwill:p) [from B1, B5] 
(B7) ~■[(~Nwill:p & ~N~will:p)→(~Twill:p v ~Fwill:p)] [from B1,B6] 
 
(B2) appears to have ‘the force of a tautology’ (Thomason, 1975), even when 
the superficial future is concerned. No matter if the future is open or not, it will 
be the case that either p or not p for every possible p. Rejecting (B2) seems 
thus to be a desperate manoeuvre. Moreover, the rejection of (B2) and, hence, 
the truth of 
(11)  ~will:(p v ~p) 
would require the refined gappists to reject also some intuitively valid 
principles governing the interaction between ‘will:’ and ‘~’ on the one hand 
and ‘&’ and ‘v’ (De Morgan laws) to avoid the catastrophic conclusion 
according to which it is true that: 
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(12) will:(~p & p) 
The passage from (B2) to (B3) is based on the principle of retrospective 
determinacy for superficial tense-operator which, as I have argued, the refined 
gappist is forced to accept in virtue of the very deep/superficial past/future 
distinction. (B4) is obtained by (B3) by the agglomeration principle for the 
superficial past-tense operator 
(AG) (was:P & was:Q) → was:(P & Q) 
It is true that when it comes to the open future some apparently intuitive 
principles governing the interaction between operators and Boolean 
connectives have to be rejected by gappists. For instance, gappists appear to 
have to reject either the fact that the future-tense operator or the truth-operator 
distributes over disjunction 
(FD) F(p v q) → (Fp v Fq) 
(TD) T(p v q) → (Tp v Tq) 
since, otherwise the following argument would be valid: 
 
ARGUMENT C 
(C1) TF(p v ~p) [premiss] 
(C2) T(Fp v F~p) [from C1, by FD] 
(C3) TFp v TF~p [from C2, by TD] 
(C4) TFp v FFp [from C3] 
 
 
However, rejecting AG would seem really odd. ‘was:P & was:Q’ and ‘was:(P 
& Q)’ appear in fact to be equivalent formalisations of ‘it was both the case 
that p and q’. What could it mean that it was the case that P and that it was the 
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case that Q but it was not the case that P and Q? Similarly, the passages from 
(B4) to (B5) and from (B5) to (B6) appear to be hardly questionable.1  
It follows that, at least prima facie, gappists cannot reject A’s conclusion 
by rejecting P1 in light of the distinction between two dimensions of 
pastness/futurity. Therefore, the culprit for A’s conclusion must be the 
principle of retrospective determinacy. 
5. Retrospective determinacy: an argument from aboutness 
As we have seen, the principle of retrospective determinacy appears to be an 
intuitively valid principle about the past truth-status of past future-contingent 
statement. However, the validity of the principle can be traced back to what 
appears to be a prima facie platitude about future-directed statements, that is, 
their being about the future of the moment in which they are made. Consider, 
in fact, the following argument (‘m1’ is the moment that obtained yesterday): 
 
ARGUMENT D 
(D1) It is now the case that p [premiss] 
(D2) In the future of m1, it is the case that p [from D1] 
(D3) Fp was about the future of m1 [premiss] 
(D4) Fp was true if, and only if, in the future of m1 it 
is the case that p 
[from D3] 
(D5) Fp was true [from D2, D4] 
 
                                                     
1
 As for  the passage from (B4) to (B5), the tacit assumption is that the superficial tense-operators in 
argument D are metric tense-operator of the form ‘it was/will be the case that n time-units ago/hence’. 
Therefore, the general principle underlying the passage from (B4) to (B5) is: 
(P) FnPnp → p 
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Now m2 is present and p obtains. m2 has become present one day after m1. 
Therefore, it is true that in the future of m1 it is the case that p. Fp was about 
the future of m1 and, thus, Fp was true if, and only if, in the future of m1 it is 
the case that p. Since that is in fact the case, we cannot but conclude that it was 
true that Fp and, hence (since the argument clearly generalises ), that the 
principle of retrospective determinacy is valid. 
At first glance, it may seem that the gappist might declare argument D 
invalid by blaming the passage from (D3) to (D4) and claiming that (i) what 
only follows from (D3) is 
(D4ʹ)  Fp was true if, and only if, it was the case that in the future of m1 it 
is the case that p 
and (ii) From (D2) and (D4ʹ) one cannot conclude (D5). However, as we have 
seen in the previous section, it seems that gappists must reject the 
deep/superficial past/future distinction. It is clear that without such distinction 
no meaningful difference between (D4) and (D4ʹ) can be invoked. If, in fact, 
we cannot distinguish between the future of m1 from the point of view of m1 
and the future of m1 from the present point of view, we are only left with the 
future of m1 simpliciter. To accept that the future of m1 is now such that p 
obtains, but was not such that p would obtain, is just to say that the way the 
future of m1 is (now) can differ from the way the future of m1 was (when m1 
was present). Without the possibility of distinguishing between the way the 
future is and the way the future was, the passage from (D3) to (D4) is clearly 
valid: if ‘It will be the case that p’ was (as it appears to be) about the future of 
m1 (stating, thus, that in the future (of m1) it will be the case that p), then ‘It 
will be the case that p’ was true if, and only if, in the future of m1 it is  the case 
that p. It follows that this kind of gappist, to resist D’s conclusion, must reject 
(D3) and, hence, claim that future-contingent statements are not  about the 
future. 
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6.  Simple Reductive Gappism  
Let us take stock. Argument A proves that future-contingent statements are 
truth-valued and, hence, that Gappism is false. In order to resist A’s 
conclusion, the gappist can either appeal to the distinction between a deep and 
superficial past and future or reject the principle of retrospective determinacy 
altogether. However, the distinction between the two dimensions of pastness 
and futurity entails the validity of some refined versions of Retrospective 
Determinacy (in particular P2a and P2d) that are (respectively) at odds with 
Gappism and compatible with True-Futurism. Therefore, the gappist has to 
reject P2 altogether along with the distinction between the past/future as it 
was/will be and the past/future as it is. However, the principle of retrospective 
determinacy appears to be grounded in the very idea that future-contingent 
statements are about the future. Therefore, in order to reject the thesis that 
future-contingent statements are truth-valued, the gappist has to uphold the 
thesis that (the so-called) ‘future’-contingent statements are not  about the 
future. 
But what could it mean that future-directed statements are not  about the 
future? I see two only possible answers: 
 
(i) future-directed statements are not  about anything 
 
(ii) future-directed statements are about the present 
 
According to the first option, future-directed statements are not  about 
anything. However, if any future-directed statement is not  about anything, it 
seems difficult to deny that every future-directed statement  is as such gappy. 
In other words, gappists are burdened with having to explain why future-
contingent statements  are neither true nor false. On the other hand, it appears 
that if future-directed statements are not  about anything, then this must be the 
reason why future-contingent statements and, hence, all future-directed 
statements are gappy. This, however, does not  seem to be correct. On the one 
hand, in fact, there are logical truths like: 
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(13) p v ~p 
and 
(14) ~(p & ~p) 
such that, when prefixed by the future-tense operator, appear to yield true 
statements: 
(15) F(p v ~p) 
(16) F~(p v ~p) 
On the other hand, there appear to be complex propositions such that, although 
formed by future-contingent propositions (which for the gappist would be 
neither true nor false if taken alone) are nevertheless truth-valued such as 
(17) Fp v F~p 
or (taking p to stand for ‘Socrates exists’ and supposing both that  Socrates 
exists now and that it is metaphysically impossible that something begins  to 
exist again, after it has ceased to exist) 
(18) FFp→Fp2 
If future-directed statements were not  as such about anything and, hence, as 
such, neither true nor false, then also (14), (15), (16) and (17) would have to be 
assessed as neither true nor false, contrary to what our intuitions appear to 
strongly mandate. 
It follows that future-directed statements must have some sort of truth-
conditions and, therefore, given the intuitive validity of principle (AB-TC), 
must be about something. But what can future-directed statements be about if 
not the future? The only plausible candidate I see is the present state of the 
world. As a matter of fact, I am arguing that (i) gappists have to reject the 
                                                     
2
 These appear to be the counterparts in an open future setting of what Kit Fine has called ‘penumbral 
connections’ in the case of vagueness (see Fine 1975). 
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principle of retrospective determinacy to be able to claim that, necessarily, 
future-contingent statements are neither true nor false and (ii) that future-
directed statements, although about something, are not about the future. 
Therefore, gappists seem to be obliged to claim that 
 
(i) future-directed statements are about something 
 
(ii) future-directed statements are truth-valued if, and only if, they are 
now-settled, that is: they are settled by the present state of the 
world 
 
However, the conjunction of (i) and (ii) appears to at least strongly suggest that 
what future-directed statements are about is, in fact, the present state of the 
world, and in particular, the way in which the present state of the world pre-
determines the future. Gappists can in fact say: a future-directed statement P is 
true(false) if, and only if, the present state of the world is such to necessitate 
P(~P); otherwise P is neither true nor false. 
7.  Refined Reductive Gappism 
As we have seen in section 3, Refined Gappism (the gappist theory that 
distinguishes between deep and superficial past and future) has troubles with 
the following disambiguations of P2: 
(P2a)   p→was:will:p 
(P2d)  p→WAS:WILL:p 
This led us to conclude that Refined Gappism is an untenable theory. However, 
at a closer look, that conclusion was a little too rash, since the refined gappist 
appears in fact to be in position to try and maintain the deep/superficial past 
and future distinction without committing herself to the validity of P2a and 
P2d. 
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First, she can resist argument B’s conclusion by claiming that what only 
argument B shows is that principle P2a is not a-necessary, but only d-
necessary. At any moment m in time considered as present (that is: from the 
point of view of m itself) it is true that if p, then in the superficial past it was 
the case that in the superficial future it would be the case that p. But this is not 
always the case at moments not considered as present. If, in fact, in the 
superficial future it  will be the case that either p or ~p, we cannot conclude by 
constructive dilemma that in the superficial future it  will be the case that either 
was:Twill:p or was:Twill:~p. On the one hand, in fact, the superficial future is 
in fact nothing but  what it is settled by the present state of the world; on the 
other hand, the superficial past of the superficial future is just the present. 
Therefore, to say that in the superficial past of the superficial future it is the 
case that either will:p is true or will:~p is true is just tantamount to saying that 
in the present either will:p is true or will:~p is true. However, for the gappist 
the present can be such as to settle the truth of it will be the case that either p 
or ~p without actually settling either the truth of it will be the case that p or  it 
will be the case that ~p. Only from the point of view of the present, concludes 
the gappist, there is always Retrospective Determinacy.  
As for  P2d, consider the following disambiguation of argument D given 
the deep/superficial past/future distinction (for reasons that will be clear below) 
I will keep the ambiguous ‘Fp’ for the future-contingent statement in question; 
the capitalised  ‘WAS’ signals the presence of a deep-past tense-operator in the 
logical form of the sentence): 
 
ARGUMENT E 
(E1) It is now the case that p [premiss] 
(E2) In the deep future of m1, it is the case that p [from E1] 
(E3) Fp WAS about the deep future of m1 [premiss] 
(E4) Fp WAS true if, and only if, in the deep future 
of m1 it is the case that p 
[from E3] 
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(E5) Fp WAS true [from E2, E4] 
 
Now m2 is present and p obtains. m2 has become present one day after m1. 
Therefore, it is true that in the deep future of m1 it is the case that p. In the 
deep past Fp was about the deep future of m1 and, thus, in the deep past 
WILL:p was true if, and only if, in the deep future of m1 it is the case that p. 
Since that is in fact the case, we cannot but conclude that in the deep past it 
was true that Fp and, hence (since the argument clearly generalises), that P2d is 
valid. 
As it happened with argument D, at first glance it may seem that the 
gappist might declare argument E invalid by blaming the passage from (E3) to 
(E4) and claiming that (i) what only follows from (E3) is 
(E4ʹ)  Fp WAS true if, and only if, it WAS the case that in the deep future 
of m1 it will be the case that p 
and (ii) From (E2) and (E4ʹ) one cannot conclude (E5). However, in order to 
distinguish between (E4) and (E4ʹ) one has to distinguish between the deep 
future as it is and the deep future as it was and hence distinguish between a 
superficial deep-future and a deep deep-future. Clearly, this move can only 
shift the problem to another level, since in that case it would be sufficient to 
rephrase argument E substituting deep tense operators and deep temporal 
expressions with deep-deep ones. At that point, distinguishing between a 
superficial deep-deep future and a deep, deep-deep future would just be 
tantamount to embarking in what would seem to be a vicious infinite regress 
that—I submit—gappists would not be happy to be committed to. Therefore, 
the only option available for the refined gappist is to reject premiss (E3) and 
deny that future-directed statements are about the deep future. The refined 
reductive gappist introduces, thus, an asymmetry between the past and the 
future: while we can talk both about the superficial and the deep past, we can 
only talk about the superficial future, that is what is settled by a certain state of 
the world at a certain time. 
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8.  No (deep) future for us? 
Refined Reductive Gappism, contrary to Reductive Simple Gappism manages 
to maintain a certain form, if weak, of Retrospective Determinacy and thus 
appears to be preferable to its sister theory. Both theories, however, appear to  
reduce the truth value of our future-directed talk to what is settled by the 
present state of the world and thus deny the possibility of talking about or even 
referring to the ‘real’ (deep) future. Unfortunately, this position appears to have 
some unwelcome consequences that—as I shall argue—should ultimately lead 
to its rejection and, hence, to the acceptance of True Futurism as the right 
stance on future-contingent statements. 
 In the following, I will address argument D. As it will be clear, however, 
everything I will argue against the simple reductive gappist also holds for —
mutatis mutandis—the refined reductive gappist: it is sufficient to substitute 
‘deep future’ with ‘future’ where appropriate. 
 
8.1 The present is the future of the past 
 
Return now to the second line of argument D 
(D2)   In the future of m1, it is the case that p 
which is inferred by the fact that (i) it was the case that m1 obtains and (ii) it is 
now the case that p. How can our gappist uphold (D2)? It does not  seem she 
can: for her, in fact, our future-talk is only about what is settled about the 
present and it is true even now that what was the case at m1 was such as not to 
settle whether it would have been the case that p or not it the future. Therefore, 
the gappist must reject (D2). Not only. By generalising from this point she also 
has to claim that 
(19) This moment (=m2) is not the future of m1 
since the fact that the present moment m2 obtains is not settled by the fact that 
m1 obtains. Hence, it seems that the gappist must commit herself to the 
incredible claim that while m1 is the past of m2, m2 is not the future of m1. 
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This, however, strikes as clearly absurd: if m1 obtained in the past, then this 
very moment is clearly the future of m1—what has happened after m1 has 
obtained—even if m1 did not  settle m2 to obtain. Therefore, the gappist  has to 
acknowledge that m2 is the future of m1. But, in order to acknowledge that, she 
also has to acknowledge a notion of future that is not exhausted  by what is 
settled by the present and, hence, to admit that, contrary to what the rejection 
of argument D’s conclusion appears to require her, future-directed talk can be 
about the real future.  
 
8.2  Possible futures vs. the settled present state of the world 
 
It appears natural to model the open future by means of a branching tree of 
possible histories. Within a branching setting, the future of a certain moment to 
is open if, and only if, there is a plurality of possible histories sharing a 
common past up to m and branching afterwards. Intuitively, such histories 
represent all the possible ways ‘the future might turn out to be’.  
Consider then a certain history h passing through the present moment m 
and call H the set of all and only the propositions true with respect to h (and 
m). H can be divided in two proper subsets SETT and FUT: SETT is the set of 
propositions that are settled at m; FUT is the set  of propositions that are true 
with respect to h but unsettled with respect to m. Intuitively,  FUT represents a 
possible way ‘the future’ might turn out to be. However, in order to grasp this 
notion of the future and make sense of it, one has to be able to grasp and refer 
to a notion of future that exceeds what is simply settled by the present. The 
possible future that is represented in h is not  (simply) a possible way the 
gappist’s reductive future might turn out to be: it is a possible way the real and 
deep future might turn out to be; the future that isn’t exhausted by what is 
settled by the present.  
As a matter of fact, when gappists say that “the future” is unsettled, they 
cannot thereby refer to the reductive future: what is, in fact, settled by the 
present is not open, but as well settled. The reductive future (the way in which 
the present settles the future) is thus settled, by definition. What is open  is the 
deep future, that is the way the future will be beyond what is  settled by the 
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present state of the world. It is the deep future that can now go one way or the 
other and precisely because it is not settled by the present state of the world.  
 
It appears thus that not only the possibility of modelling the openness of the 
future by means of branching histories, but also the very idea of an open future  
requires the ability to grasp and talk about a notion of future that is not  simply 
exhausted by what is settled by the present state of the world. 
9.  The argument 
The upshot of the considerations put forward above is that (at least part of) our 
future-directed talk employs—and indeed requires—a notion of deep future, 
that is a notion of the future as it will be beyond what is settled by the present 
moment. This allows us to refine the True-Futurist position as consisting in the 
conjunction of the following claims: 
 
Refined True Futurism 
(TF1)  Our future-directed discourse features (at least in part) a notion of 
future that exceeds—in principle—what is simply settled by the 
present (=the deep future). 
(TF2) Some (deep-) future-directed statements are settled; others are 
unsettled. 
(TF2)  Necessarily, every (deep-) future-directed statement is either true or 
false. 
As we have seen in section 3, True-Futurism is better understood not as the 
theory according to which future-contingent statements simpliciter are neither 
true nor false, but as the theory which affirms the absolute necessity of  the 
principle of bivalence for statements that are about the deep and real future of  
a moment, that is the dimension of future possibly exceeding what the present 
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state of the world settles. The argument for true futurism can thus be seen as an 
argument from the meaningfulness of the notion of deep future.  
From what I have argued above, it follows in fact, that once the notion of a 
deep future is accepted as meaningful and, hence, the existence of propositions 
about the deep future is acknowledged, the following argument (merging 
together arguments A and D(/E)) is valid. 
 
ARGUMENT F 
(F1) Now, the moment m2 obtains [premiss] 
(F2) In the past, the moment m1 obtained [premiss] 
(F3) This moment (m2) is the (deep) future of m1 [from F1, F2] 
(F4) It is now the case that p [premiss] 
(F5) The (deep) future contingent statement Fp was 
about the (real, deep) future of m1 
[premiss] 
(F6) The (deep) future contingent statement Fp was 
true if, and only if, in the (deep) future of m1 it is 
the case that p 
[from F4] 
(F7) Fp was true (at m2), even though unsettled [from F3, F4, F6] 
(F8) It is not (a-)necessary that (deep) future-
contingent statements are gappy 
[from F7] 
(F9) (deep) Future-contingent statements are either   
(a-)necessarily gappy or (a-)necessarily truth-
valued 
[premiss] 
(F10) (deep) Future-contingent statements are   
(a-)necessarily truth-valued 
[from F8, F9] 
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We can thus finally appreciate the importance of the principle of 
retrospective determinacy in the Gappism/True Futurism debate. The principle 
of retrospective determinacy allows us to understand what  the present truth-
status of future-contingent propositions is by looking at other moments in time 
from the advantaged point of view of their future. By so doing, it is possible for 
us to realise that the unsettledness of the future is perfectly compatible with 
future-contingent statements’ being truth-valued and, hence, that the principle 
of bivalence is indeed valid for future-directed statements as such.  
10. Against MacFarlane’s relativist theory 
The argument exposed in favour of True-Futurism and against Gappism clearly 
applies also to MacFarlane’s relativist theory for the open future.3 As a matter 
of fact, the deep/superficial past/future distinction characterising  Refined 
Gappism is based on the distinction between the two ways of considering a 
moment in time. 
 
• as the moment m at which a certain statement has a certain truth-
value (or not) 
 
• as the moment mʹ from the perspective of which a certain statement 
has a certain truth-value (or not) at m 
 
This distinction is clearly mirrored within MacFarlane’s relativist framework in 
the distinction between the context of use (the context in which a certain 
sentence is uttered or used) and the context of assessment (the context from 
which a certain sentence is assessed as uttered in a certain context of use). 
According to MacFarlane, although from the point of view of today, it is 
                                                     
3
 In what follows  I will implicitly address MacFarlane’s first theory on future contingent statements (see 
MacFarlane 2003). In his second paper on the subject (MacFarlane 2008) he, in fact, advances a new 
theory for the open future according to which, at least at the object-language level, the principle of 
bivalence is valid.  
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neither true nor false that it will be sunny tomorrow, it is correct to say from 
the point of view of today (which we can suppose to be a sunny day) that it was 
true yesterday that it would be sunny today. This means that for MacFarlane, 
the principle stating the entailment from the unsettledness of the future to the 
gappiness of future-contingent statements is only diagonally valid, that is it is 
only true when the context of use and the context of assessment coincide. 
At this point, however, MacFarlane is faced with a choice: either his 
gappist theorist can express in her object-language the main statement 
characterising Gappism in all its modal force or not. Clearly, the second 
possibility—that we might label Ineffable Gappism—cannot be a real option. 
Therefore, MacFarlane must concede the existence in the object-language of 
his theory of operators capable of shifting the context of assessment4  to ensure 
that gappists are  able to state their gappist credo while debating with their 
detractors and to say things like: 
(20) From the point of view of today, it was true that it would be sunny 
today, but from the point of view of yesterday it was neither true 
nor false 
But, clearly, these kinds of operators are nothing but the counterpart in 
MacFarlane’s framework of our deep tense-operators ‘WILL:’ and ‘WAS:’ and 
thus the criticism advanced above against Refined Gappism and Reductive 
Refined Gappism also applies to MacFarlane’s case. Consider, in fact, the 
following statement 
(21) From the point of view of tomorrow it is true that  it will be sunny 
tomorrow 
and call it S. Suppose then that today is indeed a sunny day. MacFarlane is thus 
faced with a choice: either the following statement is true or not. 
(22) From the point of view of yesterday S was true 
                                                     
4
 According to the Kaplanian terminology, such operators would be ‘monsters’ (see Kaplan 1989). 
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If (22) is true, then True-Futurism is vindicated, since (22)—the true-futurist 
can say—is about the deep future of yesterday (what will happen in the future 
from the point of view of the future) and its being true entails that, therefore, 
deep future-contingent statements are a-necessarily either true or false. If (22) 
is false it must be because the expression ‘from the point of view of tomorrow’ 
fails to really refer to the point of view of tomorrow and is in fact equivalent to 
the expression ‘from the point of view of today’, so that, yesterday, (22) is in 
fact equivalent to 
(23) From the point of view of today it is true that  it will be sunny 
tomorrow 
and, hence, also to 
(24) It is true that  it will be sunny tomorrow 
Consider, in fact, the following argument: 
 
ARGUMENT G 
(G1) It is sunny today [premiss] 
(G2) In the deep future of m1, it is sunny the next 
day 
[from G1] 
(G3) From the point of view of yesterday, S was 
about the deep future of m1 
[premiss] 
(G4) From the point of view of yesterday, S was true 
if, and only if, in the deep future of m1 it is is 
sunny the next day 
[from G3] 
(G5) From the point of view of yesterday, S was true [from G2, G4] 
 
As with arguments D and E, the only option  for MacFarlane is that of rejecting 
premiss (G3). But once premiss (G3) is rejected it follows that deep future-
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directed statements like ‘from the point of view of tomorrow it is now true that 
it will be the case that p’ are in fact about the present state of the world and 
what the present state of the world settles about the future. But then again, if 
the only ‘future’ we can refer to and talk about is the superficial future (in this 
case: the future as seen from the context of assessment of the present), then: 
 
•  What does MacFarlane mean when he claims that ‘the future’ is 
open?  
 
•  In which sense can he claim that the possible histories branching 
from the present moment represent ways ‘the future’ might turn out 
to be? 
 
•  How can he avoid being committed to the incredible claim that, 
while (the past moment) m1 is in the deep past of (the present 
moment) m2, m2 is not in the deep future of m1? 
 
MacFarlane’s relativistic kind of Refined Gappism does not  seem, therefore, 
to manage to escape the criticism I put forward against Refined Gappism in 
general, and is thus to be rejected in favour of True-Futurism. 
11. A final worry: branching worlds 
Until now,  I have not  assumed any specific metaphysical stance on time in my 
argument. However, there is at least one possible way to metaphysically 
conceive the openness of the future that appears either to mandate a (simple or 
refined) reductive gappist treatment and, hence, the falsity (or meaningless) of 
claims like: 
(25)  It WAS the case that it WOULD be the case that p 
or 
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(26)  From the point of view of yesterday it was true that from the point 
of view of today it was then true that it would be sunny today 
Such a metaphysical picture of the open future is the static branching-worlds 
picture, according to which a plurality of concrete world exists, overlapping 
towards the past and branching towards the future with no world being 
somehow distinguished or singled out as representing the way things will turn 
out to be.5 
According to the branching-worlds picture, the moment  m1 that obtained 
yesterday has, even from the point of view of today, many concrete possible 
futures, only in one of which the moment m2 obtains. It seems,  therefore, that 
a theorist upholding a gappist stance in the open future is somehow legitimised  
to claim that the principle of retrospective determinacy is simply invalid in the 
open future,  and that it is now true to say 
(27) P~TFp 
even if is now true that p. 
The gappist might of course refine its theory and distinguish between deep 
and superficial past, and so claim—as  MacFarlane does—that while 
(28) WAS:T:will:p 
is false, 
(29) was:Twill:p 
is now true. Even  so, it appears that the refined gappist is nevertheless obliged 
to  claim that  
(30) WAS:TWILL:p 
is either false or meaningless. As a matter of fact, if every possible way the 
future could turn out to be is an atemporally existing concrete world, where 
every world is ontologically on a par and no world is singled out as the way 
                                                     
5
 See Lewis (1986). 
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things will turn out to be, we cannot infer from the mere fact that we are 
located at m2 that, therefore, m2 is the deep future of m1 considered without 
keeping fixed the fact that m2 ‘has become present after’ m1. Even if we are 
located at m2, we have  to acknowledge that m2 is not the deep future of m1, 
because m2 is but one of the many concretely existing ‘futures’ of m1.  
It seems thus that the argument in favour of True-Futurism that I have 
advanced in this paper has at best a limited validity, since it appears to rest in 
fact on some tacit metaphysical assumptions. 
I think, however, that appearances are in this case deceptive and that the 
worry just reviewed about the branching-worlds scenario, far from showing 
any shortcoming in the argument I have exposed here, points instead to the 
problematic character of the branching-worlds theory as a theory for the open 
future. An argument parallel to arguments D, E and G shows in fact that also 
the gappist branching theorist is committed to rejecting the thesis that future-
directed statements are about the deep future. If that is the case, however, it 
also follows that the gappist branching-worlds theorist is beset with the 
problems that surround any kind of refined gappist theory: if ‘future’-directed 
statements are in fact only about the superficial future, in what sense can the 
‘future’ be open? In what sense are moments later then the present moment on 
worlds branching off the present moment be possible ways the ‘future’ might 
turn out to be?  
In particular, in the branching-worlds case, the issue related to the 
asymmetrical relation between past and future (m1 is the [deep] past of m2, 
even if m2 is not the [deep] future of m1) is  particularly telling. As a matter of 
fact, the correct response to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that m2 is 
neither the superficial nor the deep future of m1 appears to be in this case that 
of saying that m2 is just one of the (deep) futures of m1. If all the concrete 
possible worlds in the branching multiverse are simply on a par, then the 
correct thing to say is not that m2 is not  the future of m1, but that it is just one 
of its many futures. The future of  m1 is thus not  open or unsettled: it is  just 
not unique.  It is therefore not the case that ‘the future’ might go one way or the 
other and it is presently unsettled which way it will go. There are many futures, 
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and it is both the case that (i) for every future f it is settled that f is so-and-so 
and that (i) it is settled that there are many equally existing futures ahead of us.  
Therefore, I conclude that the worry sketched in this section about the 
branching-worlds theory just shows that, in the absence of a ‘thin red line’,6 a 
branching-worlds scenario is actually not an ‘open future’ scenario and, hence, 
poses no threat whatsoever to the argument for True-Futurism. 
12. Conclusion 
Intuitively, saying that the future is open is just saying that the way the present 
settles the future fails to completely determine its course. In turn, saying that 
the way the present settles the future fails to completely determine its course is 
just tantamount to saying that, when we talk about the future, we are talking 
about a temporal dimension that is not exhausted by—and goes, therefore, 
beyond—what is settled by the present. If we call ‘superficial’ future the way 
the future is settled by the present, this train of thought shows that in order to 
entertain the very idea of an open future, we have to be able to grasp and talk 
about the ‘deep’ future, that is the dimension of the future that goes (possibly) 
beyond what is settled by the present. However, if there are deep-future-
directed propositions, and if we can produce deep-future-directed statements, 
then it follows that the principle of retrospective determinacy is valid and, 
hence, that (since it is not the case that necessarily future-contingents 
statements are neither true nor false) True-Futurism is correct. 
I conclude, therefore, that the principle of bivalence is not threatened by 
the hypothesis that the future is open in some robust, objective, and 
metaphysical sense and, thus, that True-Futurism is the correct theory about 
future-contingent statements. 
 
                                                     
6
 See chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4 
Bivalence and Indeterminacy 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recently, some authors have proposed a family of theories featuring a rather 
unorthodox form of gappism, which I will here label Determinacy Gappism.1 
According to Determinacy Gappism, unsettledness does not give raise to truth-
value gaps, but to determinacy gaps instead. In other words, while for 
determinacy gappists, for every statement p, it is determinately the case that p 
is either true or false 
(1) Det(Tp v Fp) 
future-contingent statements (such as ‘Fp’, ‘It will be the case that p’) are 
neither determinately true nor determinately false 
(2) ~DetTFp & ~ DetFFp 
In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the relation between Determinacy 
Gappism and True-Futurism, and argue that Determinacy Gappism poses no 
serious threat to the main core of True-Futurism. My strategy will be the 
following: 
 
                                                 
1
 See MacFarlane (2008), Barnes and Cameron (2009) and Greenough (ms.). 
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(i) Firstly, I will argue for a view that I shall label Definite Futurism, 
according to which future-contingent statements are either 
definitely true or definitely false. 
 
(ii) Secondly, I will conclude that determinacy gappists cannot 
construe their notion of determinacy along the lines of the notion of 
definiteness characterizing Definite Futurism. 
 
(iii) Finally, I will show that the notion of indeterminacy invoked by 
determinacy gappists should be understood either as lack of 
grounding, or as lack of definite grounding for future-contingent 
truths. For this reason, I will conclude that, far from contradicting 
True-Futurism, Determinacy Gappism can be seen as a way to 
address the question about whether future-contingent truths are 
grounded in reality. 
2.  Definiteness Gappism  
Suppose that two novelists—A and B—write two short stories about a certain 
fictional character called ‘Mr. Smith’. In both stories Mr. Smith goes to a party 
wearing a blue necktie, and we are told that those wearing a blue necktie at that 
party are either bankers or professors. In the first story, novelist A specifies 
that Mr. Smith is a professor; in the second story, novelist B tells us simply that 
Mr. Smith wears a blue necktie without specifying—or giving us any clue to 
understand—whether Mr. Smith is a professor or a banker. Suppose, 
furthermore, that John is asked to read both stories—that we might label ‘story 
A’ and ‘story B’, after their authors—and to answer some simple questions 
about them, and that the manuscript of story A that is given to John is missing 
the page in which novelist A specifies that Mr. Smith is a professor. Imagine 
that, after being asked about Mr. Smith’s profession in both stories, John says, 
that in both cases 
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(3) Mr Smith is a professor 
Clearly, with respect to both stories there appears to be something wrong with 
this kind of answer. However, there appears to be something specifically odd 
with (3) with respect to story B. In both cases John not only does not know 
what is Smith’s profession, but he has also no evidence at all available that can 
make him reasonably suppose that Smith is a professor. In the case of story B, 
however, it is not only John’s lack of knowledge that makes the assertion of (3) 
odd, but it is the fact that story B itself does not mention whether Smith is a 
professor or not. In the scenario we are imagining Jones knows everything 
there is to know about story B. Nevertheless, that is insufficient for him to be 
in position to assert that Smith is a professor. By asserting that Smith is a 
professor, Jones appears to implicate that story B specifies Smith’s profession 
in a way it actually does not. If John knows that novelist A has specified in 
story A whether Smith is a professor or not, whereas novelist B has not, it 
seems that the best answer that John can give about both stories is the 
following: 
(4) In story A, either Smith is definitely a professor or he is definitely a 
banker; in story B, instead, although Smith is definitely either a 
professor or a banker, he is neither definitely a professor nor 
definitely a banker. 
In this case, although we do not have a gap in truth-value,  we do have thus a 
gap in definiteness, since we have statements that are neither definitely true nor 
definitely false. I shall label any theory that allows there to be gaps in 
definiteness, definiteness gappist.2 
Let us now return to the open future. The possible threat that Definiteness 
Gappism might pose to True-Futurism is that of making—for an arbitrary 
future-contingent statement Fp—‘it is either true that Fp or false that  Fp’ the 
most specific claim one could make about Fp’s truth-value, in the sense just 
                                                 
2
 A similar kind of treatment of truth in fiction can be found in Stone (2010). However, Stones posits 
truth-value gaps, instead of gaps in definiteness. 
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reviewed of ‘can’. Definiteness gappists, in other words, might claim that 
although it is definitely the case that Fp is either true or false 
(5) Def(TFp v FFp) 
it is neither definitely the case that Fp is true nor it is definitely the case that Fp 
is false 
(6) ~DefTFp & ~DefFFp 
thereby implying that that reality itself is—somehow—such that there is simply 
no further fact of the matter about Fp’s truth-value beyond the fact that Fp is 
either true or false. Although Definiteness Gappism is indeed a true-futurist 
theory—upholding that the principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid—it 
seems to subtly betray the very true-futurist intuition. As a matter of fact, the 
very core of the true-futurist idea seems to be that the truth-status of future-
directed statements is in no way affected by the fact that the future is open, so 
that, for instance, future-contingent statement should enjoy the very kind of 
truth-status of historically settled statements. However, definiteness gappists 
claim instead that the historical contingency of future-directed statements in an 
open future setting entails that the future is indefinite and, hence, that future-
contingent statement—although bivalent—have no definite truth-value. The 
question that should concern us here is, therefore, whether determinacy 
gappists can interpret their notion of indeterminacy as indefiniteness.  
3. An argument for Definite-Futurism. 
Suppose,  that in some situation s, p is true (‘[in-s]’ will stand here for the 
operator ‘in the situation s, it is the case that’): 
(1) [in-s]Tp 
If p is true in s, then it is false that ‘it is either true or false that p’ is the most 
specific claim that can be made about p in s since, clearly, the most specific 
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claims are in that case ‘p is true’ and ‘p is false’ (where, clearly, the first is true 
and the second is false). How can we then say that p is not definitely true in s?  
If p is neither definitely true nor definitely false, then it is true to say that 
its truth-value is indefinite. To say that p’s truth-value is indefinite is to say 
that, although it is true to say that p is either true or false, the way reality is, is 
such as to not specify further p’s truth-value. In other words, if p’s truth-value 
is indefinite, then saying that p’s truth-value is either the True or the False is 
just to reach the level of maximal specification about p’s truth-value allowed 
by reality itself, so to speak.  
If, however, it is true that, in a situation s, p is true, then it appears we 
cannot say that, in s, p’s truth-value is indefinite. As a matter of fact, if p is true 
in s, then in s, p has a definite truth-value, that is: the True. The following 
principle appears, in other words, to be valid (using ‘Def’ for the operator ‘it is 
definitely the case that p’): 
(TDF) [in-s]Tp→[in-s]DefTp 
One might object that (TDF) cannot be accepted, since it delivers the 
unwelcome result according to which, if in a situation s, p is not definitely true, 
then it is true to say that, in s, p is not true. The argument is the following: 
 
ARGUMENT TD 
(TD1) [in-s]~DefTp [premiss] 
(TD2) ~[in-s]DefTp [from TD1 by Contraposition] 
(TD3) ~[in-s]Tp [from TD2 by TDF] 
(TD4) [in-s]~Tp [from TD3] 
 
Beyond the validity of Contraposition (which I shall not put into question 
here)3 argument TD implicitly relies on two  principles governing the 
interaction between the operators ‘[in-s]’ and ‘~’: 
                                                 
3
 As it is well known, Contraposition is not valid within supervaluationist frameworks (for a discussion 
on this point see, for instance, Varzi 2007). In case of argument (TD) I am therefore allowing 
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(IN1) [in-s]~p→~[in-s]p 
(IN2) ~[in-s]p→[in-s]~p 
IN1 appears to be intuitively valid: If in s, it is not the case that p, then clearly 
it is not the case that, in s, p is the case. On the contrary, the validity of IN2 
appears to be dubious. To say that is not the case that, in a certain situation s, p 
is the case is not necessarily to say that, in s, p is not the case: when, in s, it is 
neither definitely the case that p, nor definitely the case that ~p, ‘in the 
situation s, p or ~p’ appears to be the most specific claim that could be made 
about the status of p in s. If that is indeed the case, however, it appears also 
correct to deny that in the situation s, p is the case: if the status of p is not 
specified in s, then—in a relevant sense—it is not the case that, in s, p is the 
case; in s, it is only the case that either p or not p: no more specific fact obtains, 
in s, about p. Consider again the case of the stories A and B: in B it is not 
specified whether B is a professor or a banker; therefore, although it is correct 
to say that in B Smith is either a professor or a banker, it seems also correct to 
deny  both that, in B, Smith is a professor and that, in B, Smith is a banker. I 
conclude, therefore, that IN2 should be best seen as invalid and that, hence, 
TDF can be safely acknowledged by anyone as a valid principle. 
Let us then return to Determinacy Gappism. According to determinacy 
gappists, the principle of retrospective determinacy—which we might re-label 
‘principle of retrospective truth’, in order to avoid confusion—is valid: 
(2) p→PTFp 
However, given what we just said, if it was the case, say: yesterday, that it is 
true that it will be the case that p, then it should follow that yesterday Fp’s 
truth-value was definite and, hence, that yesterday it was definitely true that it 
would be the case that p. From this it follows that if the principle of 
retrospective truth is valid, then also the principle of ‘retrospective definite 
truth’ must be valid 
                                                                                                                                 
determinacy gappists who employ a form of supervaluationism in their theory (as Barnes and Cameron 
do) to use such a rule of inference, even if it is not universally valid in their framework. 
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(3) p→PDefTFp 
If, however, the principle of retrospective definite truth is valid, then—granted 
the validity of the principle stating that the definiteness status of future-
contingent statements is necessary: 
(PD1) Either it is necessary that future-contingent statements are either 
definitely true or  definitely false, or it is necessary that future-
contingent statements are neither definitely true nor definitely false 
 □[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→( DefTFp v DefFFp)] v  
□[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→ (~DefTFp v ~DefFFp)] 
it is possible to argue, by means of an argument parallel to argument A (see 
chapter 3), that future-contingent statements are either definitely true or 
definitely false. The argument from the necessity of the definiteness status of 
future-contingent statements to the validity of the principle of definite 
bivalence goes as follows: 
 
ARGUMENT AD 
(AD1) p [premiss] 
(AD2) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp) [premiss] 
(AD3) PTFp [from AD1 by (6)] 
(AD4) PDefTFp [from AD3 by TDF] 
(AD5) P(~NFp & ~N~Fp & DefTFp) [from AD2, AD3] 
(AD6) ~□[(~NFp & ~N~Fp) → (~DefTFp v 
~DefFFp)] 
[from AD4] 
(AD7) □[(~NFp & ~N~Fp)→(DefTFp v DefFFp)] [from AD5 by PD2] 
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To recap: if the principle of retrospective truth is valid, then—given the 
validity of the principle (TDF), according to which if in a situation s a 
proposition p is true, then in s it is definitely the case that p is true—the 
principle of retrospective definite truth is also valid. However, if the principle 
of retrospective definite truth is valid, then Definiteness Gappism is false and, 
hence, Definite Futurism is true.  
Since determinacy gappists uphold that the principle of retrospective truth 
is valid in their theory, they cannot take determinacy simply to be what I am 
here calling definiteness and, hence, they must both commit themselves to the 
truth of Definite-Futurism and provide an adequate account of what 
indeterminacy amounts to in their theory.  
4 Determinacy Gappism: ungroundedness and indeterminate 
grounding 
Patrick Greenough (ms) has proposed a truthmaker/truthmaking gap theory of 
indeterminacy according to which 
(TG1) A proposition p is indeterminate in truth-value, if and only if, either 
p is true and ungrounded or p is false and ungrounded 
where, roughly  
(GR1) A proposition p is ungrounded if, and only if, either there is 
nothing to make p either true or false or its truth-value does not 
supervene upon what things there are and how things are. 
A future-contingent proposition p is, thus, indeterminately true or false for 
Greenough, if p is true but there is nothing in reality to ground its truth-value. 
Therefore, it appears that for Greenough, for every future-contingent 
proposition p, there is something more specific than ‘p is either true or false’ 
that could—at least in principle—be asserted about p. But if p is true/false, 
then its being true/false is ungrounded—a brute fact that does not depend in 
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any sense on how reality is. There is indeed something weird in asserting ‘p is 
true’: being ungrounded, p’s truth-value is—for Greenough—metaphysically 
unknowable and therefore one could claim that asserting p violates the norm of 
assertion according to which one should assert that p, only if p is 
metaphysically unknowable. However, if p is a future-contingent statement and 
one asserts that p she is not thereby committing the mistake one would commit 
were Definite True-Futurism false.  
Within Barnes and Cameron’s (henceforth: ‘B&C’) proposal, the idea is 
that the openness of the future amounts to a case of ontic indeterminacy. The 
future does exist, but it has gaps and fuzzy areas, as it were. Suppose, for 
instance, that it is settled today that Socrates will exist tomorrow (at t) but that 
it is open whether he will be sitting or standing. For B&C, the fact that it is 
unsettled today whether Socrates will be sitting or standing at t depends on the 
fact that reality itself is indeterminate as to what Socrates is doing at t. Reality 
itself is like a blurry picture from which it is impossible to make out whether 
Socrates is sitting or standing at t. The fact that reality itself is blurry, entails 
that there are many possible precise representations of reality that can 
consistently fill its gaps and holes, although no one—being they all ‘over-
precise’—can be taken to be a faithful picture of how it really is (that is: 
indeterminate). According to all representations, it is either true or false that 
Socrates is sitting tomorrow—and so it is determinately the case that: either it 
is true that Socrates is sitting or it is false that Socrates is sitting—but only in 
some of them it is true that Socrates is sitting—and so it is neither 
determinately true that Socrates is sitting tomorrow nor it is determinately false 
that Socrates is sitting tomorrow. 
Suppose that Fp stands for <Socrates will be sitting tomorrow> and let us, 
just for the sake of the argument, assume that propositions, if grounded, are 
grounded by facts. Since the future is a cloud of indeterminacy as to whether 
Socrates would be sitting or not tomorrow, it is correct to say that the fact that 
Socrates will be sitting today does not determinately exist. This means that the 
most precise fact about Socrates’ situation tomorrow that determinately exists 
is the fact that either Socrates will be sitting tomorrow or Socrates will be 
 105 
 
standing tomorrow. Both the fact f1 that Socrates will be sitting tomorrow and 
the fact f2 that Socrates will be standing tomorrow exist only indeterminately 
(‘Ind:p’ stands for ‘~Detp & ~Det~p’): 
(4) IndExists(f1) & IndExists(f2) 
Clearly, however, it is determinately true that if Fp is grounded by something, 
it is grounded by f1 
(5) Det[Grounded(Fp)→Grounds(f1,Fp)] 
Therefore, since f1 exists only indeterminately, it follows that it is both false 
that it is determinately the case that Fp is grounded and that it is determinately 
the case that Fp is ungrounded: 
(6) ~DetGrounded(Fp) 
(7) ~Det~Grounded(Fp) 
and, thus, that Fp is only indeterminately grounded: 
(8) IndGrounded(Fp) 
From what I have just said, it follows that the following appears thus to be 
one (if not the only) feasible option for B&C to combine Definite-Futurism 
within their theory of indeterminacy: instead of claiming—as Greenough 
does—that to be indeterminate in truth-value amounts to being ungrounded, 
they can claim that for a proposition p to be indeterminate is for it to lack 
determinate grounds, or, in other words, to be indeterminately grounded. We 
can understand the notion of a proposition being indeterminately grounded as 
follows: 
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(IG)  A true proposition p is indeterminately grounded if, and only if, the 
fact f that grounds the truth that p is such that f exists only 
indeterminately4 
It seems thus that B&C can just simply replace TG1 and GR1 above with: 
(TG2) A proposition p is indeterminate in truth-value if and only if either 
p is true and indeterminately grounded or p is false and 
indeterminately ungrounded 
where  
(GR2) A true(/false) proposition p is indeterminately ungrounded if, and 
only if either it is indeterminately the case that something makes p 
true(/false)  or p’s truth-value indeterminately supervenes upon 
what things there are and how things are  
Therefore, whereas Greenough’s theory of indeterminacy is a theory of 
indeterminacy as lack of grounding, B&C’s theory appears thus to be best 
understood as a theory of indeterminacy as lack of determinate grounding. 
In section  3, I have argued that determinacy gappists are committed to 
Definite-Futurism. In this section I have shown how B&C can interpret the 
notion of indeterminate truth characterizing their theory by means of the notion 
of indeterminate grounding. This entails that true-futurists can happily accept 
both Greenough’s and B&C’s kind of determinacy gappism, since—given the 
validity of Definite-Futurism—the only way to make sense of their theories is 
that of taking them not as theories about the truth-status or what we might call 
the definiteness-status of future-contingent statements, but as views about their 
grounding-status. In other words, Greenough’s and B&C’s proposals can, 
therefore, be seen as dealing only with the problem of what grounds the truth-
value of future-contingent statements, without jeopardizing the idea that future-
contingent statements are either definitely true or definitely false. 
                                                 
4
 Incidentally, this view appears to be very close to the one upheld by Cameron (2010) in his paper on 
truthmaking and presentism. 
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I conclude, therefore, that Determinacy Gappism is perfectly compatible 
with True-Futurism both in Greenough’s and B&C’s version. 
5  MacFarlane 
John MacFarlane’s (2008) case is slightly more difficult to assess. As a matter 
of fact, in his Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths he defines a ‘determinate 
truth’ predicate only for the supervaluationist theory (which he then criticizes) 
as follows: 
 
[Fo]r those supervaluationists who do think that a proof of unsettledness should 
compel withdrawal of an assertion about the future, there is an easy solution. 
We can introduce a ‘determinate truth’ predicate: 
 
(47)  ‘DetTrue’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <c,w>  if, and only if, x 
is a proposition and x is true at every world wʹ ∈ W(c). 
 
Using this predicate, our speakers can correctly characterize propositions whose 
truth is still unsettled as ‘not Determinately True’. Whether they take a proof of 
unsettledness to compel withdrawal of an assertion about the future will then 
depend on whether they think retraction is required by a proof that the assertion 
is not Determinately True. (MacFarlane, 2008: 97) 
 
However, as we have seen in chapter 2, MacFarlane also claims that the 
introduction of an actuality operator within his relativist theory requires the 
introduction of a context-of-assessment parameter in the points of evaluation. 
In that case, we have then two possible choices for the ‘determinate truth’ 
predicate: 
(DT1) ‘DetTrue’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <cu,ca,w>  if, and 
only if, x is a proposition and x is true at every world wʹ ∈ W(cu). 
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(DT2) ‘DetTrue’ applies to x at a point of evaluation <cu,ca,w>  if, and 
only if, x is a proposition and x is true at every world wʹ ∈ 
W(cu|ca).5 
Suppose now that today (in the context c2) it is a sunny day and we assess an 
utterance of ‘it is determinately true that it will be sunny tomorrow’ made 
yesterday (in the context c1). It is easy to see that, within MacFarlane’s 
relativist theory, the sentence  
(9) It is determinately true that it will be sunny tomorrow 
uttered in c1 and assessed in c2 turns out to be false according to DT1 and true 
according to DT2. However, in both cases it is true to say today (in c2, which 
is also taken as context of assessment) that 
(10) What I said yesterday was determinately true 
referring to what I said yesterday by uttering (9). 
Given any two contexts c1 and c2, such that c2 is one day later than c1, 
and any future-directed sentence S uttered in c1, one of the main desiderata of 
MacFarlane’s relativist theory appears to be the validity of the following 
principle 
(11) If with respect to <c2,c2> (that is: taking the context c2 both as the 
context of utterance and of assessment) the sentence ‘What I said 
yesterday [in the context c1] by uttering S was true’ is true, then S 
is true with respect to <c1,c2> (that is: taking c1 as the context of 
utterance and c2 as the context of assessment) 
As a matter of fact, it would seem to be very odd for a relativist to claim that 
(12) What I said yesterday by uttering S was true, even if my utterance 
was not true 
                                                 
5
 See chapter 2 for the meaning of the symbolism. 
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However, if DT1 is taken as the correct definition of ‘DetTrue’ within a 
relativist framework, then it follows that it is true to say in c2 (and from the 
point of view of c2) that 
(13) What I said yesterday by uttering S was determinately true, even if 
my utterance of ‘It is determinately true that S’ was not true 
Although there is a certain asymmetry between (12) and (13), I take it that the 
falsity of (12) should intuitively point to the falsity of (13) and, hence, to the 
rejection of DT1. 
Returning now to the main point under discussion, we have that an 
argument parallel to the argument mounted against MacFarlane in chapter 3 
can be made here against his novel determinacy gappist proposal. Being his 
novel proposal a kind of determinacy gappism, MacFarlane should uphold the 
thesis that 
(14) Future-contingent statements are neither determinately true nor 
determinately false 
However, in order to be able to state the full modal force of his version of 
determinacy gappism and claim that (at least in some sense of necessity) it is 
necessary that future-contingent statements are neither determinately true nor 
determinately false, he must introduce in the object-language operators capable 
of shifting both the context of utterance and the context of assessment. As a 
matter of fact, the thesis that if a statement p is historically contingent, then it 
is neither determinately true nor determinately false is not guaranteed to hold 
for any <context of use, context of assessment> pair, but only when the context 
of use and the context of assessment coincide (such thesis is, in other words, 
only diagonally valid). In other words, in order to make his philosophical thesis 
not ineffable within the object-language, MacFarlane needs some special 
operators to be able to say things like 
(15) From the point of view of today, it was indeed correct to say 
yesterday that it is determinately true that it would be sunny today; 
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however, from the point of view of yesterday, it was instead correct 
to say it is neither determinately true nor determinately false. 
As we have seen in chapter 3, however, it appears that MacFarlane is 
compelled to accept the soundness of  the following argument:6 
ARGUMENT G 
(G1) It is sunny today [premiss] 
(G2) In the deep future of c1, it is sunny the next day [from G1] 
(G3) From the point of view of yesterday, ‘From the 
point of view of tomorrow it is true that  it will 
be sunny tomorrow’ was about the deep future 
of c1 
[premiss] 
(G4) From the point of view of yesterday, ‘From the 
point of view of tomorrow it is true that  it will 
be sunny tomorrow’ was true if, and only if, in 
the deep future of c1 it is sunny the next day 
[from G3] 
(G5) From the point of view of yesterday, ‘From the 
point of view of tomorrow it is true that  it will 
be sunny tomorrow’ was true 
[from G2, G4] 
 
However,  it follows from (G5) that 
(G6) From the point of view of yesterday, it was true that from the point 
of view of today it would true that it would be sunny today 
and, given the validity of principle (TDF) 
(TDF) [in-s]Tp→[in-s]DefTp 
it follows from (G6) that 
                                                 
6
 Cfr. argument G, chapter 2. I replace here ‘m1’ with ‘c1’ and ‘S’ with ‘‘It will be sunny tomorrow’’. 
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(G7) From the point of view of yesterday, it was determinately true that 
from the point of view of today it was true that it would be sunny 
today 
which entails the falsity of determinacy gappism for deep-future contingent 
statements7 of the form ‘from the point of view of tomorrow, it is true today 
that it will be the case that p tomorrow’. But, as we have seen in chapter 2, the 
truth of gappism only with respect to superficial-future contingent statements is 
but a pyrrhic victory for gappists that, in fact, appears to be perfectly 
compatible with the very core of the true-futurist intuition. 
I conclude, therefore, that  also MacFarlane’s version of determinacy 
gappism is poses  no threat whatsoever to True-Futurism. 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that future-contingent statements are either 
definitely true or definitely false, a qualified true-futurist position that I have 
dubbed ‘Definite-Futurism’. As a result, I have shown  that the most plausible 
way to construe the position according to which future-contingent statements 
are neither determinately true nor determinately false (‘Determinacy Gappism’) 
is to take the relevant notion of indeterminacy in play to refer not to  the truth-
status of future-contingent statements, but to their grounding-status instead. I 
conclude, therefore, that Determinacy Gappism does not pose any threat to 
True-Futurism and that, to the contrary, it might be its best ally with respect to 
the challenge posed by the grounding principle.8 
 
                                                 
7
 See chapter 2. 
8
 See chapter 1 and 8. 
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Chapter 5 
The logic of true futurism I—The problem of 
counterfactual evaluation 
1 Introduction 
I. According to temporalists, tense is to be analyzed by means of temporal 
operators such as ‘it was the case that’ and ‘it will be the case that’. For 
instance, a sentence like  
(1) It will be sunny in Paris  
is parsed by temporalists as 
(2) It will be the case that [it is sunny in Paris] 
Where [it is sunny in Paris] is thought as a present-tense proposition capable of 
having different truth-value at different times (it might for instance have been 
false yesterday and be true today). This entails that when it comes to provide 
the temporalist with an adequate semantics for tensed discourse, the central 
notion to be defined in the theory is the notion of truth-at-a-temporal-point. As 
a matter of fact, on the one hand we would like to have adequate semantic 
clauses for our temporal operators having the form 
(3) ‘It will be the case that P’ is true at a temporal point k if, and only 
if... 
(4) ‘It was the case that P’ is true at a temporal point k if, and only if... 
113 
 
On the other hand, we intuitively would want to define the notion of validity as 
truth at every temporal point (in every model) and the notion of logical 
consequence as truth-preservation at every temporal point (in every model). 
 
II. Open-futurists claim that the future is open in some robust, objective, and 
metaphysical sense. Among open-futurists,  gappists claim that if the future is 
open, future contingent statements are neither true nor false, true-futurists 
claim instead that they are either true or false, even if their truth value is not 
now-necessary or settled.  
 
III. An idea that temporalist open-futurists might find appealing is that the best 
way to model the openness of the future is by means of what is customarily 
called a branching structure, that is a pair <M,R>, where M is a non-empty set 
of moments and R is a irreflexive, antisymmetric, left-linear relation. Letting a 
‘history’ be a maximal and linear chain of moments, a branching structure 
intuitively represents the tree of possible courses of history: all the possible 
ways the world might turn out to be in the future. Furthermore, this kind of 
models give an intuitive way to understand the notions of ‘historical 
possibility’ and necessity, thought of as truth in some possible history and truth 
in every possible history, respectively. 
 
Here and in the following chapters I will be concerned with temporalist true-
futurists upholding that the validity of the principle of bivalence for future 
contingent statements should be mirrored in temporal models by the presence 
of a single history marked as special, intuitively representing the way things 
will actually turn out to be, (what Belnap and Green (1994) and Belnap et al. 
(2001) have called the ‘Thin Red Line’—henceforth: ‘TRL’). In other words, 
temporalist true-futurists claim that: 
 
(i) The future is open in some robust, objective and metaphysical 
sense 
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(ii) Future-contingent statements are either (definitely)1 true or 
(definitely) false 
 
(iii) Tense discourse is to be analyzed by means of the temporal 
operators ‘F’ (‘it will be the case that’) and ‘P’ (‘it was the case 
that’); atomic proposition are priorean proposition, i.e. 
propositions like <Socrates is sitting> or <it is raining in Paris> 
that can vary their truth-value over time. 
 
(iv) The openness of the future is to be modelled by means of 
branching structures of moments, i.e. pairs <M,R>, where M is a 
non-empty set of moments and R is a irreflexive, antisymmetric, 
left-linear relation. 
 
(v) The fact that future-contingent statements are either true or false 
corresponds on branching models to the presence of a Thin Red 
Line: a history marked as special, representing the way things will 
in fact turn out to be 
 
Since this kind of true-futurists are temporalists, the central notion in their 
theory is that of truth-at-a-temporal point (for some kind of temporal point). 
However, as Belnap and Green (1994) and Belnap et al. (2001) have argued, 
providing true-futurists with an adequate definition of truth-at-a-temporal-point 
proves to be a more difficult task than it might appear at first sight. Briefly 
stated, the problem is that the most intuitive candidates for such notion appear 
to have the undesired consequence of either delivering the wrong predictions in 
specific scenarios or rendering intuitively valid principles governing tense 
discourse invalid.  
The aim of this chapter is (i) to expose clearly what I will dub the problem 
of counterfactual evaluation, (ii) to consider the distinction that Belnap et al. 
put forward between relative and absolute Thin Red Line theories, (iii) to put 
forward two initially plausible TRL-theories that might seem to overcome the 
                                                     
1
 See chapter 4. 
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problem of counterfactual evaluation, and (iv), finally, to cast some doubts on 
their real efficacy. In the final part of the chapter I will introduce a general 
philosophical question for true-futurists which appears to be immediately 
relevant to the problem of counterfactual evaluation and argue that the two 
possible answers  to that question divide the true-futurists’ camp in two 
subgroups. The following chapter will be devoted to arguing that one of these 
position should be rejected as incompatible with the very spirit of True-
Futurism. Finally, in chapter 7, I will return to the problem of counterfactual 
evaluation and expose two true-futurists theories—deploying the notion of an 
absolute and relative TRL, respectively—that meet all the desiderata for an 
adequate true-futurist theory. 
2 Thin Red Line and the problem of counterfactual evaluation 
Let us start considering first linear structures. A temporal model on a linear 
structure is a triple <M,Rlin,V>, where M is a non-empty set of moments, V is a 
function from the set of moments to the power set of atomic propositions and 
Rlin is a linear relation on moments (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
The recursive definition of the notion of truth-at-a-moment for Boolean 
connectives and temporal operators can be given as follows (where ‘F’ and ‘P’ 
are, respectively, the future-tense and the past-tense operator ‘It will be the 
case that’ and ‘It was the case that’): 
 
(A1) p is true at m iff p belongs to V(m)  (for any atomic p) 
(A2) ‘p & q’ is true at m iff p is true at m and q is true at m 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 
Figure 1 
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(A3) ‘~p’ is true at m iff p is not true at m 
(A4) ‘p v q’ is true at m iff either p is true at m or q is true at m 
(A5) ‘p→q’ is true at m iff if p is true at m, then q is true at m 
(A6) ‘Fp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that mRlinm′ and p is 
true at m′ 
(A7) ‘Pp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that m′Rlinm and p is 
true at m′ 
 
Clauses (A6) and (A7) should be intuitive enough. Consider as a matter of fact 
the toy-model depicted in Figure 2 (square balloons represent the value of the 
function V for the given moment; round balloons represent the notion of truth-
at-a-moment) 
 
 
 
 
q belongs to V(m3). Therefore, q is true at m3 (by A1). Hence, since m3 is later 
than m2, by (A6) it is also true at m2 that it will be the case that q (Fq). 
Similarly, p does not belong to V(m3). Therefore, by (A1) p is not true at m3. 
Hence, since m3 is later than m2, by (A6) it is also true at m2 that it will be the 
case that ~p (F~q). 
A branching model with a Thin Red Line is a 4-tuple <M,Rbr,TRL,V>, 
where the earlier-later relation Rbr orders the set of moments in a tree-like 
fashion and TRL is a single history on the tree marked as special, intuitively 
representing the history that will in fact obtain (see Figure 3). 
 
m1 m2 m3 
p q 
Fq 
F~p 
Pp 
P~q 
Figure 2 
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In the branching case the translation of the clause for the future-tense operator 
given in (A6) would appear as follows: 
(A6′)  ‘Fp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that mRbrm′ and p is 
true at m′ 
However, it is easy to see that (A6′) is not adequate in this case.  As a matter of 
fact, (A6′) dictates that ‘It will be the case that p’ is true at a moment m if (and 
only if) there is a moment m′ such that p is true at m′ and mʹ is ‘Rbr-later’ than 
m (henceforth, I will simply use ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ to refer to the Rbr-relation). 
But in a branching model there can be different moments later than m,  lying on 
different histories, and differing as to the truth-value of p. In this situation 
(A6′) would predict that, at m, it is both true that it will be the case that p and 
that it will be the case that ~p, which is surely an unwanted result (see Figure 
4). 
 
 
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
~p 
p 
Fp & F~p ??? 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
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How can we then provide an adequate semantics for the future-tense 
operator in a branching setting with a Thin Red Line? Consider again figure 4. 
The future of m1 appears to be open as to whether it will be the case that p: at 
m2, p is not the case, whereas p obtains at m3. However, m3 lies on the Thin 
Red Line, which is supposed to represent the way things will in fact turn out to 
be. Therefore, Fp should come out true at m1 (even if ‘unsettled’ or 
‘historically open’). This train of thought  seems to suggest the following 
clause for the future-tense operator: 
(A6′′)  ‘Fp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that: (i) mRbrm′; (ii) 
m′ belongs  to TRL; (iii) p is true at m′ 
According to (A6′′) ‘Fp’ is indeed true at m1, since there is in fact a moment m′ 
later than m, belonging to the TRL and such that p is true at it. Consider, 
however, the following model (Figure 5): 
 
 
 
p is true in every possible future of m2. Intuitively, this should mean that it is 
settled at m2 that p will obtain2 and, hence, that it is true at m2 that it will be 
the case that p. Nevertheless, (A6′′) predicts in fact that ‘Fp’ is false at m2, 
since—given that m2 does not belong to the TRL—there is no moment m′ that 
is both later than m2 and belongs to the TRL.  
The history marked as the Thin Red Line is supposed to represent the way 
things will in fact turn out to be. Therefore, the histories not marked in red 
                                                     
2
 Intuitively, it is settled at a moment m that it will the case that p if, and only, if in every possible future 
of m p will be the case. 
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 p 
p 
 ~Fp ??? 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 5 
119 
 
represent what we might call counterfactual histories. In the same way,  the 
moments not belonging to the TRL can be seen as counterfactual moments.  
For this reason, the problem highlighted in figure 5 can be called the ‘problem 
of counterfactual evaluation’, which can be framed more precisely as follows: 
 
Given a branching model with a TRL, how are sentences to be evaluated at 
moments lying off the Thin Red Line?  
 
The problem of counterfactual evaluation has been first presented by 
Belnap and Green (1994) and Belnap et al. (2001). Before pronouncing their 
final verdict on TRL theories, however, Belnap et al. (2001) try, on behalf of 
the TRL-theorist, to add some epicycles to the theory in order to see whether 
there is some way to salvage the very idea of a TRL in the open future. Their 
analysis is very detailed and subtle, but for the purpose of this chapter it will be 
sufficient to consider the main manoeuvre they consider the TRL-theorist to be 
in position to make. The idea is very simple: in order to cope with 
counterfactual evaluation, the TRL-theorist can claim that the TRL is not 
absolute, but instead only relative to moments. Instead of having a single 
history in the model marked as red, we have a function trl such that for any 
moment m, trl(m) is the Thin Red Line of m.3 
Figure 6 gives an example of branching model with a relative Thin Red 
Line: 
 
                                                     
3
 The following appear to be two intuitive constraints on trl: 
 
(TRL1)   m ∈ trl(m) 
 
(TRL2)   (m1 < m2 ∧ m2 ∈ trl(m1)) → trl(m1) = trl(m2) 
 
In this paper I will simply assume (TRL1) and (TRL2) to be the adequate constraints on the trl-function 
in a relative TRL framework. For a discussion on this see Belnap & Green (1994), Belnap et al. (2001), 
Bräuner et al. (2000) and Øhrstrøm (2009). 
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In a  relative Thin Red Line framework (henceforth ‘R-TRL’), the following 
seems to intuitively be the right semantics for the future-tense operator: 
(A6′′′) ‘Fp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that: (i) mRbrm′; (ii) 
m′ belongs  to trl(m); (iii) p is true at m′ 
Consider in fact the following model (Figure 7): 
 
 
 
‘Fp’ is a future-contingent proposition at m2, since in some possible future of 
m2 p is true (m5) and in some other (m4) is false. However, m5 lies on the R-
TRL of m2. This means that m5 represents the way will in fact turn out to be in 
the future of m2. (A6′′′) rightly predicts that ‘Fp’ (although unsettled) is true at 
m2.  
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 6 
m3 
m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
~p 
p 
 Fp  
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 7 
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A relative TRL plus (A6′′′) seems thus to adequately solve the problem of 
counterfactual evaluation: on the one hand, future-tense statements are to be 
evaluated with respect to the relative TRL of the moment in question; on the 
other hand, every moment is guaranteed by definition of having a history 
marked as ‘its own’ actual history.  
Unfortunately, a serious problem lurks also for this type of relative TRL 
(henceforth: ‘R-TRL’) theory. Consider in fact the following model (Figure 8): 
 
 
Since also in this framework (as in any kind of branching setting) every 
moment m has a unique past, the clause for the past-tense operator can be 
obtained simply be modifying (A7) as follows 
(A7′)  ‘Pp’ is true at m iff there is a moment m′ such that m′Rbrm and p is 
true at m′ 
With (A7′) in play it is then easy to see what is the problem with this kind of R-
TRL. The model depicted in figure 8 is in fact a counter-model to the following 
principle: 
(PF)  p → PFp 
As a matter of fact, p is true at m2 but, given that ‘F~p’ is true at m1 and that 
m1 is the only moment earlier than m2, we have by (A6′′′) and (A7′) that ‘PFp’ 
is false at m2. But (PF) appears intuitively to be a valid principle: if I am 
running now then it was the case that I would be running now. Notice that this 
is different from saying that it was necessary or settled that I would be running 
m3 
m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
~p 
p 
 F~p  
~p 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 8 
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now. Furthermore, (PF) is intimately connected to what MacFarlane (2003, 
2008) calls the ‘determinacy intuition’, i.e. the intuition that if it is now raining 
and yesterday I uttered the sentence ‘It will be raining tomorrow’ it is correct to 
say that what I said yesterday is true. 
It might be replied that, although seemingly intuitive, it is perhaps a 
peculiar feature of the open future that principles like (PF) fail to be valid. 
Within branching settings, one might continue, one has to expect that things 
might become a bit weirder that in linear ones, given that in the former case 
temporal operators seem to get inextricably entangled with modality. 
I am not at all convinced either that temporality and modality get 
inevitably and inextricably entangled in the open future, nor that with dealing 
with branching structures we should be more relaxed as to our intuitions about 
temporal statements and accept lightly odd failures of intuitively valid 
principles. I think that since principles like (PF) appears in fact to be deeply 
entrenched with our understanding of time and tensed discourse, we should—
ceteris paribus—do all is possible to safeguard their validity and reject them 
only if absolutely necessary.  
However, the real problem for the R-TRL framework we are now 
discussing is not much the fact the (PF) fails, but the specific way in which it 
fails. As a matter of fact, the R-TRL theory just sketched above compels us to 
accept something actually worse than the simple failure of (PF). Since ‘F~p’ is 
true at m1 in figure 8, it follows not only that ‘PFp’ is false at m2, but also that 
‘PF~p’ is true. In other words, it is both true to say at m2 that p is the case and 
that it was the case that ~p would be the case. This means that substituting p 
with ‘the coin lands tails’ and supposing that at m3 ~p is true because the coin 
lands heads at m3, this theory predicts that it is correct at m2 to say 
(5) The coin came up heads, but this is not what was going to happen. 
The coin was going to come up tails. It’s just that it didn’t4 
(5) strikes me as extremely odd. In fact, those who contend the validity of (PF) 
are normally thinking that (PF)  fails because even if it is today true that the 
coins lands tails, yesterday it was neither true nor false. Those who reject (PF) 
                                                     
4
 Belnap and Green (1994, p. 380) 
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do so, in other words, because they believe that a future contingent statement 
like ‘Fp’ can change its  truth-status relative to a certain moment from 
indeterminate (or neither true nor false) to either true or false. However, 
setting aside cases of non-Ludovician time travel (see van Inwagen 2010), 
claiming that  future contingent statement like ‘The coin will land tails’ can 
change their truth-status with respect to a moment m from being false at m to 
being true at m (or vice versa) is, I submit, a bullet nobody would want to bite. 
For future reference, let us dub the (absolute and relative) TRL-theories 
presented in this section—corresponding to the clauses (A6ʹ), (A6ʹʹ) and 
(A6ʹʹʹ), respectively—naive TRL-theories. 
3 Aristotle, Ockham and TRL 
The last naive R-TRL theory just reviewed in the last section makes use only of 
a notion of truth relative to moments. However, in the ockhamist logic firstly 
put forward by Prior (1967), truth is relativized both to a moment and to a 
history, as follows (‘□’ is the ‘historical necessity’ operator): 
 
(B1) p is true at <m,h> iff p belongs to V(m)  (for any atomic p) 
(B2) ‘p & q’ is true at <m,h>  iff p is true at <m,h>  and q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B3) ‘~p’ is true at <m,h>  iff p is not true at <m,h>  
(B4) ‘p v q’ is true at <m,h>  iff either p is true at <m,h>  or q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B5) ‘p→q’ is true at <m,h>  iff, if p is true at <m,h>, then q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B6) ‘Fp’ is true at <m,h>  iff there is a moment m′ belonging to h such 
that mRbrm′ and p is true at <m′,h>  
(B7) ‘Pp’  is true at <m,h>  iff there is a moment m′ belonging to h such 
that m′Rbrm and p is true at <m′,h> 
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(B8) ‘□p’ is true at <m,h>  iff for every h′ such that m belongs to h′, p is 
true at <m,h′> 
The ockhamist definition of the future tense gives, however, rise to a problem.  
According to (B1)-(B8), a moment m is not sufficient to determine the truth-
value of Fp:  an assignment to the history parameter is needed.  But:  which 
history is to be chosen, amongst all the possible futures of m? We can call this 
the problem of the prima facie assignment. 
Thomason’s (1970) ‘aristotelian’ solution to the problem of the prima facie 
assignment is that of taking all the possible futures of m to be relevant, and to 
define accordingly the notion of sentence-truth/falsity at a moment m as 
truth/falsity at every point of evaluation <m,h> such that h is an history passing 
through m: 
(6) S is true at m iff S is true at <m,h>, for every h passing through m; 
S is false at m iff S is false at <m,h>, for every h passing through m; 
otherwise, S is neither true nor false at m. 
This definition allows for truth-value gaps, taking thus seriously and 
accommodating what MacFarlane (2003; 2008) has called the indeterminacy 
intuition, i.e.  the intuition that future contingent statements are neither true nor 
false. 
What is of great interest of Thomason’s theory for the TRL-theorist is that 
while he uses Prior’s ockhamist notion of truth as relative to <moment, 
history> pairs to define Boolean, temporal and modal operators, he then 
defines on the basis of that a second notion of truth as relative only to 
moments.5 This second notion is then used to define the notions validity and 
logical consequence. In other words: although Thomason theory uses a doubly 
relativized notion of truth to both moments and history, its central notion 
remains a notion of truth as relative only to moments. The same kind of 
manoeuvre appears to be available also to both relative- and absolute-TRL 
theorists. 
 
                                                     
5
 In his aristotelian setting this is achieved by letting the moment parameter  ‘quantifying out’  (see 
Belnap 2009) the history parameter.  
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3.1 Relative TRL theory 
 
The R-TRL theorist can simply retain the ockhamist clauses (B1)-(B8), and 
then define the notion of sentence-truth at a moment as follows: 
(7) S is true at m iff S is true at <m,trl(m)> 
According to (2), for a sentence S to be true at m is for S to be true at m and the 
Thin Red Line of m. Since for the R-TRL theorist any moment m has its own 
TRL, this definition appears to be intuitively correct. Furthermore, it makes 
(PF) valid.6 We might dub this theory ‘ockhamist R-TRL theory’ (or ‘OR-
TRL’ for short). 
Although they do not define explicitly the notion of truth at a moment, this 
solution appears faithful to the spirit of the R-TRL theory proposed by Brӓuner 
et al. (2000) and Øhrstrøm (2009).  The particular kind of R-TRL I am 
proposing here, however, differs from their theory in a crucial point:  whereas I 
take (B8) to be the correct definition of historical necessity, Bräuner et al. 
(2000), Øhrstrøm (2009) and Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011) prefer the following 
clause: 
(8) ‘□p’ is true at <m,h>  iff for every h′ belonging to C(m), p is true at 
<m,h′> 
where C(m) is thought of as the set of future possibilities of m and is 
constrained as follows: 
(9) C(m) = {h | m ∈ h & ∀mʹ[(mʹ ∈ h & mʹ > m) ⇒ trl(mʹ) = h] } 
This definition requires that every possible future history h of m is such that, 
for every moment mʹ, if mʹ is later than m and lies on h, then h is the TRL of m. 
It is easy to prove that (9) entails that the set of possible futures histories of a 
given moment m is such that there can be no pair of histories h and hʹ 
belonging to C(m), such that h and hʹ pass both through some moment later 
                                                     
6
 The proof is straightforward. 
 
126 
 
than m.7  I find this requirement highly implausible. Take, for instance, the 
moment m1 in figure 1: if h1 is a possible history of m1 (so that h1 ∈ C(m1)), 
why should that rule out the present (at m1) possibility that the next actual 
moment after m2 will be m5 (so that also h2 ∈ C(m1))? 
Øhrstrøm (2009) justifies the rejection of (7) with the idea that ‘new 
possibilities may show up’ in the future.8 This idea appears, however, to have 
some undesired consequences.  Consider, for instance the following scenario:  
in the tree depicted in figure 1 h1 is the TRL of m1 and m2, h2 is the TRL of 
m5 and p is true only at m5. It follows from (9) that h2 does not belong to 
C(m1), since: m2 is later than m1, m2 lies on h2  and h2  is not the TRL of m2.  
Let us assume that m5  is two time-units later than m1. Deploying thus the 
metric operators Pn and Fn (‘it was the case n time-units ago’; ‘It will be the 
case n time-units hence’) we can observe that the following is the case at m5: 
(10) P2F2p 
However, given (8), also the following is true at m5: 
(11) P2□~F2p 
which is equivalent to 
(12) P2~◊F2p 
From which (by &-introduction and the fact that P2 agglomerates) we have 
(13) P2(F2p & ~◊F2p) 
i.e. that it was it was the case (two time-units ago) that it would be the case 
(two time- units hence) that p and that it was impossible that it would be the 
case (two time-units hence) that p. But F2p & ~◊F2p sounds as a plain 
                                                     
7
 Proof : Assume for reductio that m1 < m2, h1≠h2, h1∈C(m1), h2∈C(m1), m2 ∈ h1 and m2 ∈ h2. Since 
m2 is later than m1 we have—from (9) and the fact that it belongs to h1 (a possible future history of 
m1)—that trl(m2) = h1. Similarly, from (9) and the fact that it belongs to h2, we have that trl(m2)=h2 
and, hence, that h1 =h2. Hence, we have both that h1 = h2 and (by our initial assumptions) that h1≠ h2. 
Contradiction! Therefore for every history h and hʹ belonging to C(m), such that h≠ hʹ, there is no 
moment mʹ later than m such that mʹ belongs both to h and to hʹ. QED 
8
 See Øhrstrøm (2009, p. 30). 
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contradiction! As a matter of fact, if □ is to represent the settledness, it surely 
must be factive: 
(14) □p→p 
so that (13) should entail 
(15) P2~F2p 
and hence (from (12), by &-introduction and P2-agglomeration) 
(16) P2(F2p & ~F2p) 
I conclude, therefore, that (7) is to be preferred to (10) and, consequently, 
that the OR-TRL theory just sketched above is superior to the theory put 
forward by Bräuner et al. (2000) and Øhrstrøm (2009). 
 
3.2 Absolute TRL-theory 
 
The absolute TRL (henceforth ‘A-TRL’) theorist needs only to take 
Thomason’s supervaluationist definition of sentence-truth at a moment and 
modify it as follows: 
(17) S is true at m iff S is true at <m,h>, for every h belonging to fut(m); 
S is false at m iff S is false at <m,h>, for every h belonging to 
fut(m); 
otherwise, S is neither true nor false at m. 
where fut is a function from the set of moments to the set H(M)  of all histories 
on the model such that: 
(18) if m belongs to TRL, then fut(m) = {TRL} 
if m does not belong to TRL, then fut(m) = H(m) 
(where H(m) is the set of all histories h, such that m belongs to h, i.e. the set of 
all histories that ‘pass through’ m). For any moment m, the function fut(m) 
answers the question: which is the history h belonging to H(m)—i.e. the set of 
histories passing through m—that represents the way things will in fact turn out 
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to be in the future of m? If m is on TRL then the answer is determinate. If, on 
the other hand, m does not belong to TRL, the answer is indeterminate and 
such indeterminacy is reflected by the fact that the value of fut(m) is not a 
singleton (as {TRL}), but the very set H(m). Let this kind of A-TRL be the 
‘supervaluationist A-TRL theory’ (or ‘SA-TRL’ for short). 
4. Some worries 
4.1 Truth-Value Links 
 
The first problem for the TRL theories briefly sketched in the previous section 
is the failure of the so called Truth-Value Links.9 As a matter of fact, there 
appears to be a set of principles linking the truth-value of different temporal 
sentences at different temporal points that strike as being deeply entrenched in 
our understanding of tensed-discourse. One of these principles is the following: 
 (TVL) For every temporal point k1 and k2, such that k2 is later than k1, if 
p is true at k2, then ‘Fp’ (‘It will be the case that p’) is true at k1 
However, it is easy to see that both SA-TRL and OR-TRL fall short of TVL. 
As for SA-TRL, consider figure 9: 
 
 
                                                     
9
 Dummett (1978). For a discussion see Wright (1986), Weiss (1996) and, more recently, Westphal 
(2004).  
129 
 
 
 
 
In this model we have by (7) both that p is true at m2 and that ‘Fp’ is not true at 
m1, despite the fact that m1 is earlier than m1. As for OR-TRL, consider figure 
10 
 
 
 
Even in this case we have by (8) that p is true at m2 and ‘Fp’ is not true at m1. 
(TVL) appears to be the meta-linguistic counterpart of (PF). Also in the 
case of (TVL) it must then be stressed that what troubles the TRL theories 
under consideration is not just its failure, but the specific way in which it fails. 
As a matter of fact, in the models depicted in figures 9 and 10 not only it is the 
case that (TVL) is false, but also that while p is true at m2, ‘It will be the case 
that not p’ is true at m1. As in the case of (PF), detractors of (TVL) are in fact 
normally Aristotelians who admit that the it is possible for S to be true at 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
m3 m2 
m1 
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temporal point k1 and for ‘WILL:S’ to be neither true nor false at earlier 
temporal points.10 In our case, instead, ‘WILL:S’ is false—and consequently 
‘WILL:~S’ is true—at m1: a highly unintuitive result few would want to 
underwrite. 
 
4.2 Counterfactual evaluation and counterfactuals of openness 
 
The problem of counterfactual evaluation is the problem of how to evaluate 
future contingent statements at moments lying off the (absolute) TRL. Taking a 
moment m lying off the TRL and future-contingent statement Fp (with respect 
to m), the question is thus: 
(Q1)  What is the truth-value of ‘Fp’ at m? 
(Q1) is, in itself, a rather technical question concerning the notion of sentence-
truth in our temporal models. However, the problem of counterfactual 
evaluation—which I have so far presented in its most technical dress— 
intuitively appears to point to a philosophically significant question, that is 
(Q2)  What would have been the truth value of ‘Fp’, were m to have 
belonged to the actual history?  
or, alternatively: 
(Q3)  What would have been the truth value of ‘Fp’, had the 
circumstances represented by m obtained? 
or, again: 
(Q4)  What would have been the truth value of ‘Fp’, were m to have been 
present? 
The connection between (Q1) and (Q2-4) strikes as intuitively correct, on pain 
of the representational adequacy of the branching model itself. Given that 
moments on the branching tree are thought of as representing possible ways 
things might have turned out to be, asking about the truth-value of a sentence at 
                                                     
10
 See, for instance, McCall (1966) and Halpin (1988) on the failure of (principles akin to) (TVL). 
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a given moment seems intuitively to be equivalent to asking what would have 
been the truth-value of the sentence in question, were that moment to have 
become actual/present.  
Let us call ‘Truth-Value Counterfactuals’ (TVCs) counterfactuals of the 
form 
(TVC) If m had obtained, S would have been true/false/neither-true-nor-
false/either-true-or-false 
where m is a merely counterfactual moment and S is a future-contingent 
statement with respect to m. What is the general relation between TVCs and the 
truth-value of the sentence S at the moment m? The following principle appears 
to be valid: 
(L1) If it is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false], then S is 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false at m 
As a matter of fact, if—as I suggested—asking about the truth-value of a 
sentence S at a given moment m is equivalent to asking what would have been 
the truth-value S, were m to have become actual/present, then it follows that to 
say, for instance, that if m had obtained, then S would have been true is simply 
to answer ‘the True’ to (Q2) and, hence, to claim that in our model S should be 
true with respect to m. 
 
4.2.1 The inadequacy of SA-TRL 
 
Given the validity of L1, it is easy to see that SA-TRL is inadequate as a theory 
for true-futurists. As a matter of fact, true-futurists upholds that future-
contingent statements are bivalent not as a matter of mere fact, but as matter of 
necessity: what could it mean that future-contingent statements are actually 
bivalent but, had things gone otherwise, then future-contingent statements 
would have been gappy?11 Therefore, for every counterfactual moment m and 
                                                     
11
 See chapter 3 on this point. 
132 
 
future-contingent statement Fp with respect to m, true futurists must be 
committed to the truth of the following counterfactual: 
(C1)  Were the circumstances represented by m to have obtained, the 
future-contingent statement ‘Fp’ would have been either true or 
false 
However, for SA-TRL theorists a future-contingent statement ‘Fp’ is neither 
true nor false with respect to a counterfactual moment m. Hence, it follows by 
(L1) that SA-TRL theorists must claim that 
(C1SA) Were the circumstances represented by m to have obtained, the 
future-contingent statement ‘Fp’ would have been neither true nor 
false 
contrary to our assumption. For this reason, I conclude that SA-TRL is not a 
feasible true-futurist theory. 
 
 
4.2.2 Is OR-TRL an adequate theory? The problem of Counterfactual 
True-Futurism. 
 
According to OR-TRL, for every moment m and sentence S either S is true at 
m or S is false at m. Therefore, OR-TRL is not in contradiction with (C2), and 
so manages to comply with what appears to be one of the minimal features of 
any possibly feasible true-futurist theory. However (and leaving aside for a 
moment the question related to the Truth-Value Links), a possible problem 
lurks also for OR-TRL theorists. As a matter of fact, not only for OR-TRL 
theorists, for every moment m and sentence S, it is true that either S is true at m 
or S is false at m, but it is also true that which truth-value S has with respect to 
m is determinate. In other words, for OR-TRL theorists it is also true that either 
S is determinately true at m or S is determinately false at m. As a matter of 
fact, for every sentence S and moment m there is, according to OR-TRL,  a 
determinate answer to the question: ‘what is the truth-value of S at m?’. In 
order to appreciate what this entails, we have to finally understand what is the 
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general relation between TVCs and the notion of sentence-truth at a moment. 
Consider in fact the left-to-right version of L1 
(L1-lr) If S is true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false at m, 
then it is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false] 
(L1-lr) cannot be correct. To see why, take the following counterfactuals 
 (C3) If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been true 
(C4)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been false 
(C3) and (C4) appear to be the counterparts, in an open future setting, of the 
so-called ‘counterfactuals of freedom’ (COFs) in the debate on Molinism. I 
shall thus call them counterfactuals of openness (COPs). Independently of any 
specific purported logic for true-futurism (SA-TRL, OR-TRL etc), the question 
about whether there are true COPs is a question capable in principle to divide 
the true-futurists’ camp into two distinct kinds of true-futurist theories that we 
might call Factual (‘there are no true COPs’) and Counterfactual True-
Futurism (‘there are true COPs’). Not only Factual True-Futurism appears to 
be a real option for true-futurists, but there appears also to be something 
immediately counterintuitive about Counterfactual True-Futurism. As a matter 
of fact, if the future of a counterfactual moment m is open, it seems to be at 
least prima facie intuitive to say that (C3) and (C4) should turn out false. It 
would, in fact, seem very odd to say things like 
(C5)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, the future 
would have been open as to whether ‘Fp’ would have been true or 
not. Nevertheless, in that case, ‘Fp’ would have been true 
or, even worse 
(C6)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, no entity 
existing at m, nor any state of affairs then obtaining would have 
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been sufficient to settle the truth-value of ‘Fp’. Nevertheless, in 
that case, ‘Fp’ would have been true 
However, if we assumed the validity of (L1-lr), then Factual True-Futurism 
would be as such  an inconsistent theory, since the falsity of both (C3) and (C4)  
would entail, by contraposition on (L1-lr), that ‘Fp’ is neither true nor false at 
m, which would be inconsistent with (C1). Notice that from (L1-lr) and (L1) it 
follows that 
(19) It is not the case that if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true 
entails that 
(20) If m had obtained, then S would have been untrue 
which seems to be a bad result. What (L1-lr) leaves unrightfully out of the 
picture is, in fact, the possibility that the truth-value of a sentence S at a 
counterfactual moment m is indeterminate. One might in fact say that although 
S is determinately either true or false at m, it is neither the case that S is 
determinately true at m nor that S is determinately false at m, which appears to 
be exactly what factual true-futurists should say by denying that either (C3) or 
(C4) is true. As an example, consider the following three counterfactuals: 
(21) If I had tossed a coin, it would have landed either heads or tails 
(22) If I had tossed a coin, it would have landed heads 
(23) If I had tossed a coin, it would have landed tails 
In normal circumstances (the coin is fair, etc) it would seem natural to say that 
while the first counterfactual is true, the last two are false: 
(24) Although it is the case that, if I had tossed a coin, it would have 
landed either heads or tails, it is both not the case that if I had 
tossed a coin, it would have landed heads and that if I had tossed a 
coin, it would have landed tails 
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However, this seems to be just equivalent to say that the outcome of my 
possible toss is indeterminate or, in other words: 
(25) The outcome of my possible toss is determinately either heads or 
tails, but it is indeterminate whether it is heads or tails 
that is 
(26) It is neither determinately the case that the outcome of my possible 
toss is heads nor it is determinately the case that the outcome of my 
possible toss is tails 
If this is correct, we can then state the general relation between TVCs and the 
notion of sentence-truth at moment as follows: 
(LINK) It is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false] if, and only if,  
S is determinately true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-
false at m 
Given that, intuitively, determinate truth entails plain truth 
(27) If it is determinately true that p, then it is true that p 
it follows that if both (C3) and (C4) are untrue, then, by LINK, Fp is neither 
determinately true at m nor determinately false at m. However,  since for true-
futurist (C2) is true it follows, by LINK, that for any true-futurist it is 
determinately the case that S is either true or false at m. 
We are now finally in the position to ask ourselves whether OR-TRL is a 
feasible true-futurist theory. The answer is that such a question simply boils 
down to the question whether Counterfactual True-Futurism is a feasible and 
consistent version of True-Futurism. As a matter of fact, an immediate 
consequence of LINK is that OR-TRL entails Counterfactual True-Futurism. 
According to OR-TRL, for every sentence S and moment m 
(28) Either S is determinately true at m or S is determinately false at m 
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from which and LINK it follows that, for every counterfactual moment m and 
future-contingent statement ‘Fp’ with respect to m, either 
(29) If m had obtained, then S would have been true 
or 
(30) If m had obtained, then S would have been false 
is true, which is precisely the counterfactualist position.  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have  
 
(i) discussed the ‘problem of counterfactual evaluation’,  
 
(ii) advanced two possible theories for its solution (SA-TRL and OR-
TRL),  
 
(iii) dismissed SA-TRL as unfaithful to the very spirit of True-
Futurism, 
 
(iv) briefly distinguished between what I have called ‘Factual’ and 
‘Counterfactual True-Futurism’,  
 
(v) and argued that the question about whether OR-TRL  is a feasible 
true-futurist theory depends on whether Counterfactual True-
Futurism is really an option for true-futurists. 
 
As I have briefly argued in the last section, Counterfactual True-Futurism has 
at least the ring of counter-intuitiveness to it. Nevertheless, I think that 
something more than the mere appeal to intuitions can be made to reject the 
idea of Counterfactual True-Futurism and, hence, the adequacy of OR-TRL as 
a possible true-futurist theory. As I shall argue in the following chapter, in fact, 
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if we accept some intuitive valid inference patterns for counterfactuals and the 
idea that ‘chancy’ counterfactuals like ‘If I had tossed the coin, it would have 
landed tails’ are, in normal circumstances, not  true, then Counterfactual True-
Futurism must be rejected. The upshot of my argument will then be that  
(i)  also OR-TRL is not a plausible true-futurist theory 
(ii)  therefore: no theory reviewed in this chapter solves the problem of 
counterfactual evaluation; 
(iii) complying with Factual True-Futurism is a necessary condition for 
any theory T to be a feasible candidate for True-Futurism. 
Finally, in chapter 7, I will expose two adequate factual true-futurist theories 
that appear to comply with all the desiderata for a true true-futurist theory. 
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Chapter 6 
Against Counterfactual True-Futurism 
1.  Introduction 
1.1 Factual and Counterfactual True-Futurism 
 
True-futurists maintain that, for every future contingent statement S, S is either 
true or false. This entails, in turn, that among all the possible histories ‘passing 
through’ the present moment a single history is ‘marked’ as the true history: 
the Thin Red Line (TRL). Consider then an arbitrary moment m lying off the 
TRL representing a merely possible way things could have turned out to be. 
According to true-futurists the principle of bivalence holds for future-
contingent statements not as a matter of fact, but as a matter of necessity.1 It is, 
in other words,  necessary that, for every future-contingent statement S, either S 
is true or S is false. Given the highly-intuitive validity of the following 
principle governing the interaction between metaphysical necessity and 
counterfactuals2 
(NC) From □p, infer q⇒p (for any q) 
it follows that any true-futurist should, as such, subscribe to the truth of the 
following counterfactual (where P is a future-contingent statement with respect 
to m): 
(1) If m had obtained, then P would have been either true or false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ [True(P) or False(P)] 
                                                     
1
 See chapter 2. 
2
 ‘⇒’ stands here for the counterfactual conditional (see section 1.3). 
 139 
 
Consider, however, the following two counterfactuals: 
(2) If m had obtained, then P would have been true  
Obtain(m) ⇒ True(P)  
(3) If m had obtained, then P would have been false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ False(P) 
Here, it seems, true-futurists face a choice. One might, in fact, ask whether one 
of those counterfactuals is true or whether, instead, both of them are false/not 
true. By analogy with the so-called ‘counterfactuals of freedom’ (COFs) in the 
debate on Molinism3 we might call counterfactuals as (2) and (3) 
counterfactuals of openness (COPs). The general question for the true-futurist 
becomes thus:  
 Are there true counterfactuals of openness? 
This question gives rise to two possible positions for true-futurists that I shall 
call ‘Factual’ and ‘Counterfactual True Futurism’, respectively: 
(FTF) Factual True-Futurism: for every counterfactual moment m and 
sentence P such that P is future-contingent with respect to m both 
(2) and (3) are not true  
(CTF) Counterfactual True-Futurism: for every counterfactual moment 
m and sentence P such that P is future-contingent with respect to m, 
either (2) is true or (3) is true  
While both factual and counterfactual true-futurists uphold that if m had 
obtained, then P would have been truth-valued, only counterfactual true 
futurists think that there is actually a fact of the matter as to which truth-value a 
future contingent statement P would have had, had m obtained. For future 
reference I shall call Counterfactual Determinacy and Counterfactual 
                                                     
3
 For a recent discussion about Molinism and counterfactuals of freedom see, among others, Zimmerman 
(2009) and Merricks (2011). On the relation between Molinism and the notion of a Thin Red Line see 
Restall (ms.). 
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Indeterminacy the phenomena acknowledged by counterfactual and factual 
true-futurists, respectively. 
 
 
1.2 Aim and overview 
 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that CTF is false and that, therefore, there 
are no true COPs. The gist of my general argument against CTF will be the 
following:  
 
CTF-theorists have the burden to put forward a general analysis of 
counterfactuals in the open future such as to (i) make some COPs true and 
(ii) respect the intuitive truth-value of ordinary counterfactuals. In 
particular, it appears that, intuitively, chancy counterfactuals like ‘If I had 
tossed a coin, it would have landed tails’ and ‘If I had tossed a coin, it 
would have landed heads’ should be predicted to be false. However, it is 
possible to argue that, in order for there to be true COPs and for  chancy 
counterfactuals to be false, counterfactualists appear obliged to posit a 
mysterious kind  of correlation between the relative true-futures of 
counterfactual moments, which appears to be in contradiction with the 
thesis that the future of counterfactual moments is indeed open. I will, 
therefore, conclude that CTF has to be rejected. 
 
More in detail, I will proceed as follows: 
 
(i) In section 2 I shall briefly dismiss two possible strategies against 
counterfactualism  based, respectively, on the duality of ‘would’ 
and ‘might’, and on the principle of grounding 
 
(ii) In section 3 I will begin discussing how counterfactualists can 
produce a general semantics for counterfactuals such that: 
i.  it is based on a relevant notion of similarity (as Lewisian 
orthodoxy mandates) 
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ii.  it is such as to make some COPs true 
iii.  it respects our intuitions about ordinary counterfactuals 
and, hence, predicts ‘chancy’ counterfactuals like ‘If I 
had tossed the coin, it would have landed tails’ to be 
untrue 
To this effect I will propose a first possible counterfactualist 
analysis for counterfactuals (‘AC1’) that seems to deliver the right 
results  
 
(i) In section 4 I will criticise AC1 on the grounds that it appears to 
posit a mysterious kind of ‘correlation’ among the thin red lines of 
merely counterfactual moments.  
 
(iv) In section 5, I will advance two new semantic analysis of 
counterfactuals (‘AC2’ and ‘AC3’) and then dismiss them as 
wanting. Finally, I will put forward a general argument—quite 
independent from any specific account for counterfactuals—
showing that Counterfactual True-Futurism is inconsistent with 
some intuitively valid inference rules for counterfactuals 
 
1.3 Notation 
 
Before concluding this introductory section it may be useful to briefly 
overview the kind of notation I will be using. As usual, I shall be very relaxed 
about the use/mention distinction and let it be clear from the context whether a 
certain expression is used or mentioned. 
 
• ‘⇒’ stands for the counterfactual conditional, so that ‘p⇒q’ is to be 
read ‘if p had been the case, then q would have been the case’; 
 
• ‘p ||might> q’ stands for ‘if p had been the case, then q might have been 
the case’; 
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• ‘N’ stands for the historical necessity operator ‘it is now historically 
settled that’; 
 
• ‘□’ is the metaphysical necessity operator; 
 
• throughout the paper I will often use ‘m⇒p’ for an arbitrary COP. It is 
to be read ‘If the merely counterfactual moment m had obtained, then 
the future contingent statement p (with respect to m) would have been 
true’; 
 
• in general, I will use ‘m’ both as a variable over moments, as a moment-
parameter, and as shorthand for ‘the moment m obtains’. So, for 
instance, ‘∃m(m & ...)’ is to be read ‘There is a moment m such that m 
obtains and...’. The meaning of ‘m’ will be made clear from the context; 
 
• in discussing the problem of ‘chancy’ counterfactuals, I will use 
‘toss⇒heads’ and ‘toss⇒tails’ for ‘If I had tossed the coin, it would 
have landed tails’ and  ‘If I had tossed the coin, it would have landed 
tails’. However, ‘m⇒tails’ and ‘m⇒heads’ will stand for  ‘If the 
moment m had obtained, then ‘The coin will land heads’ would have  
been true’ and  ‘If the moment m had obtained, then ‘The coin will land 
tails’ would have  been true’. 
 
Other expressions will be defined as I introduce them for the first time. 
2. Two non-starters 
2.1 Would/might duality 
 
According to the thesis of Counterfactual Openness, the future of 
counterfactual moments is open, which is equivalent to saying that, for every 
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counterfactual moment m, there is some proposition p such that, if m had 
obtained, then it would not have been settled either that p or that ~p: 
(4) m⇒(~Np & ~N~p) 
using ‘p ||might> q’ for ‘If p had been the case then it might have been the case 
that q’, it seems that (7) intuitively entails both 
(5) m ||might> p 
(6) m ||might|> ~p 
However, according to Lewisian orthodoxy, the following principles hold for 
‘might’ and ‘would’: 
 
 DUALITY: 
 From p⇒q, infer ~(p ||might|> q) 
 From p||might|>q, infer ~(p⇒q)  
 
However, from (8) and (9) and Duality we can infer both 
(7) ~(m⇒p) 
(8) ~(m⇒~p) 
which contradicts CTF. 
It appears hardly questionable that Counterfactual Openness entails—and 
is entailed by—the corresponding ‘might’-counterfactuals. However, although 
this argument surely shows a clear tension between CTF and Duality (a tension 
that might well turn out to be fatal), I think that we had better look elsewhere 
for a specific argument against CTF as such. As a matter of fact, Duality is not 
a problematic principle only for counterfactualists, but for open-futurists (true-
futurists and gappists) in general. Consider, in fact, the following argument:  
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        ARGUMENT DU 
(DU1) If I were to strike the match, it would be (historically) possible for 
it not to light  [premiss] 
(DU2)  If I were to strike the match, it might not light  [from DU1] 
(DU3) It is not the case that, if I were to strike the match, it would light 
[From DU2, by Duality] 
If Counterfactual Openness does entail—as it is intuitively the case—the truth 
of the relevant might-counterfactuals, (DU1) entails (DU2) which, in turn, 
entails (DU3) by Duality. (DU1) is a claim to which open-futurists as such 
appears to be committed to. Surely, if the future is indeed actually open, my 
striking a match would not have settled it. At the same time, however, (DU3) 
surely appears to be a weird conclusion: we intuitively would like to say that if 
I had struck the match, it would have lit. Furthermore, the argument clearly 
generalizes to a vast range of ordinary counterfactuals, to the effect that, if 
argument DU is indeed valid, the startling conclusion is that most of the 
ordinary counterfactuals we employ in our everyday talk are false.  
Furthermore, is not even necessary to think that the future is  open or that 
the universe is indeterministic to have problems with Duality. As a matter of 
fact, it seems that claims like (DU2) are true even if our universe is 
deterministic,4 and (DU2) is all we need to conclude—by Duality—that most 
ordinary counterfactuals are false. 
In this chapter we are asking ourselves whether there are specific reasons 
for true-futurists to be committed to Factual True-Futurism and to reject the 
thesis that there are true counterfactuals of openness. Hence, the argument 
                                                     
4
 ‘The antecedent of “if I were to jump, I would come down” is imprecise: I have not told you anything 
about the manner in which my hypothetical jump takes place, let alone given you a molecule-by-molecule 
specification of the jump. The antecedent, then, covers a huge range of initial conditions, each of which 
results in my jumping. Among them will be initial conditions that give rise to anomalous trajectories in 
which I vaporize, for the antecedent is too imprecise to rule   them   out.  [...] So I If I were to jump, I 
might wind up on one of those anomalous trajectories. Thus, it is false to say [even in a deterministic 
universe] that if I were to jump, I would come down.  I might not. (Hajek, ms.:21) 
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from Duality is too far-reaching to efficaciously to rule out counterfactualism 
as an option for true-futurists.5  
 
2.2 Truthmakers 
 
Roughly speaking, the Truthmaking Principle says that every truth has a 
truthmaker, that is that for every p, if p is true, then there is an entity x such 
that x makes p true, while the Supervenience Principle says that every truth 
supervenes on being, that is—roughly—that for every p, if p is true, then if p 
were false there would be either a difference with the actual population of 
entities or a difference with the actual pattern of instantiation of fundamental 
properties and relations. We can thus call the following the grounding 
principle: 
 
 GROUNDING: 
 For every p, if p is true is either truth-made or supervenient 
 
Undoubtedly, the grounding principle has a certain intuitive appeal: 
truth—we appear to intuitively feel—must be grounded in reality, in one way 
or the other. However, as it happens with the counterfactuals of freedom in the 
debate on Molinism, it seems that once we accept the validity of the grounding 
principle a powerful argument against counterfactualism can be easily 
advanced. As a matter of fact, if there are true COPs, then they must be 
grounded in reality. But: what could possibly ground their truth? COPs are 
about what would happen, as a  matter of mere fact, were another moment m to 
have obtained instead and so it seems that the way the present or actual state of 
the world has turned out to be should be utterly irrelevant to the truth-value of 
a COP. It appears, therefore, that there could be nothing to ground the truth of a 
COP. Hence, the argument concludes, there are no true COPs. 
As appealing as this argument might appear at first sight, I think that it 
should also be left aside in the debate between Factual and Counterfactual 
                                                     
5
 On the problems surrounding the duality of ‘would’ and ‘might’ see, among others: De Rose (1999), 
Hawthorne (2005), Williams (2008), Ichikawa (2011) and Hajek (ms.). 
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True-Futurism. The reason is simple: as we have seen in chapter 1, at least 
within some metaphysical frameworks the grounding principle can be troubling 
for true-futurists as such, and so it is unsuitable to separate the wheat of True-
Futurism from its chaff.  
I will, therefore, assume that counterfactualists have the option of simply 
rejecting the unrestricted validity of the grounding principle.  
3.  The counterfactualist analysis of counterfactuals 
3.1 Similarity 
 
According to the received view, counterfactuals are to be analyzed by means of 
a notion of similarity.6 Within a possible-worlds account for counterfactuals, 
the truth-conditions of a counterfactual of the form ‘p⇒q’ at a world w are 
usually given along the following lines (a ‘p-world’ is a possible world in 
which p is true): 
(9) ‘p⇒q’ is true at w if, and only if, some p-world in which q is true is 
more similar to the actual world than is any p-world where q is not 
true. 
In our moments-and-histories based framework, it would appear that the most 
intuitive notion of similarity relevant to counterfactuals is (or at least involves) 
the similarity between histories.7 However, this kind of analysis appears to be 
incompatible with counterfactualism.  
Consider a counterfactual moment m. By upholding the thesis that there 
are true COPs, the counterfactualist is committed to  the thesis that a certain 
history h, belonging to the set H(m) of histories passing through m is the true 
future or the relative actual history of m. Suppose then that the COP ‘m⇒p’ 
(‘If the counterfactual moment m had obtained, than the future-contingent 
statement p—with respect to m—would have been true’) is true. Since the 
                                                     
6
 See Lewis (1973) 
7
 See, for instance, the recent work of Placek and Müller (2007) on this issue. 
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histories belonging to H(m) are the only histories along which m obtains, it 
follows that according to the history-based similarity-account for 
counterfactuals the actual truth-conditions for ‘m⇒p’ should be the following: 
(10) ‘m⇒p’ is true if, and only if, some m-history in which p is true is 
more similar to the actual history than is any p-history where q is 
not true 
However, CTF appears to be incompatible with (10), for at least two reasons: 
 
(i) First, it appears that, intuitively, the notion of similarity that would 
be involved in evaluating counterfactuals of the form ‘m⇒p’ 
should be such as not to discriminate between the histories 
belonging to H(m). When we ask whether ‘m⇒p’ is true we 
consider the hypothetical scenario in which m is present and 
wonder whether, as a matter of mere fact, there is an history h, such 
that it is true to say that it is the history that would have obtained in 
that situation. However, we also think that the future of m is 
objectively open and, so, for every history h belonging to the set 
H(m) of histories passing through m, it is possible with respect to m 
that h obtains. Hence, with respect to historical possibility, all 
histories belonging to H(m) are on a par since—despite the fact 
that some histories might be less likely to obtain with respect to 
others—each of them is as historically possible as any other, which 
should be the only thing that matters in the evaluation of COPs. 
 
(ii) Second, the counterfactualist does not seem to want to say that a 
certain history h that is the relative thin red  line of the 
counterfactual moment m because h is the most similar history to 
the actual one among all the histories passing through m. The 
identity of the true future of m should in fact be independent  from 
the identity of the actual history. It seems, in other words, to be part 
and parcel of True-Futurism that the identity of the true future of 
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any moment m, not only is not determined by what goes on at m, 
but a fortiori is also not correlated in any sense with the identity of 
the true future of other counterfactual moments in the branching 
tree of possibilities. Therefore, when we consider a counterfactual 
whose antecedent states that a certain moment m obtains, the 
similarity between the future of m and the actual future should 
have—for true futurists—no relevance at all. 
 
It follows, thus, that the counterfactualist has therefore the burden to offer an 
analysis of counterfactuals such that:  
 
(i)     the relevant notion of similarity is not (at least exclusively) that of 
similarity between histories;  
 
(ii) there are true COPs; 
 
(iii) and, of course, the intuitive truth-value of ordinary counterfactuals 
is vindicated.  
 
3.2 The problem of chancy counterfactuals 
 
Among the ordinary counterfactuals that appears to intuitively strike us as 
having a certain truth-value, I shall focus on ‘chancy’ counterfactuals, that is 
counterfactuals like: 
(11) If I had tossed the coin it would have landed heads(/tails) 
Intuitively, under normal circumstances (11) should be countered as false. If I 
had tossed that coin it might have landed tails and it might have landed heads. 
However, my flipping the coin would have been in itself insufficient to 
determine the outcome of the toss. Hence, it seems that it is incorrect to say 
both that if I had tossed the coin it would have landed tails and that if I had 
tossed the coin, it would have landed heads. If these line of reasoning is on the 
 149 
 
right track, it follows that a necessary condition for any counterfactualist theory 
of counterfactuals to be successful is that it should predict chancy 
counterfactuals like (11) to be false. 
However, one might argue that counterfactualists  are as such  committed 
to the highly controversial thesis that  there are true chancy counterfactuals. As 
a matter of fact, also the possibility that a certain counterfactual moment m 
obtains is insufficient to determine its future, but that does not prevent the 
counterfactualist from affirming that if m had been actual, then a certain history 
h would have been the actual history. 
Such an objection is, I submit, misguided and overlooks a fundamental 
difference between COPs like ‘If the counterfactual moment m had obtained, h 
would have been the true history’ and chancy counterfactuals like ‘If I had 
flipped the coin, it would have landed tails’. As a matter of fact, a moment m 
specifies the total state of the world at a certain time and, therefore, 
individuates a unique point in the garden of forking paths in which the open 
future consists. As a result, the counterfactualist could say, by supposing that a 
certain moment m had obtained we are placing ourselves in a specific location 
in the logical space that is, as such, as much determinate as the present 
moment. Since, however, we think that future-contingent statements are 
presently true or are presently false, it is also true that either if m had obtained 
P would have been true, or that if m had obtained P would have been false. On 
the contrary, by supposing only that I had flipped the coin we are under-
specifying the location in the logical space of possibilities in which we are 
placing ourselves: there are, in fact, (perhaps, infinitely) many counterfactual 
situations in which I toss the coin that are sufficiently similar to the actual 
moment. Therefore, the information encoded in the antecedent of a chancy 
counterfactual is insufficient to determine whether things would go—even as a 
matter of mere fact—as the consequent of the counterfactual predicts. 
Interestingly enough, the very train of thought showing how 
counterfactualists are not committed to endorsing the controversial thesis that 
there are true chancy counterfactuals can provide them with some useful 
guidelines for an alternative and successful account for counterfactuals. The 
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counterfactualist seems, in fact, to be in position to tell the following story 
about COPs and ordinary chancy counterfactuals: 
 
Future-contingent statements are either true or false at the current moment. 
We have just to ‘wait and see’ to discover their present truth-value, so to 
speak. The same would have happened if another (counterfactual) moment 
m had obtained now: We just would have had to ‘wait and see’ to discover 
its truth-value. Therefore, just as there is a history h belonging to H(@) 
representing the actual history, there is a history h belonging to H(m) such 
that it represents the way things would have been, were m to have 
obtained. 
However,  the antecedent of ‘If I had tossed the coin it would have 
landed heads(/tails)’ is insufficient to determine a unique moment m and, 
therefore, a unique history h. There are many nearby moments in which I 
toss the coin. Some of them are such that along their relative-TRL the coin 
lands heads and some are such that along their relative-TRL the coin lands 
tails. Therefore the counterfactual(s) ‘If I had tossed the coin it would have 
landed heads(/tails)’ is(are) false. 
 
In other words, it appears that the following analysis of counterfactuals is 
available to counterfactualists: 
(AC1)  p⇒q is true if, and only if, in all the closest moments m such that  
p is true with respect to <m,trl(m)>, q is true with respect to 
<m,trl(m)> 
Consider, for instance, the following toy-model: 
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Figure 1 
 
 
m5 is the present moment and h20 the actual history; the set 
M(toss)={m1,m2,m3,m4} is the set of nearby moments in which I toss the coin; 
h1, h5, h10 and h18 are the relative-TRL of, respectively, m1, m2, m3, and m4. 
The model depicted in figure 1 and (AC1) entail that the following COPs are 
true at m5 
(12)   m1⇒tails8 
(13)   m2⇒heads 
(14)   m3⇒tails 
(15)   m4⇒heads 
while neither of the following chancy counterfactuals are: 
(16)    toss⇒tails9 
(17)    toss⇒heads 
                                                     
8
 ‘If m1 had obtained, than ‘the coin will land tails’ would have been true’. 
9
 ‘If I had tossed the coin, then it would have landed tails’. 
HEADS TAILS HEADS TAILS 
M(toss) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 
h5 h1 h10 h18 h20 
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It seems, therefore, that by means of (AC1)—or a refined version of it—the 
counterfactualist is at least in position to take up the challenge posed by chancy 
counterfactuals.  
4.  A tension 
Let a toss-normal moment be a moment m such that I could have tossed a fair 
coin in normal circumstances (the coin is not biased etc.), but I did not. 
Intuitively, we would like to say that, necessarily, if a scenario/moment/context 
is toss-normal then both toss⇒heads and toss⇒tails are false 
(18)  □(toss-normal→(False(toss⇒heads) & False(toss⇒tails)) 
By the semantics for counterfactuals based on similarity between moments we 
have that: 
(19)  □((for every m in M(toss):(m⇒heads/tails)) ↔ 
True(toss⇒heads/tails))   
Necessarily, it is true that if I had tossed the coin it would have landed 
heads(/tails), if and only if for every moment m belonging to the set of 
nearby moments in which I toss the coin, it is the case that if m had 
obtained, then ‘The coin will land heads(/tails)’ would have been true  
From (18) and (19) it follows that: 
(20)  □(toss-normal→((~for every m in M(toss): (m⇒heads)) & (~for 
every m in M(toss): (m⇒tails))) 
which is equivalent to 
(21)  ~◊[toss-normal & for every m in M(toss): (m⇒heads/tails)] 
It is impossible that: this moment is toss-normal and every nearby 
moment m in I which I toss the coin is such that, if m had obtained then 
‘The coin would have landed heads(/tails)’ is true 
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(20) and (21) tells us that, for every toss-normal scenario, the relative true 
futures of counterfactual moments are correlated: it is in other words necessary 
that they do not have all either a future in which the coin lands heads or a 
future in which the coin lands tails. However, this  seems to run against the 
very idea that, necessarily, the ways the future would have been, had things 
gone differently, are independent from each other. There appears, in other 
words, to be a tension between the two following thesis: 
Independency: The relative true futures of merely counterfactual moments 
represent the ways things would have turned out to be in 
counterfactual situations. Hence, counterfactual true-futures are 
independent from each other. The fact that, if a certain 
counterfactual moment m had obtained, things would have gone in 
a certain way does not depend in any way on how things would 
have gone had other moments obtained instead. 
Correlation: at every toss-normal moment it is true that the counterfactual 
moments belonging to M(toss)—i.e. the nearest counterfactual 
moments at which the coin is tossed—are correlated, that is: it is 
not the case that the coin lands heads/tails with respect to every 
such moment. 
Suppose I now toss a coin and that it is now true to say that the coin will 
land tails. Since the future is open, there is nothing in the present state of the 
world that determines that the coin will land tails. It is just a mere fact. The 
coin could well land heads, instead. Clearly, there are many nearby moments in 
which I toss the coin. However, it would seem extremely odd to suppose that 
the actual outcome of my toss is somehow linked to the merely possible 
outcome of those merely possible tosses. If the future is genuinely open, and 
the present state of the world does not determine whether the coin will land 
heads or tails, then, a fortiori, what would have happened at counterfactual 
moments should be irrelevant for the present truth of ‘The coin will land tails’. 
However, the same should apply also for merely counterfactual moments in 
which I toss the coin I haven’t actually tossed. The local true future of a 
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counterfactual moment m should represent how things would have gone, had m 
obtained, as a matter of mere, random and genuinely chancy fact. To suppose, 
however, that the modal space of historical possibility is such that the relative 
futures of different moments are somehow correlated is to think that the 
‘distribution’ of local true futures on the branching tree of historical possibility 
is somehow constrained. This would appear, however, to essentially put a limit 
to the openness of the future: how can the future of a moment be genuinely 
open, if it must respect a certain kind of distribution of truths within a certain 
set of moments to which it belongs? That would be like having a set of coins 
that are so manufactured that, when  simultaneously tossed, can never land all 
on the same side. How could you say, in that case, that for each coin c, the 
outcome of the toss of c is genuinely random, chancy and ‘open’? 
I conclude, therefore, that (AC1) must be rejected and that a feasible 
counterfactualist account for counterfactuals must not posit any kind of 
correlation among the relative true futures of counterfactual moments. 
5.  Refining the counterfactualist analysis of counterfactuals 
Let us take stock. So far I have been arguing against Counterfactualism as 
follows: 
 
(i) The counterfactualist has to produce a general account for 
counterfactuals according to which: 
i. there are true COPs 
ii. chancy counterfactuals are not true 
 
(ii) A certain notion of similarity has to be central to any successful 
account for counterfactuals 
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(iii) The only two elements in a counterfactualist  framework to which a 
notion of similarity can be applied to are moments and histories 
 
(iv) The notion of similarity among histories cannot be employed by the 
counterfactualist 
 
(v) Hence, she has to employ a notion of similarity across moments, 
along the lines of (AC1)  
 
(vi) However, if the counterfactualist employs a notion of similarity 
among moments, then she is committed to acknowledge the 
existence of a mysterious form of correlation between the relative 
true futures of counterfactual moments, which appears to be in 
tension with the thesis that the future of counterfactual moments is 
objectively open. 
 
At this point, one might object that what only my argument against the 
counterfactualist shows is that her analysis of counterfactuals involving the 
notion of similarity between moments is simply more complicated than the one 
featuring in (AC1). In particular, one might think  that the counterfactualist can 
employ a sort of ‘mixed’ analysis of counterfactuals using together both the 
notion of similarity among histories and the notion of similarity among 
moments.  
As we have seen above, it seems highly intuitive that if the future of 
counterfactual moments is objectively open, then there can be no correlation 
among their possible futures.  Therefore, the counterfactualist has to allow for 
the possibility of there being a toss-normal moment m such  that every closest 
moment to m in which the coin gets tossed is such that it is true to say at m that 
if the coin had been tossed, then it would have landed—say—heads. Therefore, 
the truth-value of the chancy counterfactual ‘If I had tossed the coin it would 
have landed heads’ cannot simply depend on what goes on along the relative 
 156 
 
thin red line of the closest counterfactual moments. But surely the truth-value 
of COPs like m⇒heads must depend on the fact that the along the thin red line 
of m the coin lands heads. 
This train of thought suggests thus the following possibility for the 
counterfactualist: 
(AC2) If there is just one moment m at which p is true, then p⇒q is true if, 
and only if q is true at <m,trl(m)>; otherwise, p⇒q is true if, and 
only if q is true with respect to all the closest histories at which p is 
true. 
Consider figure 2:  
 
 
 
  
 
Since m1, m2, m3, and m4 are the closest toss-moments, we can safely suppose 
that the set {h1,h2,…,h2,h18} is the set of the closest toss-histories. Therefore, 
since it is false that there is only one moment m such that ‘the coin is tossed’ is 
true at m, the truth value of toss⇒heads will depend on whether with respect to 
all histories belonging to {h1,h2,…,h2,h18} it is true that the coin lands heads. 
However, since this is not in fact the case, toss⇒heads is to be assessed as not 
true, as our intuitions mandate. 
However, even this refined analysis for counterfactuals harbors a problem. 
Consider in fact the following sentence: 
    
M(toss) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 
h5 h1 h10 h18 h20 
H T H H H T T T 
Figure 2 
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(22) If one of the moments in M(={m1,m2,m3,m4}) had obtained, then 
‘The coin will land heads’ would have been true 
 
[(∃m(m & m∈M))⇒heads] 
 
In the toy model we are considering (figure 2) every moment m in 
{m1,m2,m3,m4}  is such that trl(m) is a heads-history and, hence, it is true that: 
(23) m1⇒heads & m2⇒heads & m3⇒heads & m4⇒heads 
Therefore, it seems that also (22) should be true. But according to the 
semantics just given it is not. As a matter of fact, there is not a unique moment 
m such that ‘one of the moments in M(toss) obtains’ is true (since that is true 
with respect to every moment in M(toss)) and, hence, given the validity of 
(AC2) the truth-value of (22) will depend on whether in every history 
belonging to {h1,h2,...,h18} the coin does land heads. But in our toy model this 
is not the case and hence (22) is not true. 
The problem here is that both antecedents of  
(22) If one of the moments in {m1,m2,m3,m4} had obtained, then ‘The 
coin will land heads’ would have been true 
and 
(24) If I had tossed coin, it would have landed heads. 
determine the same set of nearby moments. But intuitively, we would like the 
truth value of (22) to depend on  the thin red line of the nearby moments in 
question, but the truth value of (24) to depend on all histories passing through  
such moments and not only their thin red lines. Nevertheless, if we look more 
closely to the counterfactuals  
(25) If m1 had obtained, ‘The coin will land heads’ would have been 
true 
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(22) If one of the moments in {m1,m2,m3,m4} had obtained, then ‘The 
coin will land heads’ would have been true 
we can notice an important difference with chancy counterfactuals like 
(24) If I had tossed the coin, it would have landed heads. 
As a matter of fact, only in the case of (22) and (25) the set of nearby moments 
at which the antecedent of the counterfactual is true  is identical with the set of 
possible moments at which the antecedent of the counterfactual is true. In the 
case of (24), instead, the set of closest moments at which ‘I toss the coin’ is 
true is simply  a proper subset of the set of possible moments at which ‘I toss 
the coin’ is true. This appears to be an important difference between the two 
kinds of counterfactuals and suggests the following refined version of (AC2): 
(AC3) If the closest p-moments are the only possible moments at which p 
is true, then p⇒q is true if, and only if, for every moment m 
belonging to the set of closest p-moments, q is true with respect to 
every point <m,trl(m)>; otherwise, p⇒q is true if, and only if, for 
every moment m belonging to the set of closest p-moments, q is 
true with respect to <m,h>, where h is a history passing through m. 
According to AC3, the thin red line of a set of moments M is called into 
consideration only when we are interested in the members of M as such—as it 
were—and not insofar they are the closest moments at which the antecedent of 
the counterfactual conditional in question is true. It is easy to see that AC3 
predicts (22) and (25) to be true and (24) to be false at m5 in the toy model 
depicted in  figure 2. 
AC3 appears thus not only to be an adequate counterfactualist account for 
counterfactuals, since it seems to manage to make some COPs true and chancy 
counterfactuals false without entailing any kind of correlation among the thin 
red lines of counterfactual moments, but also to efficaciously explain the 
behavior of counterfactuals in a counterfactualist setting. However, a serious 
problem appears to lurk  also for this refined version of CTF. Consider in fact 
the following intuitively valid inference patterns: 
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SUBSTITUTION: 
From p⇒q, q⇒p and q⇒r, infer p⇒r 
 
LIMITED TRANSITIVITY: 
From p⇒q and (p & q)⇒r, infer p⇒r 
 
Substitution says that if two propositions counterfactually entail each other (if 
they are, as we might call them, counterfactually equivalent10) then ‘either may 
be substituted for the other, salva veritate, as the antecedent of any subjunctive 
conditional’ (Bennett, p. 299). Limited Transitivity says that a proposition r is 
counterfactually entailed by a proposition p, if p entails a proposition q such 
that r is entailed by the conjunction of p and q. 
The two inference rules strike as valid. However,  an unwelcome result of 
AC3 is that it predicts there to be counterexamples to both. Consider in fact the 
following set of sentences (keeping in mind that we are still considering the toy 
scenario represented in figure 2): 
 
SUBSTITUTION: 
(i) toss⇒∃m(m & m∈M) 
(ii) (∃m(m & m∈M))⇒toss 
(iii) (∃m(m & m∈M))⇒heads 
(iv) ~[toss⇒heads] 
 
LIMITED TRANSITIVITY: 
(i) toss⇒∃m(m & m∈M) 
(ii) [toss & ∃m(m & m∈M)]⇒heads 
(iii) ~[toss⇒heads] 
 
If I had tossed a coin, one of the moments belonging to M(toss) would have 
obtained. In the same way, if one of the moments belonging to M(toss) had 
                                                     
10
 See Stalnaker (1984:140) 
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obtained, then I would have tossed a coin. However, if one of the moments 
belonging to M(toss) had obtained, then ‘The coin will land heads’ would have 
been true. But it is false that if I had tossed a coin it would have landed heads, 
even if it is also true that if I had tossed a coin and one of the moments 
belonging to M(toss) would have obtained, then the coin would have landed 
heads. 
So far, after having rejected a counterfactualist account for counterfactuals 
based on the notion of similarity among histories, we have tried to provide a 
moment-based similarity account for counterfactuals firstly by putting forward 
AC1 and then by refining it by means of AC2 and AC3. At this point, however, 
it appears that we can no longer go forward and try to refine also AC3. The 
reason is that the failure of Substitution and Limited Transitivity appears to be 
part and parcel of the very spirit of Counterfactualism, once the thesis of No 
Correlation is accepted. 
As a matter of fact, in order to establish the incompatibility between the 
thesis of Counterfactual Openness and Counterfactualism we do not need to 
appeal to any specific semantics for counterfactuals. What we only need is the 
thesis that the set of points (possible histories, possible moments, etc) that are 
relevant for the truth-conditions of chancy counterfactuals like ‘if I had tossed 
the coin, it would have landed tails’ determine, at every toss-normal moment 
m, a set M of counterfactual moments such that, it is true at m that 
(Z1) If I had tossed the coin, then one moment belonging to M would 
have (then) obtained 
Notice that it follows from the Lewisian account for counterfactuals that, for 
toss-normal situation S, there is a set of worlds W such that it is true in S that 
(Z1b) If I had tossed the coin, then one world belonging to W would have 
obtained 
In this case, W is simply the set of nearby worlds in which I toss the coin (at 
the time in question). In our case, quite independently from the specific 
account for counterfactuals the counterfactualist might put forward, once we 
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accept that a certain notion of similarity must be central to any possibly 
successful account for counterfactuals, it seems difficult to deny that the truth-
conditions for ‘If I had tossed the coin, then q’ are not such as to single out a 
set M of moments such that (Z1) is true. In particular, as we can speak of 
nearby worlds and histories we can surely speak of nearby moments. 
Therefore, there is a set of moments such that it is the set of nearby moments at 
which I toss the coin. If that is correct, however, calling ‘M’ such a set, it 
appears equally difficult to deny that (Z1) is true. Hence, our first premiss 
appears to be plausible enough. 
Secondly, if we accept the thesis that the relative thin red lines of 
counterfactual moments are independent from each other, and so the truth-
values of the correspondent COPs are not correlated, we must admit the 
possibility of a certain toss-normal situation K such that, where M is the set of 
moments that makes (Z1) true in K, it is true that 
(Z2)  If one of the moments belonging to M had obtained, then ‘the coin 
will land heads’ would have been true 
Furthermore, by the very definition of M it follows that 
(Z3) If one of the moments belonging to M had obtained, then I would 
have tossed the coin 
However, by Substitution, (Z1), (Z2) and (Z3) entail that 
(Z4) If I had tossed the coin, then ‘the coin will land heads’ would have 
been true 
and, hence, 
(Z5) If I had tossed the coin, the coin would have landed heads 
By the same token, from the very definition of M it intuitively follows that 
it is also true that 
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(Z6) If I had tossed the coin and one of the moments belonging to M had 
obtained, then ‘the coin will land heads’ would have been true 
But (Z4) and (Z5) follow also from (Z1) and (Z6), by Limited Transitivity. 
I conclude, therefore, that regardless of the validity of AC3 or of any 
specific account of counterfactuals, Counterfactual True-Futurism is 
incompatible with the idea that the future of counterfactual moments is 
objectively open and, hence, that it is inconsistent with the very spirit of True-
Futurism. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Counterfactual True-Futurism is the thesis according to which, even if the 
future of counterfactual moments is open, there is a fact of the matter as to 
which future would have been their true future had they obtained. The 
argument I have put forward in this chapter shows instead that Counterfactual 
Openness  and Counterfactual Determinacy are incompatible, at least if we 
want to salvage the intuitive falsity of chancy counterfactuals (‘No True 
Chancy Cs’). As a matter of fact, we have on the one hand that Counterfactual 
Openness intuitively entails that the identity of the true future of a certain 
counterfactual moment m is not constrained by the identity of the true future of 
other moments (‘No Correlation’) on the other hand, we have also that if there 
are true counterfactuals of freedom (and chancy counterfactuals are false), then 
there is a certain kind of modal correlation between the true futures of 
counterfactual moments. My argument against Counterfactual True-Futurism 
can thus be summarized as follows: 
 
    
 
 
 163 
 
 
ARGUMENT C 
 
(C1) Counterfactual Openness → No Correlation 
(C2) No True Chancy Cs 
(C2) (Counterfactual Determinacy & No True Chancy Cs) → 
Correlation 
(C3) Counterfactual Openness → Counterfactual Indeterminacy  
 
I conclude, therefore, that true-futurists are as such committed to the 
rejection of Counterfactual Determinacy and of the thesis that there are true 
counterfactuals of openness and, hence, that  Factual True-Futurism is the true 
true-futurist theory. 
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Chapter 7 
The logic of true futurism II—The True Logic of 
True-Futurism 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Summing up 
 
In the last chapter, I have argued that true-futurists are committed to Factual 
True-Futurism, that is the thesis that there are no true counterfactuals of 
openness (COPs). This amounts to saying that, for every counterfactual 
moment m and future-contingent statement P (with respect to m), although it is 
true that 
(1) If m had obtained, then P would have been either true or false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ [True(P) or False(P)] 
it is both false to say that 
(2) If m had obtained, then P would have been true  
Obtain(m) ⇒ True(P)  
and that 
(3) If m had obtained, then P would have been false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ False(P) 
Furthermore, at the end of chapter 5 I have argued that the notion of sentence-
truth at a moment should be constrained by the following principle: 
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(LINK) It is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false] if, and only if,  
S is determinately true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-
false at m. 
From LINK and the thesis that there are no true  COPs it follows that any 
successful  theory for True-Futurism must be such that its notion of sentence 
truth at a moment does not predict that, for any counterfactual moment m and 
future-contingent statement P with respect to m, P is true with respect to m. 
However, this is precisely what happens with the relative-TRL theory I have 
dubbed ‘OR-TRL theory’. As a matter of fact, according to OR-TRL, (i) every 
moment m on the branching tree of historical possibilities has its own TRL and 
(ii) sentence truth at a moment is defined as follows: 
(4) S is true at m iff S is true at <m,trl(m)> 
which entails that for every moment m and sentence S (and, hence, also for 
every counterfactual moment m and future-contingent statement S with respect 
to m) either S is determinately true at m or S is determinately false at m, 
contrary to what Factual True-Futurism mandates. It follows that OR-TRL is to 
be rejected.  
 
 
1.2 True-Futurism: the desiderata 
 
From what I have been arguing so far, it follows that  an adequate true-futurist 
theory must meet the following desiderata: 
 
(A1) The principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid (i.e.: the notion of 
truth at a temporal point governing the theory must be such that, for 
every temporal point k and sentence S, either S is true at k or S is 
false at k) 
(A2) For every counterfactual moment m and sentence S, it is true that if 
m had obtained, then either S would have been true or S would have 
been false 
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(A3) There are no true counterfactuals of openness: for every 
counterfactual moment m and future-contingent statement Fp with 
respect to m it is false to say both that, if m had obtained, then Fp 
would have been true and that, if m had obtained, then Fp would 
have been false (in other words the theory must be a factual true-
futurist theory) 
(A4) (PF) must be valid (see chapter 5) 
(A5) Truth-Value Links must hold (see chapter 5) 
 
In this chapter I aim to put forward two adequate true-futurist theories 
complying with (A1-5). Both theories are ockhamist theories, in the priorean 
sense reviewed in chapter 5. In other words, both theories define a notion of 
truth at a <moment, history> pair as follows (see chapter 5, section 3): 
 
(B1) p is true at <m,h> iff p belongs to V(m)  (for any atomic p) 
(B2) ‘p & q’ is true at <m,h>  iff p is true at <m,h>  and q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B3) ‘~p’ is true at <m,h>  iff p is not true at <m,h>  
(B4) ‘p v q’ is true at <m,h>  iff either p is true at <m,h>  or q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B5) ‘p→q’ is true at <m,h>  iff, if p is true at <m,h>, then q is true at 
<m,h>  
(B6) ‘Fp’ is true at <m,h>  iff there is a moment m′ belonging to h such 
that mRbrm′ and p is true at <m′,h>  
(B7) ‘Pp’  is true at <m,h>  iff there is a moment m′ belonging to h such 
that m′Rbrm and p is true at <m′,h> 
(B8) ‘□p’ is true at <m,h>  iff for every h′ such that m belongs to h′, p is 
true at <m,h′> 
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However, while the first theory (‘ATL’) employs a  notion of absolute TRL 
and takes as its central notion of sentence truth that of sentence truth at time, 
the second (‘RTL’) uses a notion of relative TRL and takes moments to be its 
relevant temporal parameters. In addition, ATL relativizes sentence truth only  
with respect to a single time parameter (which we might think of as the time of 
utterance) and, therefore, qualifies as ‘absolutist’ in MacFarlane’s usage of the 
term. RTL, instead, relativizes sentence truth with respect to two moments (the 
time of utterance and of assessment) and, hence, qualifies as ‘truth-relativist’. 
Let us review them in turn. 
2 Absolute Thin Red Line and Factual True Futurism 
2.1 Truth-at-a-time, bivalence and counterfactuals of openness 
 
The most important notion within a theory T, for a certain subject matter K, is 
the one on the basis of which validity and logical consequence are defined. 
Usually, there is a certain set of points of some sort with respect to which the 
notion of sentence-truth is defined—for instance: a set of possible worlds in 
propositional modal logic. That notion is then used to define validity and 
logical consequence, usually along the following lines: 
(5) A sentence S is valid if, and only if, for every point k and model M, 
S is true at k in M 
(6) A sentence Q is a logical consequence of a sentence P if, and only 
if, for every model M and point K such that P is true at k in M, Q is 
also true at k in M 
Intuitively, in a framework in which tense is treated by means of temporal 
operators and atomic propositions are thought of as capable  of changing truth-
value across time,  the relevant kind of points must have a temporal nature. So 
far, we have taken moments as the relevant temporal points central to our true-
futurist theory. Moments do have a certain temporal nature, since they are 
ordered by a sort of earlier-later relation. Furthermore, they are the basic 
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elements of our models, out of which histories are constructed. However, the 
problems we have encountered so far suggest that the central notion in a true-
futurist theory cannot be that of sentence-truth at a moment.  
The first factual true-futurist theory I shall present in this chapter (that I 
will label ‘ATL’) makes the fundamental move of defining sentence-truth not 
as relative to moments, but to times instead.  
What are times? The set of times can be seen as the ‘horizontal division’ of 
the tree of time, as sketched in Figure 1:1 
 
 
 
 
The intuitive idea behind the introduction of times is the following: moments 
represent, intuitively, not only possible ways things might turn  or have turned 
out to be, but possible ways things might turn out to be at a certain stage of 
history. In September 2008 United States were struck by a financial crisis that 
was later to spread out to the rest of the world. We might think, however, that 
in 2006 it was not yet settled that a financial crisis would strike the US in 2008. 
This means that, from the point of view of the actual 2006, there were other 
possible 2008s, as it were, in which no financial meltdown occurs in the US. In 
an ATL-model, the possible 2008s are represented by different moments and 
the fact that they all represent a way in which the year 2008 might have turned 
out to be is represented by the fact that all such moments lie (in some relevant 
sense) at the same time, that is: 2008.  
                                                     
1
 What I am here calling ‘times’ are called ‘instants’ by many authors, including Belnap et al (2001). See 
Belnap et al. (2001) for a rigorous definition of the notion of instant and Di Maio and Zanardo (1994) for 
the necessity of a ‘horizontal division’  of the tree of time in branching settings.  
t3 
t2 
t1 
times 
m3 m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
Figure 1 
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Similarly, consider the aristotelian question that allegedly originates the 
philosophical debate on future-contingents: ‘Will there be a sea-battle 
tomorrow?’ Thinking that the future is not settled today as to whether there 
will be a sea battle tomorrow only amounts to thinking that there are a plurality 
of possible tomorrows, that is: a plurality of moments ‘lying on’ the same time, 
representing the possible ways things might turn out to be once a day will have 
elapsed.  
There are many possible ways to ‘synchronize’ histories in order to take 
moments to be able to occur ‘at the same time’ (see Di Maio and Zanardo 
1994). For simplicity’s sake, however, I will simply add to our models a 
linearly ordered set T of times, such that any time is (properly)  associated with 
a unique set of moments. In the figure above, for instance, t2 is associated with 
{m2,m3}, so that m2 and m3 can be said to ‘lie’ at the same time (although 
along different histories). We can thus have a two-place function mom such 
that for any history h and time t, mom(h,t) is the moment that lies on h at time t.  
A model M for ATL is a 6-tuple <M,V,T,mom,Rbr,Rlin,TRL>, where M is a 
non-empty set of moments, V is a valuation function from the set of moments 
to the power set of atomic propositions, T is a non-empty set of times, mom is 
the function just mentioned above, Rbr is a ‘branching’ earlier-later relation 
between moments, Rlin is a linear earlier-later relation between times and TRL 
is the absolute thin red line.  
The notion of sentence-truth at a time in an ATL model can be defined as 
follows: 
(ATL) TRUE(S,t)  iff   T(S,mom(TRL,t),TRL) 
In English: a sentence S is true at a time t (in a TRL-model M) if, and only if, S 
is true with respect to the TRL (of M) and the moment that lies at time t on the 
TRL (of M). 
It is straightforward to prove that (A1), (A4) and (A5) hold in ATL. As a 
matter of fact, we have from (ATL) the following definition of validity: 
(7) A sentence S is valid iff S is true at any time in any model 
from which it follows that: 
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• for any time t and model M, S is either true at t or false at t2  
 
• there is no model M and two times t1 and t2 such that t2 is later 
than t1, p is true at t2 in M but ‘Fp’ is not true at t1 in M3 
 
• for every time t and model M, ‘p→PFp’ is true at t in M4 
 
2.2  Counterfactual indeterminacy and determinate truth at a moment 
 
What about (A3)? Within ATL we have two notions of sentence truth:  
 
(i) the priorean/ockhamist notion of sentence truth at a 
<moment,history> pair  
 
(ii) the notion of sentence-truth at a time. 
 
How can we speak of sentence-truth at a moment?  
Intuitively, if the moment m in question lies on the TRL of our model, for 
a sentence S to be true at m, just is for S to be true at t(m), where t(m) is the 
time at which m lies. On the other hand, if m lies off the TRL, asking the truth-
                                                     
2
 Proof: Suppose that there is an ATL-model M such that, at a time t, S is neither true nor false at t. 
Therefore, by (ATL), there is a pair <m,h> such that S is neither true nor false at m. But the notion of 
sentence-truth at a <moment, history> pair is, by definition, bivalent. Contradiction! Hence, for every 
sentence S, ATL-model M and time t, S is either true at M and t or false at M and t. ■ 
3
 Proof: Suppose that that there is an ATL-model M and two times t1 and t2 such that (a)  t2 is later than 
t1, (b) p is true at t2 in M but (c) ‘Fp’ is not true at t1. p is true at t1. Hence, p is true at <mom(t2),TRL>. 
From (B6) it follows that for every moment mʹ belonging to the TRL ‘Fp’ is true at <mʹ,TRL>. mom(t1) 
belongs to the TRL; therefore ‘Fp’ is true at <mom(t1),TRL> and, hence, by (ATL), ‘Fp’ is true at t1. 
Contradiction! Hence: there is no model M and two times t1 and t2 such that t2 is later than t1, p is true at 
t2 in M but ‘Fp’ is not true at t1 in M. ■ 
4
 Proof: Suppose that there is a time t and ATL-model M such that ‘p→PFp’ is not true at t in M. From 
(ATL) we have that ‘p→PFp’ is not true at <mom(t),TRL>. If p is true at <mom(t),TRL>, however, it 
follows—by (B6) and (B7)—that ‘PFp’ is true at <mom(t),TRL>. Hence, by (B5), ‘p→PFp’ is true at 
<mom(t),TRL>. Contradiction! Therefore, for every time t and  ATL-model M, ‘p→PFp’ is true at t in M 
■ 
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value of a sentence S at m seems equivalent to asking what would be the truth 
value of S at t(m), were m to have belonged to the TRL: 
(Q1)  Had m belonged to the TRL, what would have been the truth-value 
of S at t(m)? 
Let then the notion of trl-variance be defined as follows: 
(VAR) a model M is a trl-variant of a model M′ if, and only if, M is 
identical with M′ except possibly for what concerns the identity of 
the TRL 
Consider then the claim: 
(K1)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been true 
Within an ATL framework, the following clause appears to adequately express 
the adequate  truth-conditions for (K1)  
(KTC) K1 is true iff for every model M′, such that M′ is a trl-variant of 
(the actual model) M and m2 belongs to the TRL of M, ‘Fp’ is true 
at t2 (=t(m2)) 
This should be intuitively enough: when we ask whether Fp would have been 
true were m2 to have been actual, we are asking whether Fp would have been 
true were m2 to have belonged to the TRL. Therefore, we are asking to 
consider what would be the case in models which possibly differ from the 
actual one only for what concerns the identity of the TRL. However, there are 
many models in which the TRL passes through m2 and everything else is just 
like in our model. Therefore, asking whether Fp would have been true were m2 
to have been actual is (within an absolute TRL framework) tantamount to 
asking whether Fp is true at t2 (the time of m) in every model M′ such that: (i) 
Mʹ is a trl-variant of M and (ii) in Mʹ, m belongs to the TRL. Given that only in 
some such models Fp is true at t2 (and only in some models Fp is false at t2) 
we have thus that the two following claims are false: 
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(K1)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been true 
(K2)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been false 
and so (A3) is true. However, since in every such model ‘Fp’ is either true or 
false, (A2) turns out to be true and so that Factual True-Futurism is vindicated.  
Accommodating Factual True-Futurism by quantifying over models might 
appear too unorthodox a strategy to many. Luckily, there appears to be another 
way for factual true-futurists to model the phenomenon of counterfactual 
indeterminacy that doesn’t require any kind of quantification over models. As a 
matter of fact, in chapter 5 I have advanced an absolute-TRL theory—‘SA-
TRL’—employing a supervaluationist treatment of sentence truth at a moment. 
According to SA-TRL 
(8) S is true at m iff S is true at <m,h>, for every h belonging to fut(m); 
S is false at m iff S is false at <m,h>, for every h belonging to 
fut(m); 
otherwise, S is neither true nor false at m 
where fut is a function from the set of moments to the set H(M)  of all histories 
on the model such that: 
(9) If m belongs to TRL, then fut(m) = {TRL} 
If m does not belong to TRL, then fut(m) = H(m) 
Recall that: 
 
• H(m) is the set of all histories h, such that m belongs to h, i.e. the 
set of all histories that “pass through” m 
 
• For any moment m, the function fut(m) answers the question: which 
is the history h belonging to H(m)—i.e. the set of histories passing 
through m—that represents the way things will in fact turn out to 
be in the future of m? If m is on TRL then the answer is 
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determinate. If, on the other hand, m does not belong to TRL, the 
answer is indeterminate and such indeterminacy is reflected by the 
fact that the value of fut(m) is not a singleton (as {TRL}), but the 
very set H(m). (see chapter 5) 
 
As we have seen in chapter 5, however, given the validity (L1)  
(L1) If it is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false], then S is 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false at m 
and the fact that, for true-futurists, for every moment m and sentence P it must 
be true that 
(1) If m had obtained, then P would have been either true or false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ [True(P) or False(P)] 
SA-TRL must be rejected. As a matter of fact, for every counterfactual moment 
m (that is: for every moment m lying off the absolute thin red line) and every 
future-contingent statement P with respect to m, SA-TRL predicts that 
(10) P is neither true nor false at m 
from which and LINK it follows that 
(11) If m had obtained, then P would have been neither true nor false 
Obtain(m) ⇒ [~True(P) or ~False(P)] 
contrary to our assumptions about True-Futurism. 
However, the idea of a supervaluationist treatment of sentence truth at a 
moment was not completely on the wrong track. As a matter of fact, the factual 
true-futurist thesis, according to which there are no true COPs, is just a thesis 
about the actual determinacy and counterfactual indeterminacy of the truth-
value of future-contingent statements with respect to moments. In other words, 
for factual true-futurists, while for every actual moment m and future-
contingent statement P, the truth-value of P at m is determinate and, hence 
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(12) P is either determinately true or determinately false at m 
for every counterfactual moment mʹ, P’s truth-value at mʹ is indeterminate, that 
is 
(13) P is neither determinately true nor determinately false at mʹ 
Hence, what appears to be wrong with SA-TRL is not the application of 
supervaluationism per se, but the fact of taking what is defined in (8) to model 
the notion of plain sentence-truth at a moment. The notion of super-truth at a 
moment m (that is the notion of being true at every <m,h> pair, where m 
belongs to fut(m)) appears, in other words, to capture the notion of determinate 
truth instead, so that (8) should be in fact replaced with 
(14) S is determinately true at m iff S is true at <m,h>, for every h 
belonging to fut(m); 
S is determinately false at m iff S is false at <m,h>, for every h 
belonging to fut(m); 
otherwise, S is neither determinately true nor determinately false at 
m. 
Within an absolute TRL framework, (14) predicts that at any counterfactual 
moment m a future-contingent statement Fp is neither determinately true nor 
determinately false at m. From this and LINK 
(LINK) It is the case that [if m had obtained, then S would have been 
true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-false] if, and only if,  
S determinately is true/false/neither-true-nor-false/either-true-or-
false at m. 
 it follows that the COPs 
(15) If m had obtained, Fp would have been true 
(16) If m had obtained, Fp would have been false 
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are false. Furthermore, not only (14) is consistent with the claim according to 
which future-contingent statement would have been bivalent also at 
counterfactual moments 
(17) If m had obtained, Fp would have been either true or false 
but the treatment of determinate truth displayed in (14) appears to be in 
keeping with the following definition of being determinately either true or false 
(18) S is determinately either true or false at m iff S is either true at 
<m,h> or false at <m,h>, for every h belonging to fut(m) 
Within an ATL framework, (19) predicts for any future-contingent statement 
Fp and counterfactual moment m 
(19) S is determinately either true or false at m 
which, in turn, entails (given the validity of LINK) (19), whose truth, conjoined 
with the falsity of (15) and (16), is precisely what is required by Factual True-
Futurism. 
To sum up: within ATL we have three notions of sentence truth: 
 
(i) sentence truth at a <moment-history> pair 
 
(ii) sentence-truth at a time 
 
(iii) sentence-truth at a moment 
 
For every such notion the principle of bivalence is determinately valid: 
(20) It is determinately the case that [S is either true at k or false at k] 
however, the principle of determinate bivalence 
(21) [Either S is determinately true at k] or [S is determinately false at k] 
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is valid only for the first two notions, since for moments m lying off the thin 
red line and any future-contingent statement P with respect to m it is true 
instead that 
(22) P is neither determinately true at m nor determinately false at m 
(22), however, just reflects the phenomenon of counterfactual indeterminacy, 
which as I have argued in the last chapter, is something any true-futurist must 
as such acknowledge. 
I conclude thus that ATL is the true logic for True-Futurism within an 
absolute thin red line framework. 
3 Relative Thin Red Line and Factual True Futurism 
3.1  Open future, bivalence and relative truth 
 
In the last section Factual True-Futurism was accommodated within an 
absolute TRL setting. Interestingly enough, however, it is possible to put 
forward also a relative TRL and Factual True-Futurist theory. All the R-TRL 
theorist has to do in order to comply with (A1-5) is to doubly relativize the 
notion of sentence-truth central to her theory both to a ‘moment of utterance’ 
and to a ‘moment of assessment’. Where c and a are two moments (of 
utterance and assessment, respectively) such that c belongs to trl(a), the 
definition of sentence-truth goes as follows: 
(RTL)  S is true at <c,a> iff S is true at <c,trl(a)>   
The resulting framework, which we might label ‘RTL’, can thus be deemed to 
be truth-relativist in John MacFarlane’s usage of the term.5 
For Factual True-Futurism, future-contingent statements have a definite 
truth-value which is determined by the fact that a certain history is actual. 
Therefore, the identity of the actual history is required, in some sense, prior to 
the evaluation of a certain future-contingent statement. Within RTL, the 
                                                     
5
 For a presentation and discussion of contemporary truth-relativism in the sense used here see, especially, 
MacFarlane (2003,2005,2008)   
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identity of the actual history is not an absolute fact, but is relative to moments. 
However, the idea behind the relativistic R-TRL theory represented by (RTL) 
is that being actual is not only relative (in the sense in which the TRL is 
relative in a relative thin red line framework), but also perspectival: the truth-
value of a certain sentence with respect to a certain moment (thought of as the 
‘moment of utterance’) depends on which history (among the histories passing 
through that moment) is the actual history; however, the identity of the actual 
history is not determined by the moment of utterance, but by the moment from 
the point of view of which such sentence is actually evaluated. This imposes the 
constraint that the moment of assessment a must me such that the moment of 
utterance c belongs to its thin red line, in order to take the utterance in question 
(thought of as a <sentence, moment> pair) as belonging to the ‘actual history’.  
From (RTL), validity is defined as follows: 
(23) A sentence S is valid iff, in any model M, for every pair of 
moments <m1,m2>, such that m1 belongs to trl(m2), S is true at 
<m1,m2> 
It is straightforward to prove that (RTL) and (25) guarantee both the 
unrestricted validity of the principle of bivalence and of (PF). 
 
3.2  No ad hoc requirement 
 
The fact that in an RTL framework the notion of sentence-truth is defined only 
for pair of moments <moment of utterance (c),moment of assessment (a)> such 
that c lies on the relative thin red line of a might appear suspicious, artificial 
and ad hoc. However, at a closer look, it proves to actually embody the very 
spirit of True-Futurism.  
The solution I have proposed in order to vindicate principles (A1)-(A5) 
within an absolute thin red line framework is that of defining the notion of 
sentence truth not to moments, but to times instead, which are linearly ordered. 
More in general, the gist of such a solution is that  the problems seemingly 
besetting True-Futurism can be overcome by the existence of a linear order of 
temporal points on the branching tree of historical possibilities. Within an 
absolute thin red line framework, such order is given by the absolute thin red 
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line itself. Instead, within a relative thin red line framework, each moment 
imposes on the branching tree a ‘local linear order’, as it were, that is a single 
history marked as the local thin red line of the moment in question.  
Within ATL, the identity of the thin red line is given prior to the 
evaluation of the truth-vale of a certain sentence S at a given time t, that is: 
firstly we set the identity of the thin red line, and then we evaluate sentences 
with respect to the moments belonging to it. In the same vein, also within a 
relative thin red line framework we also have first to establish the identity of 
the thin red line in order to  evaluate sentences with respect to the moments 
belonging to the thin red line. Since, however, in a relative thin red line 
framework the thin red line is something relative to moments, it follows that 
firstly we have to choose which is the moment determining the identity of the 
thin red line and only then we can evaluate sentences with respect to moments 
lying on the chosen history. In other words, in a relative thin red line setting, 
we firstly have to choose which is the moment from the perspective of which 
we are looking at the branching tree of possibilities and only then we can pick 
one of the moments lying on its thin red line in order to evaluate a sentence.  
In order to better appreciate why suspects of ad hocery are in this case 
misplaced, a comparison with two kinds of propositional modal systems for the 
actuality operator might help.  
The main idea for a semantics for the actuality operator in propositional 
modal logic is the following: 
(AC1) ‘actually p’ is true at a possible world w if, and only if, p is true 
with respect to the actual world @ 
There are two main ways to accommodate this idea. The first is to augment the 
traditional models <W,V> for  propositional modal logic (where W is a non-
empty set of worlds, and V is the usual valuation function) with a designated 
world @, so that a model becomes in this case a triple <W,V,@> where @ 
belongs to W and represents the actual world. In this case, (AC1) as it stands is 
the correct semantics of ‘actually’, since it is the model itself that specifies 
which, among all the possible worlds, is the actual one.  
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However, ‘actually’ can be accommodated also in a framework in which 
there is no absolute fact of the matter as to which is the actual world. In this 
kind or ‘relativistic’ framework, we retain the standard models but we define 
sentence truth to pairs <w,wʹ> of possible worlds, where w is the world of 
evaluation and wʹ is the relative actual world, that is the world that is held fixed 
as the actual world. In this framework, the semantics for ‘actually’ is given as 
follows 
(ACT2) ‘actually p’ is true at <w,wʹ> if, and only if, p is true with respect 
to <wʹ,wʹ> 
In other words, the actuality operator shifts the world of evaluation to the 
(relative) actual world.67  
Let us then add to our models an accessibility relation R according to 
which some worlds w and wʹ are such that w has not access to wʹ (~wRwʹ). In 
this new framework, not every world is a possible world with respect to any 
other world and, therefore, it would seem natural to require sentence-truth to be 
defined only with respect to pairs <w,wʹ> such that w is a possible world with 
respect to wʹ (that is: such that wʹRw). Why? The relativization of sentence 
truth to both a world of evaluation and a world considered as actual should 
intuitively model a situation in which we take a possible world w and consider 
the truth-value of a certain sentence S with respect to w taking together a world 
wʹ to be the actual world. If, however, wʹ is not accessible from w, it follows 
from the intended meaning of the accessibility relation R, that w is not  a 
possible world with respect to wʹ. Hence, we are faced with a dilemma: if w is 
indeed a possible world, then wʹ cannot be the actual world (since, if wʹ were 
the actual world, w would be an impossible world); if, on the other hand, we 
insist that wʹ is the actual world, then w is not a possible world. To make more 
vivid this point consider the following principle 
(24) p→A◊p 
If p, then it is actually the case that it is possible that p 
                                                     
6
 See Davies and   Humberstone (1981). 
7
 These two ways to interpret ‘actually’ appear to be akin to the different behaviour that ‘actually’ has in 
the theories that Predelli and Stojanovic (2008) call ‘SR’ and ‘Classical Reduction’. 
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(24) strikes as a valid and necessary principle. Consider in fact a possible 
situation in which p is the case and then imagine that p is actually impossible. 
If p is actually impossible, then p is impossible. If p is impossible, however, it 
follows that the situation in which p is the case is not a possible situation, so 
that it is indeed true that in any possible situation if p is the case, then it is 
actually possible that p.8 However, in the presence of an accessibility relation 
as the one defined above, if we do not require the pairs of worlds <w,wʹ>, to 
which sentence truth is relativized, to be such that w is accessible from wʹ, (26) 
turns out to be invalid: it is sufficient to choose a pair of worlds <w1,w2> such 
that w2 has no access to w1 and p is false in every possible world accessible to 
w2 but true at w1.   
I conclude, therefore, that in the case of a ‘relativist’ two-dimensional 
logic with an accessibility relation R defined as explained above, the 
requirement that the pairs of worlds <w,wʹ> to which sentence truth is 
relativized be such that w is accessible from wʹ is not only not an ad hoc 
constraint, but it is indeed required both by the intended meaning of the notions 
in play and by the intuitive validity of principles like (26).    
In the case of two-dimensional modal logic we are interested in the truth-
value of sentences across the modal space of possibility. Hence, if the actual 
world is not absolute, the extension of the modal space will be determined and 
delimited by the world we are considering as actual. In the case of RTL, 
instead, we are primarily interested in the truth-value of sentences  across time. 
Hence, if the actual history is not absolute but relative to moments, we first 
need to fix the time-line we are considering as actual in order to be able to 
evaluate the truth-value of sentences along that time-line.  
I conclude, therefore, that far from being an ad hoc  patch to RTL, the 
requirement that the context of utterance lie on the thin red line of the context 
of assessment is perfectly in keeping with the spirit of True-Futurism and is 
                                                     
8
 These lines of reasoning mimic the Ramsey’s test for conditionals (see Ramsey 1929) especially in the 
interpretation given by Stalnaker (1968). Notice that this kind of reasoning is insufficient to prove the 
validity of the principle ‘p→Ap’ which is invalid in the ‘basic’ two-dimensional modal logic for the 
actuality operator: the fact that in a possible situation p is the case doesn’t suffice to conclude that, 
therefore, p is actually the case. 
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indeed mandated by the idea that the thin red line in the branching tree of 
historical possibilities is relative. 
 
3.3  Relative truth, Truth-Value Links and Counterfactual Indeterminacy 
 
For what concerns the Truth-Value Links, the doubly relativized notion of 
sentence-truth calls for their revision. Take, for instance, (TVL).  Its most 
plausible counterpart in this relativistic framework appears to be the following: 
(TVL2)  For every triple of moments <m1,m2,m3>, such that m2 is later 
than m1 and such that m1 and m2 both belong to the relative TRL 
of m3, if p is true at <m2,m3>, then ‘Fp’ (‘It will be the case that 
p’) is true at <m1,m3> 
The idea is the following: within this framework sentence-truth is relative not 
only to the moment in which a sentence S is uttered or used, but also to the 
moment from the standpoint of which the truth value of S is assessed; the 
Truth-Value Links, on the other hand, are principles intuitively governing the 
truth-value of tensed sentences with respect to different times belonging to the 
same history. As a matter of fact, from the “internal” point of view of someone 
located at a certain moment in the tree of time the Truth-Value Links look, for 
instance, as follows: 
(TVL3a)   If S is true then ‘WILL:S’ was true 
(TVL3b)   If S is true, the ‘WAS:S’ will be true 
Clearly, what is marked by the tense of (TVL3a) and (TVL3b) is a reference to 
the actual past, present and future, respectively. In this framework, however, 
actuality is an assessment-sensitive notion, since the ‘actual’ history is nothing 
but the relative TRL of the moment of assessment. Therefore, the Links should 
be valid only for moments of utterance lying on the R-TRL of the moment of 
assessment in question.  
In other words: our temporal standpoint (the context of assessment we are 
located in) represents a perspective from which sentences are evaluated with 
respect to moments. This perspective determines a unique actual history (the R-
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TRL of the moment in question). Within this temporal point of view, a set of 
Truth-Value Links holds between different tensed sentences and different 
moments lying on the history which from the current temporal standpoint is the 
actual one. 
Consider again the situation depicted in figure 9:  
 
 
 
 
This model is a counter-example to (TVL) in the OR-TRL theory, since p is 
true at m2 and Fp is false at m1. However, for every moment of assessment m 
such that m1 and m2  lie both on trl(m), it is easy to see that p is true at 
<m2,m> and Fp is true at <m1,m>. As a matter of fact, the moments such that 
m1 and m2 lie both on their relative TRL are m2, m4, and m5, whose relative 
TRLs are h1 and h2. We have thus on the one hand that 
(25) p is true at <m2,h1> and at <m2,h2> 
(26) Fp is true at <m1,h1> and at <m1,h2> 
and, therefore, that for any moment m belonging to {m2,m4,m5} 
(27) p is true at <m2,m> and Fp is true at <m1,m> 
The last point to consider concerns (A3). Also in this case, the R-TRL 
theorist appears to have the resources to accommodate the intuitions bolstering 
(A3). Within our relativist R-TRL theory truth is doubly relativized in such a 
way that when  moment of utterance and of assessment are connected, the 
m3 
m2 
m1 
m4 m5 m6 m7 
~p 
p 
 ~Fp  
~p 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
Figure 10 
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relevant history is provided by the moment of assessment. Therefore, in this 
framework the question 
(Q1)  Had m belonged to the TRL, what would have been the truth-value 
of S at t(m)? 
which is understood as 
(Q2) What would have been the truth-value of Fp at m2, were m2 to 
have belonged to the actual history? 
is translated as: 
(Q3) What is the truth-value of Fp taking m2 as the moment of utterance 
and as a moment of assessment a moment m such that m2 belongs 
to the relative TRL of m? 
In other words: since in this relativist R-TRL theory  which history is the actual  
one depends on which moment is the moment of assessment, the question 
about what would have been the truth value of Fp at m2, were m2 to have 
become actual, depends on which moment we are considering as the moment of 
assessment of the truth value of Fp at m2. Since the question we are 
considering mentions only a sentence—Fp—and a moment—m2, it is natural 
to understand the truth-conditions of 
(28) Fp would have been true at m2 were m2 to have become actual 
as follows: 
(29) (28) is true iff for every moment m such that m2 belongs to trl(m), 
Fp is true with respect to m2 (taken as moment of utterance) and m 
(taken as moment of assessment) 
In other words: in our relativist R-TRL framework, in order for a moment of 
utterance m to be actual (that is: to belong to the TRL), the moment of 
assessment mʹ must be such that m belongs to trl(mʹ). In the case of m2, 
however, there are three moments that satisfy these conditions and, therefore, 
three ‘scenarios’ in which m2 is actual (that is: belongs to the actual history). It 
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is thus natural to take (30) to be true if, and only if, in all these scenarios Fp is 
true. Clearly, the same goes with 
(30) Fp would have been false at m2 were m2 to have become actual 
Therefore, since only in some of those scenarios Fp is true with respect to 
<m2,m> (where m is the moment of assessment in question), we have that 
(K1)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been true 
and 
(K2)  If the circumstances represented by m had obtained, then ‘Fp’ 
would have been false 
are false and, therefore, (A3) is true. However, since in every such scenario 
‘Fp’ is either true or false, (A2) turns out to be true so that, also in this case, 
Factual True-Futurism is vindicated. 
4 Conclusion 
With the exposition of ATL and RTL we have concluded the quest for an 
adequate true-futurist logic began in chapter 5. In the process, we have 
acknowledged the philosophical significance of the problem of counterfactual 
evaluation, ruled out Counterfactual True-Futurism as an option for true-
futurist and understood that the notion of relative thin red line doesn’t per se 
commit to Counterfactual True-Futurism (as one might have initially thought). 
At the end of this journey, we can then see that at least ATL and RTL represent 
two adequate and plausible true-futurist theories overcoming the problem of 
counterfactual evaluation. 
At this point, however, two questions call for an answer: 
 
• What kind of general metaphysical lesson—if any—can be drawn 
from ATL and RTL? Do ATL and RTL  respectively point to some 
metaphysically interesting feature of time in an open future setting? 
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• ATL and RTL  appear both to comply with all the desiderata for an 
adequate true-futurist logic. How should we choose between ATL 
and RTL? What kind of metaphysical assumption about the open 
future might justify the choice of one theory over the other? 
 
Those questions shall be answered in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line 
 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have defended True-Futurism from some alleged 
logico-semantic problems apparently stemming from the very position of a 
(relative or absolute) thin red line in a branching framework. The upshot of my 
analysis is that there are at least two true-futurist theories capable of complying 
both with:  
 
(i) the unrestricted validity of the principle of bivalence;  
 
(ii) the validity of linguistic and meta-linguistic principles intuitively 
governing our temporal discourse, such as (PF); 
 
(PF) p→PFp 
                  if p, then it was the case that it would be the case that p 
 
and the Truth-Value Links;  
 
(iii) the falsity of what I have called counterfactuals of openness, that is 
counterfactuals of the form 
 
If m had obtained, then S would have been true(/false) 
 
  
187 
 
where m is a counterfactual moment and S is a future-contingent 
statement with respect to m. 
 
Those two theories—that I have labelled ‘ATL’ and ‘RTL’, respectively—
correspond to the distinction between the notions of an absolute and relative 
thin red line in the open future: whereas in one case (ATL) a single history is 
marked as actual in the tree of branching possibilities, in the other case (RTL) 
every moment m in the branching tree of time has its own actual future. 
What now remains to be discussed is the relation—if any—between the 
formal theories presented in the last chapter and the various metaphysical 
pictures purporting to model the open future.  
2  Some definitions 
Let us firstly introduce the following definitions: 
 
• A metaphysical theory for the open future is modal realist if the 
possible histories are thought of to be ontologically on a par: past, 
present and possible futures are all real and concrete in the same 
sense. 
 
• A metaphysical theory for the open future is dynamic if it posits the 
existence of a privileged present and together takes the identity of 
the present to shift ‘as time passes’ 
 
The main theories of time I will consider will be the following: presentism, the 
growing-block theory, the shrinking-tree theory, eternalism and the Lewisian 
branching-time theory. We can catalogue them in the light of the 
dynamic/static, modal-realist/non-modal-realist distinctions as follows: 
 
• Presentism and growing-block theory are both dynamic and non-
modal-realist: according to both there is a privileged (and 
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‘moving’) present; presentists think that only the present exists; 
GB-theorists think that the future doesn’t exist. 
 
• The shrinking-tree theory is both dynamic and modal-realist: ST-
theorists hold that past, present and all possible futures exist; 
however, they also uphold that the ‘passage of time’ consists in the 
progressive ‘falling-off’ or annihilation of all but one among the 
lowest branches in the branching-tree of historical possibilities 
 
• Eternalism is static and non-modal realist: for eternalists, ‘past’, 
‘present’ and only one ‘future’ exist, although no time is privileged 
as the present (and a fortiori, as the ‘moving’ present). 
 
• The Lewisian ‘Branching-Time’ Theory is both static and modal-
realist: for LBTT-theorists ‘past’, ‘present’ and all the possible 
‘futures’ exists, but no privileged present exists. 
3  Absolute TRL 
ATL is an absolute-TRL theory: only one history in the model is singled out as 
the history that will actually obtain. There appear to be two main ways to make 
intuitively sense of the privilege the absolute TRL has with respect to all the 
other histories. Let us review them in turn. 
The first and most immediate way to make intuitively sense of the 
privilege the absolute TRL has with respect to all the other histories is the 
eternalist one: the absolute TRL is privileged since it represents the only 
concretely existing history, where instead all the merely possible histories are 
only abstract representations of the way things might have turned out to be. 
This appears to be the strongest way in which a history might be singled out as 
the thin red line in an absolute thin red line framework. 
The second is the dynamicist one. Presentists, GB-theorists and shrinking-
tree theorists disagree about whether possible histories are to be understood  
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realistically or not (that is, whether, possible histories are concrete lewisian 
worlds or whether they are only ersatz construction—for instance, sets of 
propositions). However, they all agree on the fact that reality has as an 
objective and mind-independent dynamic character: 
 
• for presentists, temporal becoming is the process of going out and 
coming into existence of different sets of (present) entities; 
 
• for GB-theorists, the objective temporal passage consists in the 
progressive increasing of the world-block by means of new temporal 
slices; 
 
• for shrinking-tree theorists, the passage of time is the process in which 
more and more branches in the branching tree of historically 
possibilities fall off. 
 
In each case, there is a single history in the branching tree of historical 
possibilities such that it represents the history progressively ‘selected’ by the 
objective passage of time: 
 
• the history representing all and only the possible state of the world 
that will successively obtain, for the presentists 
 
• the history representing all and only the temporal slices that will 
come into existence, for GB-theorists 
 
• the concrete history that won’t lose any ‘segment’ in the process of 
annihilation of possible branches from the branching multiverse of 
possibilities, for shrinking-tree theorists 
 
In chapter 1 I have put forward an argument to the effect that the moving 
spotlight theory of time is incompatible with the open future. The moving 
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spotlight theory posits the existence of an objective property of presentness that 
‘moves’ from earlier to later (concrete) times. Presentism, GB-theory and 
shrinking-tree theory do not admit such a property within their theories. 
However, they all believe in an objective form of presentness that changes—
and, hence, in some sense ‘moves’—in time or, better, whose change is what 
temporal becoming consists in. For all of them, therefore, there is a point in the 
branching tree of possibilities that represents ‘the present’. Since for all of 
them, although ‘presentness’ is not a fundamental property of reality, the 
present was indeed different and will be different, we can call such a point the 
ersatz moving spotlight to distinguish it from the real moving spotlight 
featuring in the moving spotlight theory. The notion of an ersatz moving 
spotlight allows us to make better sense of the privilege that the absolute TRL 
enjoys within ATL: the absolute thin red line is nothing but the path taken by 
the ersatz moving spotlight in the branching tree of historical possibilities or, in 
other words, it is the history representing all and only the moments that either 
are, were or will be present. 
4  Relative TRL 
RTL is a relative TRL-theory, which means that according to it no history on 
the branching structure is absolutely privileged over the others. For this reason, 
this kind of theory appears to suit better LBTT-theorists unwilling to deny the 
validity of the principle of bivalence for future-contingent statements.  
 
4.1  Branching worlds and relative truth 
 
There appears to be a tension between the unrestricted validity of the principle 
of bivalence and LBTT: 
 
• on the one hand, in a branching setting  the idea that future-
contingent statements have a determinate truth-value calls for the 
notion of a thin red line, since the set of true future-contingent 
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statements at a given moment picks one of the possible future 
courses of the event as the one that ‘will obtain’;  
 
• on the other, however, the idea of an absolute TRL appears to be at 
odds with the ‘ontological even-handedness’ of a LBTT-setting: If 
all the histories are ontologically on a par and no ‘temporal flow’ 
selects a unique history on the branching tree, how can a unique 
history be singled out as the actual history? And furthermore: what 
kind of property is that of being actual in a framework in which all 
histories  exist simpliciter? 
 
The idea of a relative TRL seems to provide a possibly feasible solution to 
the factual true-futurist and LBTT-theorist. True—she can say: no history is 
ontologically privileged; but the existence of a privileged history is not 
necessary to guarantee the truth of Factual True-Futurism. What is sufficient—
she might continue—is only that every moment bear a particular relation (the 
‘R-TRL-relation’) to a single history ‘passing through’ that moment, making it 
the ‘true-history’ of the moment in question. The FTF&LBTT-theorist can thus 
maintain both the principle of bivalence and that—at the bottom—no history is 
in any sense absolutely privileged over the others. The only privilege in this 
framework is contextual: given a certain moment m, a certain history h is 
singled out among the set H(m) of the histories ‘passing through’ m. However, 
this doesn’t amount to a hierarchy in existence or reality among those histories, 
but only to the fact that a specific relation obtains between a certain history h 
belonging to H(m) and the moment in question. 
 
4.2  The grounding problem 
 
Being a true-futurist, the FTF&LBTT-theorist is committed to claiming that the 
fact that a certain history h is the relative thin red line of a certain moment m is 
not something that is grounded in what entities exist at m or in the particular 
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pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and relations obtaining at m:1 
h’s being the thin red line of m is, in other words, a brute fact with respect to 
m. To this respect, the FTF&LBTT  and the other metaphysical pictures of time 
appears to be in the same boat for what concerns the grounding status relative 
to m of true future-contingent statements.  
However, a striking difference with the other theories of time appears to 
emerge once we consider the absolute grounding status of true future-
contingent statements in a FTF&LBT framework. Consider, for instance, Non 
Modal-Realist Eternalism: for the eternalist it is true that nothing, at a moment 
m, grounds the truth of, say, ‘event e will obtain tomorrow’. However, there is 
something—beyond the population of entities and the properties and relation 
instantiated at m—that grounds such a truth: the fact that one day later than m e 
exists at mʹ (which is the moment lying one day later than m on the actual 
world). ‘event e will obtain tomorrow’ is thus grounded, although not locally 
grounded (there is, in other words, something grounding the truth-value of 
‘event e will obtain tomorrow’ as uttered at m, although it is not temporally 
located at m). 
The case of dynamic theories of time is somewhat trickier. Consider, for 
instance, presentism and the growing-block theory. Those theories belong to 
the group of no-futurist theories, that is the theories according to which the 
future doesn’t exist. For a no-futurist there can be—by definition—nothing in 
the domain of our most unrestricted quantifier grounding the truth of a future-
contingent statement. It seems thus that no-futurist must be committed not only 
to the thesis of local ungroundedness of future-contingent statement, but also to 
the less appealing thesis of their being simpliciter ungrounded: how can, in 
fact, future-contingent statements be in any way grounded if they cannot be 
grounded by the present or by the past (on pain of the future’s being settled) 
and the future does not exist?  
However, although the issue is surely one that no-futurists cannot refuse to 
address and, perhaps, such to force them to bite the bullet and take true future-
contingent statements to be absolutely ungrounded truths, no-futurists appear to 
                                                 
1
 See chapter 1. 
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have at least something to cling to in order to at least try and dodge the 
grounding objection. As a matter of fact, no-futurist are ‘dynamicists’, that is 
they uphold—along with other kinds of theorists of time—that reality has a 
fundamental and mind-independent dynamic character, that is the one we 
usually refer to as ‘temporal becoming’. The fact that a certain future-
contingent statement S is true should thus ‘depend’ for dynamicists on the fact 
that things will indeed unfold, as time will—literally!—go by, as S predicts. 
Surely, the objective temporal flow is not a ‘thing’. Temporal becoming does 
not appear, in other words, to be something we can quantify over in order to 
meet the grounding objection. However, the dynamicist might continue, it is 
nevertheless real. Even if it is true to say that there is no x such that x is 
identical with the temporal becoming, it is true to say that reality has dynamic 
character, time literally flows and things constantly unfold in a certain way.  
Surely, whether dynamicists can develop this kind of insight—which 
seems to draw a wedge between existence (intended as membership in the 
domain of our most unrestricted quantifier) and reality2—into a fully 
intelligible, stable and consistent rebuttal of the grounding objection is surely 
moot. However, they  at least appear to have a story they can try and tell about 
the connection between future-contingent statements and reality; a story that 
does appear to have an at least prima facie intuitive appeal: future-contingent 
statements are indeed—in a certain relevant sense—ungrounded, but they still 
reflect and mirror a certain objective feature of reality, that is the fact that 
things will indeed unfold in the way they predict in the objective and mind 
independent ‘flow’ of time.3 
FTF&LBTT-theorists find themselves in a peculiar predicament with 
respect to the grounding objection. Not only they cannot appeal to any 
ontological privilege of the thin red line over other histories (as eternalists do): 
they also cannot invoke the notion of an objective temporal becoming that 
objectively ‘selects’ one history among all those that are historically possible at 
                                                 
2
 On this point see, for instance, Caplan and Sanson (2010). 
3
 Although I focus here on no-futurism, this argument clearly extends to any kind of dynamic theory of 
time.  
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a given moment m (as dynamicist might try to do). It seems thus that the only 
possible option for FTF&LBTT theorist is that of biting the bullet and claiming 
that future-contingent statements are absolutely ungrounded, in the sense that 
there is no feature of reality whatsoever that is mirrored by their truth-value. 
This seems to be, for instance,  the route taken by Patrick Greenough (ms.), 
who in fact considers true(/false) future-contingent statements to be 
indeterminately true(/false), where (roughly) a true(/false) statement is  
indeterminately true(/false) if, and only if, it is true(/false) but absolutely 
ungrounded. I think, however, that there might be another way for FTF&LBT-
theorists to face the grounding objection without committing them to the 
existence of absolutely ungrounded truths: it is the idea of an oriented 
multiverse.  
 
4.2  A possible solution to the grounding problem: the oriented multiverse 
 
In order to understand what it is for the multiverse to be oriented a spatial 
metaphor might be useful. Let us take, for simplicity’s sake, time to be 
discrete. For all moments m there is thus a moment mʹ such that mʹ is earlier 
than m and no moment mʹʹ is both earlier than m and later than mʹʹ. By 
picturing the multiverse as a two-dimensional plane, we can imagine moments 
to be connected one to another by a rectilinear segment. Consider then the 
following toy branching multiverse. Moment m1 is the closest  moment to 
moment m2 in the past. There are three possible histories branching off m2, 
leading to moments m3, m4 and m5 respectively. However, only the segment 
going from m2 to m4 lies on the same straight line on which the segment going 
from m1 to m2 lies. To say that the multiverse is oriented is then to say that 
every moment m in the multiverse is like m2, that is: every moment m is such 
that there is a unique possible future (=segment of history) such that it lays on 
the same ‘straight line’ on which the segment going from m to the first moment 
in its past lays. Such an history is the relative thin red line of m. 
Another way to present the idea of an oriented multiverse might be the 
following: Within an eternalist setting, the world-block is thought of as a 4-
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dimensional worm, where the first three dimensions are spatial and the fourth 
is time. In a branching setting, we can think of the branching multiverse as a(n 
at least) 5-dimensional tree composed of a plurality of 4-dimensional worms. 
We might call the fifth dimension ‘possibility’. Every moment in the 
multiverse can thus be individuated by a pair of coordinates <x,y>, where x is 
the time-coordinate and y is the possibility-coordinate. To say that the 
multiverse is oriented is therefore just to say that there is a three-place 
topological relation R, such that for every moment m (having coordinates 
<x(m),y(m)>, there is a unique moment mʹ, such that mʹ is later than m and the 
relative thin red line relation R holds between <x(m),y(m)>, <x(mʹ),y(mʹ)>  and 
<x(mʹʹ),y(mʹʹ)>, where mʹʹ is the first moment in the past of m.  
In an oriented branching multiverse, in other words, although many 
concrete possible futures branch off every moment m, with no future being 
privileged over the others, only one future bears a certain topological relation 
with m and its most recent past. The following analogy might help: imagine 
coming by car to an intersection X from city A. At X you can take different 
roads, leading to cities B, C, and D. However, coming from city A you have the 
road going to city C right in front of you, so that you do not need turn either 
left or right, in order to take the road that leads you to city C. In an oriented 
multiverse moments are like intersection X. They have many possible futures, 
all ontologically on a par, but they all have a unique future ‘in front of them’, 
which is their relative thin red line (their relative ‘actual’ future). 
The FTF&LBTT-theorist can thus fully satisfy the grounding requirement 
for future-contingent statements by invoking the idea of oriented multiverse. It 
is the particular orientation of the multiverse that grounds the truth of a future-
contingent statement S at a certain moment m. The fact that the possible future 
f is the relative actual future of m depends on a certain objective feature of the 
multiverse, that is its being oriented in a way that makes m facing f, despite its 
being but one of the many possible and equally existing futures of m. This 
feature, however, does not depend either on the population of entities existing 
at m or on the properties and relations that are instantiated at m, so that the 
specific ontological configuration of m is in itself insufficient to single out f as 
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its true future and, consequently, to jeopardize the idea of objective 
unsettledness of its future. 
5  Linear time—branching possibilities 
In this essay I have been assuming that the idea that the future is objectively 
open is to be modelled by means of branching structures, as it is indeed 
customary. However, in the literature on the open future this interaction 
between temporality and branching models often short-circuits engendering the 
unfortunate phrase ‘branching time’, which is sometimes even thought of as an 
equivalent label to ‘open future’. As it should be clear from what has been said 
so far, however, the idea of a branching time is not only not entailed by the idea 
that the future is open but it appears to be indeed incompatible with it. 
For a true-futurist the principle of bivalence is valid even if the future is 
open, But to say that the principle of bivalence is valid is to say that there is a 
unique future that will indeed obtain (if contingently) and, hence, a unique 
temporal line representing the actual history and the state of the world that 
obtain at each time. In other words, the principle of bivalence for future-
contingent statements clearly entails that time is not branching, but linear, since 
what branches is only what we are calling historical possibility.  
It is, however, the very idea that the future is open   that appears to actually 
presuppose the linearity of time. To say that the future is open appears in fact 
to be equivalent to saying that the only way  the future will turn out to be is 
presently unsettled and/or under-determined. The idea that the future itself 
branches appears, instead,  to be equivalent to saying that while there is only a 
unique ‘today’ (at least from the point of view of today)4 there will be many 
‘tomorrows’, since time itself is branching from the present moment onwards. 
If, however, there are many tomorrows, then I do not see in which sense we 
can genuinely say that the future is ‘unsettled’. To the contrary, it seems to me 
that in this case we should instead say that the future is settled, since it is 
                                                 
4
 If time itself branches, then, from the point of view of yesterday, there are many days lying one day in 
the future and so, in a certain sense, ‘this’ today is but one of many ‘todays’.  
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indeed now settled not only that there will be many tomorrows one day from 
now but also what will happen at each tomorrow. Within a branching time 
setting the future could be open, only if it were now unsettled which plurality 
of tomorrows will obtain  one day from now among the set of now-possible 
pluralities of tomorrows. It seems, in other words, if the future itself is 
branching, either it is presently unsettled how it will actually branch, or it is 
simply not genuinely open. 
This train of thoughts should be valid even for gappists. To say that future-
contingent statements are neither true nor false seems, in fact, to be simply 
equivalent to saying that the future—the unique set of linearly ordered 
‘temporal stages’ that will actually follow the present one—is presently empty 
or, in the best case, indeterminate. It is, in fact, this kind of emptiness or 
indeterminacy of the future what seems to lead gappists to conclude that, 
therefore, if a future-directed statement is now historically contingent, it now is 
gappy, since there is either nothing to make it true(false) or nothing that is 
sufficient to determine its truth-value. 
These lines of reasoning might be made more vivid by means of the 
following trilemma: 
Consider the statement 
(F) The future is such that p 
made in a branching-time universe, where some futures are such that p and 
others are such that ~p. I see three main possible options to understand (F): 
 
• as a complete definite description 
 (F1) There is a unique future f, and f is such that p 
 
• as a simple existential statement 
 (F2) There is a future f, and f is such that p 
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• as an incomplete definite description 
 (F3)  The future f is such that p 
However:  
 
(i) if (F) is understood as a complete definite description it should turn 
out to be false, since there is no unique future in a branching time 
setting; 
 
(ii) if (F) is thought of as a simple existential statement, then it is true, 
but in that case it is also true to say that  
 (G) The future is such that ~p 
 
(iii) if, finally, (F) is taken to be an incomplete definite description (as 
‘the book is on the table’ in a context in which there is in fact 
plenty of books), then one might indeed apply supervaluationist 
techniques and say that since (F) is not true(false) in every 
precisification, it is neither true nor false. In this case however, it 
seems apparent that it is not the future that is unsettled, but instead 
‘the future’ that is incomplete. If I utter ‘the F is G’ and not only 
there are many Fs, but some are G and some not, you might well 
decide to treat my utterance as neither true nor false, but that would 
hardly legitimise you to infer the existence of some form of 
objective ‘openness’ in reality for what concerns F-ness. 
 
Clearly, the first two options (according to which either every future-
contingent statement of the form of (F) turns out to be false or (F) and (G) turn 
out to be both true) are to rejected straight away. The only remaining option is 
the third one, according to which, although there might indeed be a class of 
future-directed statements that are neither true nor false, the future is not 
objectively unsettled.  
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I conclude, therefore, that the trilemma just presented, together with the 
considerations put forward above, suggest that the very idea of an open future 
requires time to be linear. 
6  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to make metaphysical sense of the two factual true-
futurist theorist exposed in chapter 6. I have shown that the choice between 
ATL and RTL depends on which metaphysical picture of time is assumed as 
the correct one. In addition, I have sketched a way for static and modal realist 
theorists to overcome the threat posed by the grounding objection and, finally, I 
have stressed once again that one of the important lessons to be learned from 
my discussion of the open future is that the openness of the future does not 
entail, and indeed appears to be incompatible with, the idea of a branching 
time. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I have defended the thesis according to which the principle of 
bivalence is valid for future-directed statements, even if the future is open in 
some robust, objective and mind-independent way; a thesis that, following the 
recent literature, I have called ‘True-Futurism’. The core of my discussion has 
consisted in two main steps: 
 
(i) First, I have advanced a positive argument to the effect that future-
contingent statements are either true or false (chapter 2). The 
argument relies on what I have called the ‘principle of retrospective 
determinacy’ according to which, if (for instance) today is a sunny 
day, it is correct to say that it was true yesterday that today would 
be a sunny day. Briefly stated, my argument was the following: 
future-contingent statements are either necessarily truth-valued 
(either true or false) or necessarily gappy (neither true nor false); if 
yesterday it was true that it would be sunny today and the future 
was open as to whether it would be sunny today, it follows that 
there was a situation in which a future-contingent statement (‘It 
will be sunny tomorrow’) is truth-valued; hence, it is false that 
future-contingent statements are necessarily gappy and, therefore, 
they are necessarily truth-valued 
 
(ii) Second, I have put forward two different true-futurist theories to 
make logico-semantic sense of the idea that future-contingent 
statements are necessarily truth-valued. Those theories (which I 
have dubbed ‘ATL’ and ‘RTL’) rely on the notions of an absolute 
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and relative thin red line, respectively. The central idea common to 
both theories is that, in order to comply with all the intuitive 
desiderata of a true-futurist theory, one has to rely on a linear set 
of temporal points, in order to evaluate the truth-value of sentences. 
If the actual history is thought of to be absolute (as it is the case of 
an absolute thin red line framework), then sentence-truth is to be 
thought of as relative to times (understood as ‘horizontally’ 
dividing the branching tree of historical possibilities). If,  instead, 
the actual history is thought of to be relative to moments (as it is 
the case in a relative thin red line framework), then sentence-truth 
has to be relativized to moments, but only from the perspective of 
other moments, whose function is, indeed, that of determining the 
relevant ‘local’ actual history. In the final chapter, I have then 
argued that the choice between ATL and RTL depends on which 
kind of metaphysics of time is thought of as to be the correct one. 
More specifically, I have argued that RTL should be chosen for 
static and modal-realist theories of time and that ATL fits dynamic  
and non modal-realist theories better. 
 
Furthermore, I have also argued that true-futurists are  committed to the 
following thesis: 
 
• Definite-Futurism: future-contingent statements are either 
definitely true or definitely false (chapter 3) 
 
• Factual True-Futurism: there are no true ‘counterfactual of 
openness’, that is counterfactuals of the form ‘If the merely 
counterfactual moment m had obtained, then the future-contingent 
statement S (with respect to m) would have been true(/false)’ 
(chapter 5) 
 
In addition, along the path that has lead me to conclude that True-Futurism is 
the true theory of the open future, I have also argued for the following claims: 
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(a) The kind of relativism about truth recently advocated by 
MacFarlane is unnecessary within a gappist theory for the open 
future (chapter 1) 
 
(b) There are plausible reasons to suppose that, at least in a branching 
setting, ‘actually’ is a ‘nonindexical’ operator (chapter 1, §7) 
 
(c) The so-called ‘moving-spotlight’ theory of time is incompatible 
with the future’s being open (Introduction, §2.6.2) 
 
(d) Contrary to what has been recently suggested in the literature, 
determinism is incompatible with the open future (Introduction, 
§2.4) 
 
(e) There are reasons to suppose that, at least given certain 
metaphysical assumptions, future-contingent statements are 
ungrounded (Introduction, §2.6.1) or, at least, indeterminately 
grounded (Introduction, §2.6.2; chapter 3, §3) 
 
(f) Those theorists of time who embrace a lewisian branching-worlds 
picture of time might overcome the grounding problem by 
appealing to the idea of an ‘oriented multiverse’ (chapter 7, §4.2) 
 
(g) It is the very idea of an open future that requires time to be linear 
(chapter 2, §11; chapter 7, §5) 
 
In this essay I have not defended True-Futurism from arguments aiming at 
establishing that the principle of bivalence is incompatible with the open 
future. However, the main aim of this essay was to produce a positive argument 
for True-Futurism and, then, to show how the true-futurist intuition could be 
formally accommodated within a well-defined logico-semantic framework. 
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That said, it must be stressed that the main result of this essay is, in fact, 
conditional: 
 
If the future is open, then future-contingent statements are truth-valued 
 
This means that, if it were possible to prove that 
If a statement is truth-valued, then it is not historically contingent 
it would then follow that the future is not open, but settled. However, the 
question about whether the future is indeed open, in the way I have supposed it 
to be, goes beyond the scope of this essay and must, therefore, be left for a  
(possibly possible) future occasion. 
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